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Summary 
This study analyses the theological thought of Qoheleth. In the 
Introduction, a survey of Qoheleth studies in the last hundred 
years has shown that the literary structure of the book of Qoheleth 
is still crucial to the understanding of the theological thought of 
Qoheleth. Thus, Chapter One of this thesis Is devoted to discussing 
various approaches, i. e. traditional critical, form critical, and 
modern literary approaches, which have been employed in the study 
of the structure of the book. 
Chapter Two analyses the structure of Qoheleth's theological 
thought, arguing that '7]T (the absurd) and fflri (joy) are the two 
concepts which make sense of Qoheleth's thought and also form the 
fundamental structure of his thought. Together with various second- 
ary themes such as portion, profit, wisdom, wealth, death, remem- 
brance and God, they form the total structure of Qoehleth's 
thought. This is followed by a reading of Qoheleth in Chapter 
Three, analysing the argument of the book as it develops. 
Chapter Four examines the position of Qoheleth's theological 
thought within Israel's theology. The relationships between Wisdom 
and Yahwism, and Wisdom and Creation are analysed, arguing that the 
idea that Wisdom theology is essentially Creation theology is not 
compatible with Qoheleth's thought. The theology of Qoheleth is to 
be determined by the book itself, and proves to reflect neither 
conservative Yahwism nor radical anti-Yahwism. The uniqueness of 
Qoheleth's thought leads to the identification of Qoheleth as a 
'liminal intellectual' who may be going through a period of tran- 
sition, in the process of adopting a new set of beliefs, social 
norms or status. Thus. Qoheleth's theological thought may be seen 
as a 'liminal' theology, with 'liminality' as its social setting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. A CENTURY OF QOHELETH STUDIES 
Since the Reformation, the book of Qoheleth, more commonly known 
as the book of Ecclesiastes, has been one of the most disputed 
books of the Old Testament, perhaps due to its apparently unortho- 
dox and often self-contradictory contents. Although it has been 
stigmatized as the 'black sheep' of the Old Testament wisdom 
family, interest in Qoheleth has grown, especially in the last 
century and more so during the last twenty years. The brief survey 
of works on Qoheleth from the 1850s to the 1970s which follows will 
help to set the backdrop for the current study and also provide a 
proper perspective on the shifts of interest in Qoheleth studies 
over the last hundred years. 
1. From the 1850s to 1910 
In 1857, an anonymous article in The Princeton Review entitled 
"The Scope and Plan of the Book of Ecclesiastes", argued that 
... The deficiency of arrangement [in Ecclesiastes] which has 
been alleged, does not exist; and the alterations which have 
been proposed are not improvements. There is a clear and 
consistent plan in the book of Ecclesiastes, which needs no 
changes nor mutilations in order to its discovery; one in fact 
of the most strictly logical and methodical kind. 
2 Together with Genung and Cornlll, this represents the conservative 
1The Princeton Review 29 (1857): 419-40 (427). 
2J. F. Genung, Words of Koheleth (1904) and C. H. Cornill, 
Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament (1907); 
cf. Robert Gordis, Koheleth - The Man and His World (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1965), p. 379, n. 14. 
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position on the compositional structure of Qoheleth which has 
lasted up to the present time. 3 
In Germany, however, it seems that both 'conservatives' and 
'liberals' would agree that no compositional unity existed in 
Qoheleth. A popular quotation from the conservative scholar Franz 
Delitzsch will serve as a classic example: "All attempts to show, 
on the whole, not only a oneness of spirit, but also a genetic 
progress, an all-embracing plan, and an organic connection, have 
hitherto failed, and must fail. "4 This sceptical attitude can be 
attributed to the many apparently self-contradictory and irrecon- 
cilable paradoxical sayings of Qoheleth which sometimes have been 
thought to be contrary to or hostile to Judeo-Christian orthodoxy. 
The inconsistency of the loosely connected sayings and the unsyste- 
matic organization of the entire book lead one of the most promi- 
nent critical scholars of those days, C. Siegfried, to argue for 
multiple authorship of the book. s Another radical scholar, G. 
Bickell, had suggested that Qoheleth was written in codex form with 
about 525 letters on each leaf and had become disorganized during 
3Conservatives like Walter C. Kaiser, Ecclesiastes: Total Life 
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1979); G. L. Archer, A Survey of Old Testa- 
ment Introduction (Chicago: Moody Press, 1964). 
4Franz Delitzsch, Commentary on the Song of Songs and Ecclesias- 
tes, trans. by M. G. Easton (Edinburgh, 1891), p. 181. Also E. W. 
Hengstenberg the great conservative scholar argued in his 
Commentary on Ecclesiastes, trans. by D. W. Simon (Philadelphia: 
Smith, English and Co., 1860), p. 15, that "A connected and orderly 
argument, an elaborate arrangement of the parts, is as little to be 
looked for here as in the special portion of the book of Proverbs 
which begins with Chapter X., or as in the alphabetic Psalms. " 
5Carl Siegfried, Prediger Salomonis und Hoheslied (Göttingen, 
1898). He argued that the book was first written by a Jew with a 
Greek philosophy and then commented on by a Sadducean Epicurean 
(who added the idea that one should enjoy life while it lasts), a 
Hokma-teacher ('wise man' who was responsible for the wisdom pas- 
sages which argue for the advantage of wisdom) and a Hasid (perhaps 
a 'pietist' who brought the consciousness of divine judgment into 
the scene). Later, a glossator, redactors and epilogists added more 
comments to the original message. 
9 
transmission. 6 A similar treatment of the book was given by V. 
Zapletal and P. Haupt who argued that the book had been written in 
metrical form and regarded only about one half of the book as 
genuine. Thus, Haupt was compelled to rewrite Qoheleth in order to 
support his metrical theory. 7 
In Great Britain, A. H. McNeile and G. A. Barton though not as 
radical as Siegfried, both adopted a modified version of his 
analysis, assuming the influence of the Hokma and Hasid editors on 
the original material. a Along the same line of thought the French 
scholar E. Podechard suggested that there were two epilogists, one 
a disciple of Qoheleth who was responsible for the epilogue 
(12: 9-14) and the third person material, the other a Hasid, 
plus a Hokma glossator and two other interpolators, to whom a total 
of 85 verses were assigned. 9 
Thus, the general critical opinion up to the first decade of the 
twentieth century was that the original Qoheleth was heterodox and 
disunified in its composition, and that later orthodox glosses had 
been imposed upon it to give it Its present form. It is surprising 
to see, as pointed out by Robert Gordis, that "none of these 
scholars seeks to explain why the book was deemed worthy of this 
8G. Bickell, Der Prediger über den Wert des Daseins (1884), pp. 
4-5; cf. G. A. Barton, A Critical Commentary on the Book of Eccle- 
siastes (ICC; Edinburgh, 3rd edn, 1908), pp. 25f. 
7V. Zapletal, Die Metrik des Buches Kohelet (1904); P. Haupt, 
Koheleth (1905) and The Book of Ecclesiastes (1905). 
8G. A. Barton, loc. cit.; A. H. McNeile, An Introduction to 
Ecclesiastes (Cambridge, 1904), pp. 44ff., argued that the book had 
undergone three major stages of redaction: the first redactor 
diluted the pessimistic message, then a second redactor improved 
its religious orthodoxy and the final stage was the touching up by 
the 'epilogist' and 'prologist'. 
9E. Podechard, L' Eccleslaste (Paris, 1912), pp. 142ff. 
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effort to legitimatize it, when it could so easily have been 
suppressed. " 
20 
Another related, but less disputed problem among the critical 
scholars of this period, is the question of Solomonic authorship. 
Though Jewish scholars, at least up to the eighteenth century, 
accepted the Solomonic authorship of the book, the first Christian 
to doubt this was the great reformer Martin Luther who ascribed the 
date of the book to the Maccabean period. 
11 This seems to have had 
its effect on the late nineteenth century conservatives like F. 
Delitzsch and E. W. Hengstenberg, both of whom rejected the Solomo- 
nic authorship of the book. Today, only a handful of conservatives, 
such as G. L. Archer and W. Kaiser, still hold to the Solomonic 
authorship of the book of Qoheleth. 
2. From the 1920s to the 1950s 
Scholars of this period seem to have picked up an old, but 
neglected, issue concerning foreign influence on Qoheleth and 
started a series of heated scholarly debates. The debates occurred 
in two stages; first over the issue of Hellenistic influence, 
second over the question of ancient Near Eastern influence. 
First, the debate over Greek influence centred on two areas: 
language and philosophical thought. 
12 Although Barton seems to have 
10Robert Gordis, Koheleth - The Man and His World, p. 71. 
11C D. Ginsburg, The Song of Songs and Coheleth (New York: KTAV, 
1970), p. 113, presented Martin Luther's view as "Solomon himself 
did not write the book of Ecclesiastes, but it was produced by 
Sirach at the time of the Maccabees.... It is a sort of a Talmud, 
compiled from many books, probably from the library of King Ptolemy 
Euergetes of Egypt" (quoted and translated by Ginsburg from Martin 
Luther's Table Talk, pp. 400-401 of the Förstermann and Birdsell's 
edition). 
12Cf. H. Ranston, Ecclesiastes and the Early Greek Wisdom Litera- 
ture (London: The Epworth Press, 1925). 
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argued convincingly against Greek influence in both areas in his 
1908 commentary, there are others who have seen Qoheleth as a scep- 
tic, a pessimist, an agnostic, an epicurean or a fatalist. 13 Murphy 
rightly observes that, although this debate has gone on to the 
present day, "no firm conclusion can be drawn. " 
14 Defending the 
Hebrew originality of Qoheleth, Robert Gordis argues that although 
Qoheleth is aware of the Greek culture of his day, "What is most 
striking, however, is not his familiarity with some popular ideas 
drawn from Greek philosophy, but his comi&-tek &V4t t and Lnde- 
pendent u4e of these idea to exp'Lena hLa on unique w -dd olem. "18 
Second, perhaps due to the discovery of certain ancient Near 
Eastern texts, scholars have shifted their attention to argue for a 
foreign origin of Qoheleth. As remarked by James Muilenburg in 
1954, "Commentators have had little difficulty in citing parallels 
from the literary works of the people of the ancient Near East. " 
16 
Such remarks are indeed evident in a series of articles by the late 
Father Mitchell Dahood who argued strongly for a "Canaanite- 
Phoenician" influence on Qoheleth. 17 Others who argue for an Aramaic 
13G. A. Barton, op. cit., pp. 34ff., "everything in Qoheleth can 
be accounted for as a development of Semitic thought, and [that] 
the expressions which have been seized upon to prove that its 
writer came under the influence of Greek schools of philosophy only 
prove at most that Qoheleth was a Jew who had in him the making of 
a Greek philosopher. "; cf. R. Pfeiffer, "The Peculiar Skepticism of 
Ecclesiastes, " JBL 53 (1934): 100-09; Charles Forman, "The Pessimism 
of Ecclesiastes, " JSS 3 (1958): 136-43; more recently, Charles F. 
Whitley, Koheleth: His Language and Thought (BZAW 148; 1979), pp. 
151ff.; R. B. Y. Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes (AB; 2nd edn; New 
York: Doublday, 1982), p. 192, sees Qoheleth as "a rationalist, an 
agnostic, a skeptic, a pessimist and a fatalist. " 
14R. E. Murphy, "Introduction to Wisdom Literature, " in Wisdom 
Literature: Job, Proverbs, Ruth, Canticles, Ecclesiastes, and 
Esther, (FOIL, 13; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), p. 12. 
IsRobert Gordis, op. cit., p. 56 (italics his). 
1sJames Muilenburg, "A Qoheleth Scroll from Qumran, " BASOR 135 
(1954): 20-28. 
17Mitchell Dahood, Bib 33 (1952): 30-52,191-221; idem, "Qoheleth 
12 
origin are F. C. Burkitt, is H. L. Ginsberg, ia and Frank Zimmerman. 
20 
This triggered a debate with Robert Gordis who defended the Hebrew 
orgin of Qoheleth. 
21 G. L. Archer, on the other hand, argues that 
Phoenician Influence in Qoheleth is a valid proof of the Solomonic 
authorship because Solomon had taken Phoenician wives. 
22 As the 
debate on the linguistic element of Qoheleth slowly faded into the 
background with views mostly conjectural in nature, scholars in the 
1960s entered another phase of Qoheleth studies, as tools for 
interpretation were being introduced and recognized. 
3. From the 1960s to the 1970s 
A sudden awakening from the past neglect of biblical wisdom 
literature has brought a new wave of scholarly interest in it in 
the 1970s. Consequently, Interest in Qoheleth has brought much 
advancement in understanding particularly the structure of the 
and Recent Discoveries, " Bib 39 (1958): 302-18; idem, "Qoheleth and 
Northwest Semitic Philology, " Bib 43 (1962): 349-65; idem, "The 
Phoenician Background of Qoheleth, " Bib 47 (1966): 264-82; idem, 
"Three Parallel Pairs in Ecclesiastes 10: 8: 'A Reply to Professor 
Gordis', " JQR 62 (1971-2): 84-87. He argued that Qoheleth was 
composed by a Hebrew author who employed Phoenician orthography and 
that its composition shows heavy Canaanite-Phoenician literary 
influence. 
18F. C. Burkitt, "Is Ecclesiastes a Translation?, " JTS 23 (1932): 
22-28; he asserted that, "What we have is not an original but a 
translation.... The Aramaic Influence in Ecclesiastes is of course 
evident" (22-23). 
19H. L. Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth (Jewish Theological Seminary 
of America, 1950), p. 16. 
20Frank Zimmerman, "The Aramaic Provenance of Qohelet, " JQR 36 
(1945-46): 17-45; idem, "The Question of Hebrew, " JQR 40 (1949): 
79-102. 
21Robert Gordis, "The Original Language of Qohelet, " JQR 37 
(1946): 67-84; idem, "The Translation-Theory of Qohelet Re-examined, " 
JQR 40 (1949): 103-16; idem, "Koheleth - Hebrew or Aramaic?, " JBL 71 
(1952): 93-109; idem, "Was Qoheleth a Phoenician?, " JBL 74 (1955): 
103-14; idem, Koheleth: The Man and His World, pp. 51-58,413,416. 
22G. L. Archer, "The Linguistic Evidence for the Date of 'Eccle- 
siastes', " JETS 12 (1969): 167-81. 
13 
book. Scholars of this period no longer show much interest in the 
problem of authorship and foreign philosophies or linguistic 
influence, but rather in what way the book may be said to be a 
unity. This may be attributed to the rise of New Criticism as a 
style of literary study, with which is associated James Muilenburg's 
'rhetorical criticism'. Scholars apparently think that it is unsat- 
isfactory to explain the disorganization and self-inconsistency of 
Qoheleth with a theory of multiple authors or a hypothesis of a 
foreign origin. 23 Thus the study of the structure of Qoheleth again 
became the primary concern among scholars of this period. But 
unlike the 1920s, modern scholars have generally regarded the book 
as essentially a unity and have argued or assumed that only on that 
premise can the thought of Qoheleth be understood. 24 Unfortunately, 
there is no consensus as to the extent of unity within the book. 
There are basically three views concerning the unity of 
Qoheleth: 1) the 'minimum' view; 2) the 'maximum' view; and 3) the 
'medium' view. 
1) The `minimum' view. Advocates of this view argue that there 
is no logical development or interrelation between the pericopes of 
the book, and each pericope may consist of loose sayings collected 
into independent aphoristic units, perhaps by a single author. 
23 As remarked by B. S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament 
as Scripture (Fortress, 1979), p. 582, "Increasingly, modern 
scholars have returned to the position of seeing the book as 
basically a unified composition of one author. The early theories 
of multiple authorship or extensive interpolation have not been 
sustained. However, some editorial work is generally recognized in 
the prologue and the epilogue. " 
24A. G. Wright has suggested that the literary structure of 
Qoheleth is the key to unlock the message of the book: "The Riddle 
of the Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth, " CBQ 30 
(1968): 313-34 (313). 
14 
Scholars representing this view are F. Ellermeler, 
25 Kurt Galling, 25 
Aarre Lauha, 27 G. Fohrer and 0. Eissfeldt. 
28 The pericopes are demar- 
cated by employing a form-critical method and drawing parallels 
from biblical (Proverbs, Job) and extra-biblical (Ben Sira) 
materials. 
2) The 'maximum' view. In opposition to Ellermeler and Galling, 
H. W. Hertzberg, 29 sees Qoh. 1: 2-12: 8 as a literary unit in terms of 
language, structure and style, and argues that there is a compo- 
sitional relationship between pericopes, while A. G. Wright30 exhi- 
biting the concerns of the New Criticism argues that there is a 
logical progression within the internal structure and that a 
sequence of thought can be detected. There are also others who 
argue along this line of thought though with different variations. 
31 
25F. Ellermeier, Qohelet - Untersuchungen zum Buche Qohelet I 
(1967), p. 122. 
26K. Galling, "Der Prediger, " in Die Fünf Megillot (HAT, 1969), 
who sees a unity existing in the sense that one author has put the 
strings of independent poems together from 1: 12-12: 7 (1: 1-11 and 
12: 8-14 are later addition). In his article, "Kohelet-Studien, " ZAW 
50 (1932): 281, he writes that "Ihre Einheit - nicht Einheitlichkeit 
- muss in der Einheit des Menschen Kohelet, Ihre Widersprüche, 
Spannungen und Gebrochenheiten müssen in eben diesem Widerspruch, 
der Spannung und Gebrochenheit der Menschen Kohelet geschaut 
werden. Es gilt, die Kräfte des dynamischen Schaffensprozesses 
abzutasten, um ohne Nivellierung, Addition und Subtraktion die 
ganze Fülle der Lebensschau und Lebenshaltung In diesem Menschen 
und in seinem Werk zu erkennen. " 
27Aarre Lauha seems to agree with him in, "Die Krise des reli- 
giösen Glaubens bei Kohelet, "VTSup3 (1955): 183-191 (183,189). 
23Following K. Galling's view are G. Fohrer, Introduction to the 
Old Testament (10th edn; Abingdon, 1968), p. 337; and 0. Eissfeldt, 
The Old Testament. An Introduction (ET; Oxford and New York, 1965), 
pp. 499f. 
2'9H. W. Hertzberg, Der Prediger (KAT, 1963), p. 14; also early 
1900s scholars such as A. Bea and M. Thilo. 
30Wright, op. cit.; idem, "The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited: 
Numerical Patterns in the Book of Ecclesiastes, " CBQ 42 
(1980): 38-51; idem, "Additional Numerical Patterns in Qoheleth, " 
CBQ 45 (1983): 32-43; The NAB seems to follow Wright's outline. 
31H. L. Ginsberg, "Structure and Contents of Kohelet, "VT$up 3 
(1955): 138-49; G. R. Castellino, "Qohelet and his Wisdom, " CBQ 30 
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3) The `medium' view. This view represents those who see certain 
degree of unity existed in the book as exhibited through the 
recurring phrases and themes, but who are not willing to admit that 
the work is a carefully -designed literary piece with a logical 
progression in thought. For Instance, B. Gemser sees the unity only 
in the contents of the book, i. e. one single unifying thought that 
connects all the utterances, and no unity exists in the composi- 
tional connection between pericopes. 32 Similarly Oswald Loretz33 
argues that neither the 'minimum' unity view nor the 'maximum' 
unity view are relevant, for what matters is how to relate the 
pericopes to the main idea of the book which is the thought of 
'vanity'. Along the same line of thought is R. E. Murphy who in one 
of his earlier articles on Qoheleth remarks that 
... No one will ever succeed in giving a satisfactory outline 
of the contents of the book. Any schematic outline superimposes 
upon the meditations of Qoheleth a framework that he certainly 
never had in mind. Once we recognize the fact that these are 
jottings, unified only by the very tenuous thread of 'vanity'. 
an outline ceases to reflect the real thought and mood of the 
book. 34 
(1968): 15-28; H. Carl Shank, "Qoheleth's World and Life View as Seen 
in his Recurring Phrases, " WTJ 37 (1974-5): 57-73; Michael V. Fox, 
"Frame-Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qohelet, " HUCA 48 
(1977): 83-106; R. K. Johnston, "'Confessions of a Workaholic': A 
Reappraisal of Qoheleth, " CBQ 38 (1976): 17-19. 
32B. Gemser, Sprüche Salomons (HAT, 1963). 
33Oswald Loretz, Qohelet und der Alte Orient (Freiburg: Herder, 
1964), who argues that the main idea of the book is 'vanity' and 
that unity existed in the content of the book. 
34R. E. Murphy, "The Pensees of Qoheleth, " CBQ 17 (1958): 304-14, 
p. 306-7; however, in his later work, "Ecclesiastes (Qohelet), " in 
Wisdom Literature: Job, Proverbs, Ruth, Canticles, Ecclesiastes, 
and Esther (FOTL, 13), he writes that "In the light of the uncer- 
tainty underscored by Zimmerli, and to escape subjectivity as much 
as possible, the analysis here will adopt the outline proposed by 
A. G. Wright, with only slight differences" (128); cf. idem, "Form 
Criticism and Wisdom Literature, " CBQ 31 (1969): 477; idem, "A Form 
Critical Consideration of Ecclesiastes VII, " SBL 1974 Seminar 
Papers I (ed. G. W. MacRae; Cambridge, Mass.: SBL, 1974): 77-85. 
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B. S. Childs remarks that "In my judgment, the truth lies between 
these two extremes. " 35 W. Zimmerli brings this view into the open 
with his carefully argued article entitled "Das Buch Kohelet - 
Traktat oder Sentenzensammlung? He concludes that 
... Das Buch Kohelet ist kein Traktat mit klar erkennbarem 
Aufriss und einem einzigen, bestimmbaren Thema. Es ist aber 
zugleich mehr als eine lose Sentenzensammlung, obwohl der Samm- 
lungscharakter an einzelnen Stellen nicht zu übersehen Ist. 38 
Formally speaking, of course, it cannot be doubted that the book 
consists both of collections of loose sayings as well as of 
coherent materials. Zimmerli thus suggests that the first task of 
the exegete is to determine the various form-critical units. 
Secondly, the exegete must try to relate one or more of these units 
together. Thirdly, one will then ask how the content determines the 
sequence of the individual complex form-critical units. 
37 Following 
this suggestion, though with his own methodology, is J. A. Loader, 
another recent advocate of this 'medium' view, who in his seminal 
work on Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet, 
38 
remarks that 
35B S. Childs, op. cit., p. 582. 
38W. Zimmerli, "Das Buch Kohelet - Traktat oder Sentenzensamm- 
lung?, " VT 24 (1974): 221-30 (30), "The book of Qoheleth is not a 
Trakat with clearly recognizable structure and with one definable 
theme. But it is at the same time more than a loose Sentenzensamm- 
lung, even though Sammlungscharakter (characteristic of collection) 
In some places is not to be overlooked. " 
37Zimmerli, loc. cit., p. 30, "Er hat zunächst die formgeschicht- 
lich primären Einheiten herauszuarbeiten. Er hat dann, wie es auch 
der Exeget von Prov. xxiv 30-34, aber auch schon von xxii 17ff. tun 
muß, nach der möglichen Kombinationsform von zwei oder mehr 
formgeschichtlich primären Bauelementen zu fragen. Darüber hinaus 
aber hat er, und das unterscheidet die Kohelet-Exegese von der 
Proverbienexegese und nähert sie bis zu einem gewissen Grade 
stellenweise der Hiobexegese an, nach der inhaltlich beabsichtigten 
Abfolge der einzelnen formgeschichtlich komplexen Einheiten zu 
fragen ... 
" 
38J. A. Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet (BZAW 152; 
Berlin, 1979), p. 9. 
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... we have no logical development of thought reflected in 
the composition of the book, but there are various separate 
pericopes. These are structured carefully ... it can also be 
said that separate pericopes are compositionally related to each 
other. The basic idea running through all of them is the 
conviction of emptiness which purposely begins and ends the 
book. - 
What Loader meant by 'structured carefully' is that the work is 
based on the polar structures that he discerned, such as 'life and 
death, ' 'talk and silence, ' 'Joy and toil, ' which he carefully 
distinguishes from the formal structure of the book as a whole. 
These three views will be discussed in more detail later in 
Chapter One, but it is sufficient at this juncture to make two 
observations regarding Qoheleth studies of this period. First, the 
influence of the form-critical method prevented form critics from 
seeing what New Critics later saw in Qoheleth. Secondly, though 
most modern scholars agreed that the book is basically a unity, 
there is no consensus as to where the unity lies or what the 
essence of the unity of the book is. Does the unity exist in the 
compositional structure or just in its thought or is it in both? 
Regardless, Qoheleth studies of this period have made some progress 
beyond the works of the 1950s. 
4. Since the 1970s 
As rhetorical criticism begins to take shape on the American 
scene while new methods in literary criticism are being introduced 
into biblical research in Britain and traditio-historical and 
form-critical methods still seem to dominate Germany, Qoheleth 
studies after the 1970s have made no particular advances, as can be 
seen in the lack of new commentaries. 
39 Perhaps the lack of advance- 
39J. A. Loader has made available his BZAW monograph in a popular 
version in the Dutch series of Een praktische bijbelverklaring part 
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ment in Qoheleth studies since the 1970s is due also to the rise of 
new literary critical approaches, such as Structuralism, Feminism 
and Deconstructionism for which wisdom literature is not so 
attractive as the narrative and historical portions of the Hebrew 
Bible. 40 However, there are still a few works worth mentioning here. 
Michael Fox's article, "The Meaning of Hebel for Qoheleth" (1986), 
makes a significant advancement in Qoheleth's use of '71.41 A. G. 
YV 
Wright's two companion articles, "The Riddle of the Sphinx 
Revisited: Numerical Patterns in the Book of Ecclesiastes" (1980), 
and "Additional Numerical Patterns in Qoheleth" (1983), provided 
significant support for his earlier work on the structure of 
Qoheleth. Also notable are the two 1979 BZAW monographs by Charles 
F. Whitley, Koheleth: His Language and Thought, and J. A. Loader's 
Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet. 
of the Tekst en Toelichting series in 1984, with the English 
translation of the series published by W. B. Eerdmans in 1986; 
Robert Davidson's commentary in the Daily Study Bible series also 
appeared in 1986; Graham Ogden's commentary in JSOT Press's new 
series Readings has just appeared; James L. Crenshaw for the Old 
Testament Library series. the latest, has just been released in 
February, 1988 (U. S. released in December, 1987); Michael Fox's 
commentary on Qoheleth is pending release by Almond Press later in 
1988; A number are in preparation by some leading Qoheleth 
scholars, such as R. N. Whybray for the New Century Bible Commentary 
series, R. E. Murphy for the Hermeneia series, and David Hubbard is 
also preparing for the Word Commentary series. 
40Regarding the application of Reader-oriented theory to biblical 
studies, David Gunn recently in "New Directions in the Study of 
Hebrew Narrative, " JSOT 39 (1987): 65-75, warns that "Reader- 
oriented theory legitimizes the relativity of different readings 
and thus threatens to unnerve conventional understandings of 
biblical authority. This has already happened at the level of 
critical practice through the challenge of feminist criticism.... 
my prediction is that troubling times lie ahead as the reader 
theory of the secular critics begins to corrode the edges of 
normative exegesis and doctrines of biblical authority which insist 
on viewing the Bible as divine prescription. " 
41Michael Fox, JBL 105 (1986): 409-27. 
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In sum, the survey has shown that over the last hundred years, 
scholars have been trying to understand the book of Qoheleth 
through an analysis of the structure of the book. There has taken 
place, however, a shift in the understanding of the structure of 
the book in the 1970s as compared to the 1900s. This may be 
attributed to source criticism giving way to New Criticism and/or 
rhetorical criticism. Although the literary structure of the book 
still fascinates researchers and there is no lack of works done on 
the linguistic and thematic analysis of the book in recent years, 
"Scholars remain divided in their estimate of the theological 
contribution of the book as a whole, " as B. S. Childs remarks in his 
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture. 
B. THE THESIS 
This study attempts to understand the theological thought of 
Qoheleth. As the survey of the last hundred years of Qoheleth 
studies has shown, the literary structure of the book of Qoheleth 
is still crucial to understanding the theological thought of Qohe- 
leth. Thus, Chapter One of this thesis will be devoted to discus- 
sing the various approaches which have been employed In the study- 
ing of the structure of the book of Qoheleth. Then, Chapter Two 
will attempt to analyse the structure of Qoheleth's theological 
thought, which will be followed by a reading of Qoheleth In Chapter 
Three, analysing the argument of the book as it develops. Chapter 
Four will examine the position of Qoheleth's theological thought in 
Israel, via the understanding of Wisdom and Yahwism and the idea 
that Wisdom theology is essentially Creation theology. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE LITERARY STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK OF OOHELETH 
The structure of the book of Qoheleth has been an enigma for 
over a century, as reflected in the title of A. G. Wright's article, 
"The Riddle of the Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth. " 
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, many 
scholars understood the book to be a piece of disparate, disorgani- 
zed and disunified wisdom literature. However, as the survey in the 
Introduction has shown, scholars in the late twentieth century view 
the book as essentially a unified composition, though there are 
some variations in how they understand the concept of 'unity'. But 
even with such a change in the view of the composition of the book, 
Qoheleth nevertheless remains enigmatic even to modern scholars. It 
is enigmatic not because the book has no literary structure, but 
because scholars have agreed that there is a structure and a unity, 
and yet the structure is not obvious enough to be easily recogni- 
zable in full, even though a few obvious elements such as the 77`f 
(hebel) theme are easily recognizable by all. 
In the hands of the form critics, individual pericopes are 
identified (again with divided opinions), according to their 
various 'genres'; proverb, narrative, prose, VD, etc. As various 
literary forms are identified in the book, scholars find it even 
more difficult to connect all these disparate pericopes to form a 
coherent body of literature, though at some level a unifying 
thought such as that of ýnii may be discerned. Scholars are divided 
into three different schools of thought on the unity of the book 
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as mentioned in the Introduction. This chapter will discern an 
outline of the literary structure of Qoheleth after offering a 
critique of the various approaches to the study of the literary 
structure of Qoheleth. 
A. THE VARIOUS APPROACHES IN QOHELETH STUDIES 
1. The Traditional Literary-Critical Approach 
In the late nineteenth century when literary critics applied 
their method to Old Testament studies, they were often interested 
in three questions: (1) Who was the author of the book? (2) When 
was the book written? (3) Is the book a compositional unity? The 
general consensus of the critics was that the book of Qoheleth was 
not written by Solomon, but by a sage in the Maccabean period, with 
later glossators editing the text to give the final form of the 
book which shows no unified compositional structure. This conclu- 
sion was based mostly on grounds of comparative philology, philoso- 
phy and religion. Due to the lack of internal coherence within the 
composition of the book, it was viewed largely as a collection of 
sayings, an anthology. Thus the main strength, which was also the 
weakness, of the traditional literary-critical approach to Qoheleth 
studies was its ability to recognize the incoherent and disunified 
nature of the book, and its inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to 
solve the structural puzzle of the book, i. e. the structural unity 
behind the apparent incoherent composition. This inability may be 
traced back to the inadequacy of their method of study: they paid 
more attention to the hypothetical traditio-historical background 
of the book than to the book itself as a completed literary piece 
within the canon. 
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2. The Form-Critical Approach 
With the rise of the form-critical and traditio-historical works 
of Hermann Gunkel, scholars begin to analyse the Gattungen and Sitz 
im Leben of the various Old Testament traditions. Since then, for 
more than a century, the form-critical method has proven to be an 
essential tool for biblical scholars, particularly in Old Testament 
studies. Needless to say, its contributions to wisdom research have 
been invaluable. It helps to answer questions that other methods 
could not raise and answer. James Crenshaw has commented correctly 
concerning form-critical studies of wisdom literature, that 
... 
Form critical investigation of wisdom literature advances 
only to the degree that it gives adequate answers to the 
following questions: (1) what is the scope of the literature? 
(2) what are the literary forms making up this body of 
literature? (3) what precise setting in life did these forms 
occupy? (4) what function did they perform in the life of 
ancient Israel? 
1 
He goes on to mention four kinds of wisdom literature: (1) juridi- 
cal, (2) nature, (3) practical, and (4) theological; and three 
types of settings which characterize wisdom literature: (a) family/ 
clan wisdom, (b) court wisdom, and (c) scribal wisdom. He also 
discusses eight forms of writing normally employed in the wisdom 
genre: (1) proverb, (2) riddle, (3) fable and allegory, (4) hymn 
and prayer, (5) Streitgespräch or dialogue, (6) confession, (7) 
lists, (8) didactic poetry and narrative. He discusses Qoheleth 
mainly under the category of (6) confession and (8) autobiographi- 
cal narrative, though he also realizes that the variety of forms 
employed in a book may "reflect the author's desire to express 
1James Crenshaw, "Wisdom, " in Old Testament Form Criticism (ed. 
J. H. Hayes; TUMSR, 2; San Antonio, 1974): 225-64 (226); cf. idem, 
"Prolegomenon, " in SAIW, pp. 1-60 (13-20). 
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himself by means of the total linguistic stock available to him. "2 
This method, when applied to Qoheleth studies, helps in recog- 
nizing the various literary forms that make up the book, for 
example, mashal (Ellermeler) and reflexion (R. Braun). Early works 
on Qoheleth utilizing this method are by K. Galling, and his 
student F. Ellermeier. 
A more recent form-critical approach to Qoheleth is that of R. E. 
Murphy in The Forms of the Old Testament Literature series, in 
which he consistently discusses all the pericopes of the book under 
four headings: Structure, Genre, Setting, and Intention. In his 
opening words, he recognizes the fact that "There is simply no 
agreement concerning the structure of Ecclesiastes. "3 Though adopt- 
ing the basic structure of A. G. Wright's new stylistics reading, he 
deviates slightly on 10: 16-11: 2 and thinks the unit should be 
10: 16-11: 6 instead. He remarks that "There is no claim that this is 
a logical structure; It is based on form, not content. "4 He goes on 
to make further clarification concerning the introductory poem 
(1: 3-11) and the instruction on old age (11: 7-12: 7), that "The 
instruction on old age (11: 7-12: 7) stands outside of this form 
[i. e. the catch phrases, refrains, etc. as recognized by Wright], 
as does the reflection about man's toll (1: 3-11) in the introduc- 
tion. "5 This form-critical approach to Qoheleth by Murphy reflects 
a nec-essity to synchronize the results of different approaches if 
one is to gain a broader and richer understanding of the structure 
of the book. 
2J. L. Crenshaw, "Wisdom, " p. 263; of. the suggestive remarks of 
Hermisson in Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit, pp. 137-86. 
3R. E. Murphy, "Ecclesiastes (Qohelet), " (FOTL, 13), p. 127. 
4Ibid., p. 129. 
5Ibid. 
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Without a discussion on genre, this analysis of form-critical 
study on Qoheleth is incomplete. Scholars are divided, as usual, on 
the genre of the book of Qoheleth. F. Ellermeier6 thinks Qoheleth 
is basically written in the 'mashal' (7j ) form, with Sentenz 
'saying' and Reflexion 'reflection' as the two subgenres. R. Braun? 
discerned three basic genres in Qoheleth: meditative reflection 
(betrachtende Reflexion), meditation (Betrachtung), and instruction 
(Belehrung). R. E. Murphy finds six types of genres In Qoheleth: (1) 
Wisdom sayings (7: 1ff.; 9: 17ff. ), (2) Instructions (sayings with a 
command or prohibition), (3) Reflections (such as "I said, " "I 
saw, " "I know, " "I gave, " "who knows? " "who can find out? ") which 
also includes proverbial sayings (2: 14; 4: 5,6), (4) Example Stories 
(4: 13-16; 9: 13-16), (5) Woe Oracles (2: 16; 4: 10; 10: 16), and (6) 
Blessing (10: 17). 8 
Differing from Murphy, Loader9 discovered thirteen Gattungen In 
Qoheleth: (1) Royal fiction, (2) Wahrspruch and maxim, (3) töb- 
saying, (4) comparison, (5) metaphor, (6) parable, (7) allegory, 
(8) observation, (9) self-discourse, (10) woe-saying and benedic- 
tion, (11) antilogion, (12) rhetorical question, and (13) admoni- 
tion. 
Among other form-critical studies of Qoheleth is that of Graham 
Ogden who in a series of articles studied the form of 'better'- 
6 Ellermeler, Qohelet, I, 1, p. 49. 
7R. Braun, Kohelet und die friihhellenistische Popularphilosophie 
(BZAW 130; Berlin, 1973). 
8Murphy, op. cit., pp. 129-30; cf. idem, "Form Criticism and 
Wisdom Literature, " CBQ 31 (1969): 475-83; idem, "A Form-Critical 
Consideration of Ecclesiastes VII, " in SBL Seminar Papers I (1974): 
77-85; idem, "The Interpretation of the Old Testament Wisdom Liter- 
ature, " Interp 23 (1969): 289-301. 
9J. A. Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet (BZAW 152; 
Berlin, 1979), pp. 18-28; cf. idem, "Qohelet 3: 2-8 -A 'Sonnet' in 
the Old Testament, " ZAW 81 (1969): 240-42. 
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proverbs and identified several rhetorical devices, such as twin- 
themes employed in Qoh. 9-12.10 R. Gordis and more recently R. N. 
Whybray, have also studied the use of quotations in Qoheleth. 11 
Whybray identified eight sayings as quotations from older wisdom 
sayings whose themes are characteristic of the teaching of Proverbs 
10-29, and argues that they were used either with unqualified or 
relative approval. 22 
Although form-critical studies on Qoheleth cannot be ignored and 
have much to contribute to current Qoheleth research, thej haue +heir 
own limitation as Crenshaw reminded us. One should not look beyond 
what the method has not designed to accomplish. They are valuable 
only in so far as they assist a recognition of the formal structure 
of the book. They do not help in understanding, for example, the 
thought structure of Qoheleth. 
3. Modern Literary Approach 
Since James Mullenburg urged scholarship to move beyond form- 
criticism in his 1968 SBL presidential address13, new phases of 
10Graham Ogden, "The 'Better'-Proverb (Tob-Spruch), Rhetorical 
Criticism, and Qoheleth, " JBL 96 (1977): 489-505; idem, "Qoheleth's 
Use of the 'Nothing Is Better'-Form, " JBL 98 (1979): 339-50; idem, 
"Qoheleth ix 17-x 20: Variations on the Theme of Wisdom's Strength 
and Vulnerability. " VT 30 (1980): 27-37; idem, "Historical Allusion 
in Qoh. iv 13-16?, " VT 30 (1980): 309-15; idem, "Qoheleth ix 1-16, " 
VT 32 (1982): 158-69; idem, "Qoheleth xi 1-6, " VT 33 (1983): 222-30; 
idem, "Qoheleth xi-xii 8, " VT 34 (1984): 27-38; idem, "The Mathema- 
tics of Wisdom: Qoheleth iv 1-12, " VT 34 (1984): 446-53. 
11 R. Gordis, The Man and His World, pp. 95-108; idem, "Quotations 
As a Literary Usage in Biblical, Oriental and Rabbinic Literature, " 
HUCA 22 (1949): 157-219; idem, "Quotation in Wisdom Literature, " JQR 
30 (1939-40): 123-47; R. N. Whybray, "The Identification and Use of 
Quotations in Ecclesiastes, " VTSup 32 (1981): 435-51; cf. M. V. Fox, 
"The Identification of Quotations in Biblical Literature, " ZAW 92 
(1980): 416-31. 
12R. N. Whybray, loc. cit.; the eight sayings are Qoh. 2: 14a; 4: 5; 
4: 6; 7: 5; 7: 6a; 9: 17; 10: 2; 10: 12. 
13James Muilenburg, "Form Criticism and Beyond, " JBL 88 
(1969): 1-18. 
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modern literary approach have gained considerable recognition. They 
include New criticism and Rhetorical criticism which largely flour- 
ished in the United States, while structural criticism, normally 
associated with France's Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Levi- 
Strauss, 14 also attracts its followers. However, there is a confu- 
sion over the definition of these new methodologies, and their 
compatibility with one another. For instance, James Crenshaw views 
New criticism and structural analysis as being identical, though 
different from Rhetorical criticism. is David Gunn, on the other 
hand, sees New criticism and Rhetorical criticism as two terms 
sharing the same approach but different from Structural criticism. 16 
Since they all share some common denominators, e. g. searching for 
meaning from the structure of the text, for the sake of convenience 
this section will treat them as one approach, though I am well 
aware of the dangers of such oversimplification. 
As a school of criticism in literature generally, New criticism 
especially as exemplified in what has come to be known as 
"close-reading, " looks for repeated phrases, catch words, refrains, 
symmetry and any literary or rhetorical device which may serve as 
structural markers or dividers. It focuses both on the macro- 
structure as well as the micro-structure of the book. A. G. Wright's 
new stylist's analysis of the structure of the book of Qoheleth in 
his 1968 article has, in a way, laid down the foundational struc- 
ture of the book as many have followed the structure outlined by 
him. He argues that 
14Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (Garden City; New 
York: Basic Books, 1963); cf. Daniel Patte, What is Structural 
Exegesis? (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976); Robert M. Polzin, 
Biblical Structuralism: Method and Subjectivity in the Study of 
Ancient Texts (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977). 
15James Crenshaw, "Wisdom, " p. 264. 
16David Gunn, op. cit., p. 67. 
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... There is the eight-fold repetition in 1: 12-6: 9 of "vanity 
and a chase after wind, " marking off eight meaningful units 
which contain eight major observations from Qoheleth's investi- 
gation of life, plus digressionary material ... When this 
pattern ceases in 6: 9 there follows immediately the introduction 
of two new ideas: man does not know what is good to do nor what 
comes after him; and another verbal pattern begins. The first 
idea is developed in four sections in 7: 1-8: 17. The end of each 
unit is marked by the verb "find out" and the final section ends 
with a triple "cannot find out" (8: 17) in an aba arrangement 
... The second idea is developed in six sections in 9: 1-11: 6. 
The end of each unit is marked with "do not know" or "no 
knowledge" and the final section again ends with a triple "you 
do not know" (11: 5,6) and again in an aba arrangement ... When this pattern ends we are right at the beginning of the 
generally recognized unit on youth and old age at the end of the 
book. 17 
More than ten years later, he provided additional evidence not only 
to support his earlier reading but also to advance significantly 
his understanding of the structure of the book. The evidence 
provided is based on 'numerical' analysis of the alphabetical value 
of the root '3Jl (1=5, n=2, ') = 30); the number 37 as the total 
occurrences of the root in the book (excluding either 5: 6 or 9: 9 
due to textual corruption); the total number of verses, 222, in the 
book, etc. l8 Although Wright's 'numerical' analysis of Qoheleth has 
some implications for the structure of the book, it is not so 
crucial as Murphy states in his remarks, "These and other numerical 
patterns indicated by Wright can hardly be dismissed as coinciden- 
tal, and thus they form a strong argument for a structure that goes 
beyond content and thought divisions. "19 
G. R. Castellino2° is another new stylist who has attempted a 
close reading of Qoheleth, though he suggests a different structu- 
17A. G. Wright, op. cit., p. 323. 
1sA. G. Wright, "The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited: Numerical 
Patterns in the Book of Qoheleth, " CBQ 42 (1980): 38-51; idem, 
"Additional Numerical Patterns in Qoheleth, " CBQ 45 (1983): 32-43. 
19R. E. Murphy, op. cit., p. 128. 
20G. R. Castellino, "Qoheleth and His Wisdom, " CBQ 30 (1968): 15-28 
(16). 
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ral outline than that of A. G. Wright. He divides the book, based on 
its grammatical style, into two parts breaking at 4: 16; part I 
(1: 1-4: 16) consists largely of narrative with preterite or 
imperfect with 1-consecutive and part II (4: 17-12: 14) begins with 
an imperative (K *j'7f7; *j'7)1 1077 "Guard your steps") in 4: 17 and 
is immediately followed by a negative imperative (n'! 3 -7y 7Mln-'fl 
"Do not be quick with your mouth"), in 5: la. With the sudden and 
unexpected change in style after 4: 16, Castellino believes that 
"Qohelet is no longer speaking about himself, but has turned to the 
reader, or listener, and is imparting to him admonitions and 
Instructions. " 21 
Without any doubt, any analysis of the literary structure of 
Qoheleth must treat Castellino's and Wright's results seriously. In 
my opinion, the literary structure of Qoheleth, as will be analysed 
later, stands between Wright and Castellino. 
Finding the structure of the book difficult to determine. Graham 
Ogden, in his recent commentary, comes to a "mediating position" 
which sees "the various blocks of material which comprise the book 
as individually relating to a theme" and hopes this would "avoid 
the problem of defining the structure in terms of a logical 
connection between one unit and the next. "22 Thus, he argues that 
the book is divided into two parts: chs. 1-8 and chs. 9-12. The 
first part is governed by three features: a programatic question 
about humanity's yitrbn, a negative answer and a positive response. 
The second part consists of discourse material that appraises the 
value of wisdom. 
23 
21 G. R. Castellino, loc. cit. 
22G. Ogden, Qoheleth, p. 12. 
23 Ibid., p. 13. 
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In sum, the traditional literary approach understands the book 
as a fragmented and disparate 'anthology'; the form-critical 
approach finds structure within individual pericopes; and a close 
reading of Qoheleth, seeing the book as a whole, understands the 
book as one with either a structure with a logical development 
(Wright) or a structure with little discernable logical development 
(Ogden). However, even with the recognition of a highly designed 
structure such as that of A. G. Wright's analysis, the message and 
theological thought of Qoheleth still stands in need of further 
analysis. A. G. Wright in his 1968 article proposed that if one 
discovered the underlying structure of the book, one could then 
"move ahead with confidence to attack the remaining and major 
problems (message, genre, unity) and to solve the essential rid- 
dles. " This has yet to be done! 24 
Taking Wright's and Castellino's analyses into consideration, 
the following is an analysis of the literary structure of Qoheleth. 
After which the theological thought of Qoheleth will be analysed in 
the next chapter. 
B. THE STRUCTURE 
The book of Qoheleth consists of a title (1: 1), the main body 
(1: 2-12: 8) and the Epilogue (12: 9-14). The main body is a unified 
body of text framed by the phrase 617: T `7D , though logical devel- . 1-9 
is not discernable. In form, the first person narrative 
occurs mainly In 1: 1-4: 16 (though Qoheleth falls back again occa- 
sionally Into narrative later in the book) and proverbial sayings 
and instructions (advice, command, prohibition) characterizes chs. 
24A. G. Wright, op. cit., p. 313; but more than ten years later in 
his 1980 and 1983 articles, he does not seem to have unveiled 
further the message and theology of Qoheleth, despite providing 
more evidence to strengthen his earlier argument. 
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5,7,8,10,11, which makes a clear demarcation of pericopes in 
the second half of the book very difficult. In content, the first 
six chapters are concerned mostly with the themes of absurdity (' 1 
occurs 26 out of 38 times) and profit (JIM occurs 7 out of 10 
times), while chs. 7-12 are concerned mostly with the theme of 
wisdom (TTT]7TT) (where the phrases `who can find out/cannot find' 
(MO) or 'who can know/cannot know' [P'T'] occurred), and the 
advice to enjoy UTl7) life which is expressed in the form of a 
command. Generally, the main body (1: 2-12: 8) may be divided into 
two halves: 1: 2-6: 9 and 6: 10-12: 8. No logical development in compo- 
sition is detectable, though individual pericopes are related to a 
theme and the twin themes -' and 'M31 - which consistently run 
across the two halves of the book will be analysed in the next 
chapter. 
The first half consists of a poem (1: 3-11) and six units (1: 12- 
2: 26; 3: 1-22; 4: 1-16; 4: 17-5: 8; 5: 9-19; 6: 1-9), while the second 
half consists of three blocks of materials (6: 10-7: 29; 8: 1-17; 
9: 1-11: 6) and a final advice which followed by a vivid description 
on death (11: 7-12: 7). Two superlative statements (1: 2; 12: 8) framed 
the main body (1: 3-12: 7). The book ends with an epilogue (12: 9-14). 
C. THE OUTLINE 
The Title 1: 1 
The book begins with a title introducing the noun [17fa (cf. 1: 2, 
12; 7: 27; 12: 8,9,10). 25 
25Michael Fox, "Frame-Narrative and Composition in the Book of 
Qohelet, " AUCA 48 (1977): 83-106, argues that the book is built on 
three successive levels of narrative "each with a perspective that 
encompasses the next; level 1, the author or 'frame-narrator' who 
tells about, level 2a, Qohelet-the-reporter, the narrating 'I, ' who 
speaks from the vantage point of old age and looks back on, level 
2b, Qohelet-the-seeker, the experiencing 'I, ' the younger Qohelet 
who made the fruitless investigation introduced in 1: 12f. Level 1 
32 
A Thematic Statement 1: 2 
The main body begins with an opening thematic statement or 
refrain in the superlative form which finds its counterpart in 
12: 8. It is slightly different from 12: 8 with its extra phrase 
13'? XjT Z. Framed within the two superlative statements (1: 2; 12: 8) 
is the main term of the book, 'n . which occurs thirty-eight times 
throughout the book. 
The Prologue 1: 3-11 
The prologue consists of a rhetorical question (1: 3) and a poem 
on the natural world as observed by the poet (1: 4-11). The poem may 
be divided into two parts: natural phenomena (1: 5-7) and the human 
world (1: 8-10), framed by 1: 4 and 1: 11 reflecting on the 'coming' 
('"j71) and 'going' (2tn) of the 'generation' ('11'1) so that there is 
no 'remembrance' (111 ). 28 The rhetorical question (1: 3) has caused 
some dispute among scholars who are not certain whether it belongs 
to 1: 2 or 1: 4-11 as part of the poem. Since 1: 2 is taken as an 
independent thematic statement corresponding to its counterpart in 
12: 8, there is no reason to attach 1: 3 to it. Rather, 1: 3 intro- 
duces the theme of the search for 'profit' (11'111') which character- 
izes the following unit 1: 12-2: 26, and the poem (1: 4-11) Introduces 
the scope and realm of the search. The poem defines the last phrase 
of the rhetorical question, "under the sun". Subsequently, the rhe- 
and level 2 are different persons; level 2a and 2b are different 
perspectives of one person. " Fox finds similar techiques used in 
ancient literature of various genres including wisdom literature, 
particularly in Egypt and Israel (pp. 91f. ). On the name of Qohelet, 
see Edward Ullendorff, "The Meaning of h7s1p, " VT 12 (1962): 215, 
suggests "the arguer, " drawing implication from the Aramaic-Syriac 
connotation of qhl. 
28Francois Rousseau, "Structure de Qohelet 1 4-11 et plan du 
livre, " VT 31 (1981): 200-17, argues an interesting parallel struc- 
ture between 1: 4-11 (A BC B' A') and 1: 12-11: 10 (A BC B' C'). 
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torical question of 1: 3 becomes the focus of Qoheleth's inquiry, 
especially in the first half of the book as the term 11111' occurs 
in 1: 3; 2: 11,13; 3: 9; 5: 8,15; 7: 12; 10: 10,11. 
The Experience 1: 12-2: 26 
Scholars have generally agreed that 1: 12-2: 26 forms a literary 
unit by itself and consists of several subunits. 
27 
1: 12-18 Introductions. This subunit consists of two slightly dif- 
ferent introductions (1: 13-15; 16-18, cf. A. G. Wright), with 1: 12 a 
self-identification, and 1: 15 and 1: 18 two proverbial sayings 
quoted in support of the statements 1: 13-14 and 16-17 respectively, 
concerning the 7ý`vt of pursuing wisdom. 
2: 1-11 The Test. The phrase '777 '3? t 1-11]K (I said in my heart) 
marks the beginning of a new subunit which continues the first 
person narrative or 'royal fiction/testament' that runs through to 
4: 16 (cf. Castellino). This subunit focuses specifically on the 
test of i -MM "joy" and denies that any 11111' can be found in any of 
the activities of the test; the joy of gathering 'wealth' and 
'possession' produces no 1i7n'. 
2: 12-17 On Wisdom. The phrase fl i ']it 11111M (And I turned to 
see) signals a new subunit which reflects on the profitlessness of 
wisdom. A proverbial saying (2: 14a) is used to illustrate the 
traditional concept of the value of wisdom, but is elaborated In 
2: 14b with the phrase ']21-131 'IlyT11 (But I also know) to introduce -Ir I 
the idea that both wise and fool face the same destiny - death. 
27A. G. Wright, op. cit., p. 325, has 1: 12-15; 1: 16-18; 2: 1-11; 2: 
12-17; 2: 18-26; A. Schoors, "La structure litteraire de Qoheleth, " 
OrLovPer 13 (1982): 91-116 (115), has 1: 12-15 (introduction); 1: 16 
-18; 2: 1-11; 2: 12-17; 2: 18-23; 2: 24-26 (conclusion); cf. R. Gordis, 
op. cit., pp. 148-9; A Lauha, Kohelet (BKAT 19; Neukirchen-Vluyn, 
1978), pp. 42-43. 
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This subunit concludes with the phrase '... under the sun, all is 
7ýi and a striving after wind" (2: 17b). 
2: 18-23 On Activity. The term 'T3J (activity, toil) is the key con- 
cept in this subunit where Qoheleth reflects and argues on the '1i 
and lack of 111c1' in any human activity ('103). Out of the thirty- 
five occurrences in the book, the term 10P occurs ten times in this 
subunit. It assumes two inter-related meanings according to F. 
Foresti: "hard, assiduous work, toil" and "income, fruit of work, 
profit". 
28 Again it concludes with the phrase 'Even this, it is 
absurd' (tta1'ýfl flT-0U). 
2: 24-26 Advice to Enjoy Life. The change of subject, form and style 
marks this subunit as the conclusion of the entire unit (1: 12- 
2: 26). The experience has led him to this conclusion - enjoy life. 
Life is to be enjoyed as God gives (ýhý) it (cf. 2: 26a) to those 
who pleases God. This is the first of the seven occasions in which 
advice is given to 'enjoy life' (cf. 3: 12,13; 3: 22; 5: 17-18; 8: 15; 
9: 7-9; 11: 7-9). 29 It is in the form of or a 'better'- 
proverb, which Is found also in 3: 12,22 and 8: 15, whereas 5: 17 and 
9: 7-9 are expressed in variant forms. 
The unit (1: 12-2: 26) ends with the phrase 'Also this is absurd, 
and a striving after wind' (TTf7 11W11 'I M-131). 
28Fabrizio Foresti, "'aural in Koheleth: 'Toil' or 'Profit', " Eph. 
Carm. 31 (1980): 415-30 (430), argues that "the first meaning has 
given origin to the second, according to a process largely attested 
in Semitic linguistics. " The first meaning includes the occurrences 
in 1: 3; 2: 10-11; 3: 9; 4: 4,8,9; 5: 15; 8: 15,17 (as an auxiliary 
verb); 9: 9; 10: 15; and the second meaning 2: 18-24a; 3: 13; 4: 6; 
5: 14,17,18; 6: 7; cf. Robert Gordis, "On the Meaning of 'tJ9 in 
Koheleth, " in Koheleth the Man and His World, pp. 418-20; H. G. 
Mitchell, "'Work' in Ecclesiastes, " JBL 32 (1913): 123-38. 
29For a discussion of the seven passages, see Whybray, "Qoheleth, 
Preacher of Joy, " JSOT 23 (1982): 87- 98. 
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The Reality of Time 3: 1-22 
While most scholars agree that 3: 1 marks the beginning of a new 
unit there is disagreement over its conclusion. Wright thinks it 
ends in 4: 6 with the phrase "striving after wind", but it is more 
likely that it ends in 3: 22 where the advice to enjoy life, as with 
the unit 1: 12-2: 26, forms the conclusion of the unit. Furthermore, 
the controlling concept - Time - that runs throughout the unit - 
does not extend to 4: 1-6 where social justice is the dominant 
idea. 30 Two subunits are clearly demarcated: (1) 3: 1-15; and (2) 
3: 16-22. 
3: 1-15 Time and Chance. This subunit begins with a poem on time 
(3: 2-8). According to J. A. Loader 31 the form of 3: 2-8 Is a sonnet 
which includes fourteen pairs of opposites. However, I would follow 
A. G. Wright on this score who divides the poem into two pairs of 
stanzas with three couplets each (3: 2-4,5-7), with 3: 4 and 3: 7 as 
the concluding couplets for each pair, and having the mourning/ 
rejoicing motif as a refrain. Accordingly, 3: 8 "may be an umbrella 
for the whole poem: love and hate generally motivate most of the 
constructive and destructive actions and the separations and unions 
of life ... [both] on the individual scale ... and on the larger 
scale (war and peace, 3: 8b). "32 The poem is followed immediately by 
a rhetorical question (3: 9) which expects the negative answer that 
30On this score, I tend to agree with A. Schoors, op. cit., p. 
115, who considers 3: 1-22 as a unit, but I would differ from him to 
see 3: 1-15 as a subunit rather than two (3: 1-8; 3: 9-15) subunits. 
31J. A. Loader, "Qoh. 3: 2-8 -A 'Sonnet' in the Old Testament, " 
ZAW 81 (1969): 240-42, argues that 3: 2-8 Is composed of a series of 
what Loader labels as 'Desirable' and 'Undesirable' sentences which 
are arranged in a chiastic structure. The Poem is divided into 
three pairs of two couplets (3: 2-3,4-5,6-7). 
32A. G. Wright, "<For Everything There Is A Season>: The Structure 
and Meaning of the Fourteen Opposites (Ecclesiastes 3,2-8), " De la 
Torah au Messie, Melanges Henri Gazelles, ed J. Dore et al. (Paris: 
Desclee, 1981): 321-28 (327). 
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there is no I11n' found within the various occasions of life. The 
subunit ends with a proverbial saying (3: 15a; cf. 1: 9). The theme 
seems to be the unfathomable God who has made everything i-In* 'beau- 
tiful' in its own time, yet human beings know not this timing and 
find no 11111 1. In response to the reality, an advice to enjoy life 
is given (3: 12,13). 
33 
3: 16-22 Time, Justice and Death. The phrase 1111X7 `11S)) (Moreover, I 
saw) signals a slight change of subject but stays with the main 
theme - Time. Qoheleth focuses specifically on the time for justice 
and argues that even though the time for judgment is In the hand of 
God, he does know that there is a time to die for all - righ- 
teous, wicked or beast. In such a reality, again the subunit ends 
with Qoheleth's advice to enjoy life: there is a p711 'portion' in 
one's work, the enjoyment in one's activity (3: 22b). 
The key term of the unit (3: 1-22) is flu (time) which occurs in 
all three subunits: 3: 8,11,17. In relation to the term are two 
pairs of ideas: death and joy, profit and portion. There is a 
'time' allocated to death and joy though no one knows his/her own 
time. The unpredictability and unknowability of when what will 
happen and the fact that act and consequence has little relation 
leads to a negative answer to the 111111 question - no 'profit' in 
any human activity. But there is a 'portion' (I? ) in all human 
activity, that is to enjoy life. 
Life in Society 4: 1-16 
Qoh. 4: 1-16 forms a self-contained unit by itself; 4: 17 of the 
Hebrew Bible forms a link to the next unit. Several subunits are 
33For the history of interpretation and various translations of 
3: 15b, cf. R. B. Salters, "A Note on the Exegesis of Ecclesiastes 
3: 15b, " ZAW 88 (1976): 419-22. 
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clearly demarcated. 4: 1-6 forms two subunits (4: 1-3; 4: 4-6). 
34 4: 7-8 
turns to another observation and follows with a series of numerical 
'better' -proverbs to form another subunit, 4: 9-12. The last sub- 
unit, 4: 13-16 Is an example story. The common concern of all these 
sub-units is that of personal, communal and national life, where 
absurdity abounds (4: 4,7-8,16). 
4: 1-3 On Oppression. The phrase i1? t 1? tl ']it 10]711 (And I turned and 
saw) marks the beginning of a subunit on the subject of oppression 
(4: 1). The observation on oppression is followed by a pair of 
contrasting proverbial sayings (4: 2-3) with 4: 3 having the form of 
a 'better'-proverb. 
4: 4-6 On Activity. This subunit begins with the familiar phrase 
'IK '11'K 11 (And I saw) and is also followed by a pair of contras- 
ting proverbial sayings (4: 5-6) with another 'better'-proverb in 
4: 6. Activities of the fools and the wise are the theme in this 
subunit. 
4: 7-12 On One, Two or Three. The phrase M711 ': 17J ; 7XI 'M 'M711 VV VIVT 
V1t]tfif (Then I turned and saw absurdity under the sun) signals the 
beginning of another subunit. The subunit concerns the 7ý? Y1 of accu- 
mulating wealth for oneself yet having none to share the wealth 
with or pass it onto and the deprivation of oneself from enjoying 
one's life (4: 7-8). Thus, a series of numerical sayings (4: 9-12) 
follows to encourage companionship, dwelling on the number 'two' or 
even 'three' (4: 12b). 
4: 13-16 An Example Story. The story begins with a 'better'-proverb 
(4: 13) and follows with a commentary illustrating the non-enduring 
value of wisdom. 
34Crenshaw following Gordis, links 4: 1-3 with the previous unit 
(3: 16-4: 3); Wright and Murphy think 4: 1-6 belongs to the unit 
3: 1-4: 6; A. Schoors demarcates 4: 1-16 as a unit with four subunits: 
4: 1-3; 4: 4-6; 4: 7-12; 4: 13-16. 
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Advice Concerning Religious Matters 
Advice 4: 17-5: 8 
A series of imperatives and the change of subject from the 
previous unit mark 4: 17-5: 8 as a new unit. 35 4: 17-5: 6 consists of 
advice for the religious sphere and 5: 7-8 is concerned with injus- 
tice in the high places. In form, it consists of quotations (5: 2, 
6a), several prohibitions (5: 1,3,5a, 7) 
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and commands (4: 17a, 5: 6b). 
The series of commands and prohibitions is based on the principles 
that God is unfathomable and that act and consequence have little 
relationship. It also aims to warn those who go to the temple to 
fear God. 5: 7-8 are two textually difficult and probably related 
verses which consist of a prohibition (5: 7) and a saying about the 
king (5: 8). 
Profit and Wealth 5: 9-19 
This unit breaks away from the religious subject of the previous 
unit and returns to the question of profit in wealth. It consists 
of three wisdom sayings (5: 9-11), an 'example-story' (5: 12-16) and 
concludes with advice to enjoy life as a gift from God (5: 17-19). 
This is the fourth of the seven pieces of advice to enjoy one's 
life and the fruits of activity (7nv). As in the previous units 
1: 12-2: 26 and 3: 1-22, the advice to enjoy life in 5: 17-19 (Evv. 
5: 18-20) forms the conclusion to the unit 5: 9-19. 
35Most scholars (Wright, Murphy, Crenshaw, Schoors) consider 
4: 17-5: 8 to be a unit, though a few (Ogden, Gordis) think 5: 7-8 
belongs to another unit. 
3ß5: 3a is a close quotation from Deuteronomy 23: 22. For a history 
of interpretation of this unit, see R. B. Salters, "Notes on the 
History of the Interpretation of Koh. 5: 5, " ZAW 90 (1978): 95-101. 
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The Opportunity to Enjoy Life 6: 1-9 
In form, this unit breaks away from the advice in 5: 17-19. It 
begins with an example story (6: 1-6) 
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about the 7: i1 of posses- 
sions (6: 1-2) and the 7: il of a joyless long life (6: 3-6), and 
follows with a series of wisdom sayings (6: 7), rhetorical questions 
(6: 8) and a 'better'-proverb (6: 9a) leading to the 7nij conclusion 
in 6: 9b. The key idea as expressed in the rhetorical questions and 
the advice to the undesirable situation as expressed through the 
example stories (6: 1-6) is found in the 'better'-proverb (6: 9a). 
The refrain M1 Ilay71 'S ý1 t]l (Also this is absurd and a striving 
after wind) in 6: 9b marks the end of the unit, though in general 
terms, it also marks the end of the first six chapters of the book. 
The Unattainability of Wisdom 6: 10-7: 29 
This is the first of the three blocks of materials (8: 1-17; 9: 1- 
11: 6) that characterizes the second half of the book. 
38 Scholarly 
opinion concerning the length of this unit varies widely, though 
most would agree that 6: 10-12 is an introduction. Most scholars 
would demarcate 7: 1-29 into various smaller subunits without having 
to relate them together to form a large unit as I do here. In fact, 
the various smaller subunits: 6: 10-12; 7: 1-14; 7: 15-18; 7: 19-24; 
7: 25-29, are all concerned with the theme of wisdom. 
39 It begins 
with an introduction (6: 10-12) which consists of a statement on 
37 On the history of Jewish interpretations of 6: 2, see R. B. 
Salters, "Notes on the Interpretation of Qoh. 6: 2, " ZAW 91 (1979): 
282-89. 
38I differ from Schoors who demarcates the three blocks as 7: 1-9: 
10; 9: 11-10: 20; 11: 1-6, with 6: 10-12 as an introduction. 
39Wright, Murphy, Schoors, Crenshaw, Lauha and Gordis take 7: 1-14 
as a unit, while Ogden thinks 7: 13-14 relates better to 7: 15-18. 
There is no agreement on where the unit begins with 7: 15 should 
end. There are proposals that it ends with 7: 22 (Crenshaw), 7: 24 
(Wright, Murphy, Schoors), or 7: 25 (Gordis). I take 7: 15-18 
(Brindle), 7: 19-24 (Ogden), 7: 25-29 (Wright, Murphy, Schoors, 
Ogden) as three subunits. 
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human impotence and follows with rhetorical questions (6: 11-12) 
that introduce wisdom as the theme of the following subunits. The 
root y`I' occurs frequently in the unit which also consists of a 
series of 'better'-proverbs, wisdom sayings on what is 'good', 
instructions, quotations and reflection on the theme of wisdom and 
justice. 
7: 1-14 The Unattainable Wisdom of God. This subunit consists of a 
series of cleverly edited wisdom sayings on what is 'good' (7: 1-12) 
and 7: 13-14 brings the thought together as a conclusion, urging one 
to accept one's fate knowing that the work (MIM) of God is 
unattainable by human wisdom (7: 13-14). Without 7: 13-14, the series 
of sayings stand as an anthology with little focus. 
7: 15-18 Staying Alive. The main dispute of the structure of this 
subunit is where it should end, 7: 18,7: 22, or 7: 24? 40 A reality is 
observed in 7: 15 on the criss-crossing of deeds and consequences of 
righteousness and wickedness. Three pieces of advice are given in 
7: 16-18 as principles of conduct in face of the reality. The ulti- 
mate advice is to fear God whose activity is hidden from human 
wisdom (7: 18). The advice concludes this subunit. 
7: 19-24 The Value and the Unattainability of Wisdom. The saying in 
7: 19, though still on the theme of wisdom, breaks away from the 
discussion of 7: 15-18 on the principles of conduct. The value of 
wisdom is greatly appreciated when compared with military power 
(7: 19); yet wisdom is beyond the reach of human knowledge (7: 24). 
7: 25-29 Three Findings. This subunit begins with the phrase 'I11: 10 
'171 ']tt (I turned around even my heart) which signals a break from 
the previous subunit. The key term is '(not) finding' K'3T] which 
40R. N. Whybray, "Qoheleth the Immoralist? (Qoh. 7: 16-17), " in 1W, 
pp. 191-204, thinks that 7: 15 belongs to the previous unit; Wayne 
A. Brindle, "Righteousness and Wickedness in Ecclesiastes 7: 15-18, " 
RUSS 23 (1985): 243-57, takes 7: 15-18 as a unit. SHEFFIELD 
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occurs seven times. The three findings concerning humankind are 
found in 7: 26,7: 27-28 and 7: 29. 
Wisdom and Justice 8: 1-17 
This unit forms the second block of materials of the second half 
of the book. Although scholars are divided over the structure of 
ch. 8,41 generally, three subunits may be demarcated: 8: 1-9; 8: 10- 
15; 8: 16-17, as marked by indicators such as '11'X7 j7ý) (And then I 
saw this, 8: 10) and ITV J7 ': 0-11X '11111 7VJK: ) (When I gave my heart to 
know, 8: 16). 
8: 1-9 Wisdom and the King. This subunit focuses on the wisdom of 
the sages and their conduct before the king (8: 1-4) through a 
series of sayings with command (8: 2) and prohibition (8: 3-4). Then, 
8: 5-9, although it continues with the theme of wisdom focuses on 
'time' (Ily), a concept which occurred earlier in ch. 3. Although 
the wise would know when to do what (8: 5), presumably before the 
king (8: 2-4), even they do not know the future events, especially 
those consequences of their actions (8: 7-8). The subunit concludes 
with a reflection on the power of the king (cf. 8: 2-4) in 8: 9 and 
mourns that 'absolute power corrupts absolutely. ' 
8: 10-15 On Injustice. The phrase 'And then I saw this' (8: 10) indi- 
cates a new observation on the problem of justice. No particularly 
clear logical structure is discernable. First it declares the 
criss-crossing of the deeds and consequences of the righteous and 
the wicked to be ': P, which it repeats again in 8: 14, with 8: 11 
providing the reason for the uprising of wicked deeds in society. 
Framed in between these verses is the advice to fear God as the 
41Zimmerli takes 8: 1-15 as a unit; BaruCq thinks 8: 1-8 forms a 
unit; Murphy demarcates ch. 8 as 8: 1-4; 8: 5-8; 8: 9-15; 8: 16-17; 
Crenshaw sees two units, 8: 1-9 and 8: 10-17; Hertzberg thinks 8: 1 
belongs to 7: 29 and sees two units in 8: 2-9 and 8: 10-9: 10. 
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golden principle of conduct (8: 12-13), which does not answer the 
problem of the suffering of the righteous which seems to be the 
theme of the passage. Neither does the next verse (8: 15) show any 
logical connection with 8: 14, except indirectly it serves as a con- 
cluding piece of advice in face of the absurd reality of 8: 14. 
Thus, as in the previous admonition to enjoy life (cf. 2: 24-26; 
3: 12-13; 3: 22; 5: 17-19), 8: 15 forms the fifth of the seven state- 
ments of advice to enjoy life and the conclusion of the subunit 
8: 10-15. 
8: 16-17 God's Work Unattainable by Human Wisdom. These two verses 
formally conclude 8: 1-17 with a reflection on the impotence of 
human knowledge. This contrasts with the faith which the wise place 
in wisdom in 8: 1 and supports the claims of 8: 7-8 on the unpredic- 
tability and unknowability of the activity of God. 
Wisdom and Joy 9: 1-11: 6 
This is the last of the three blocks of materials of the second 
half of the book. 42 I discerned six subunits: 9: 1-6; 9: 7-10; 9: 11- 
12; 9: 13-10: 1; 10: 2-20; 11: 1-6.43 
9: 1-6 Life is Better than Death. The phrase ': 0-U 'Ilh] iTT-77-i1K 'S . -I YT 
ofti-7>IIX 7a: 7f 
(For all this I took unto my heart, even to explain 
all this) indicates the beginning of a unit. This is followed by a 
statement of affirmation in 9: 1b that both the righteous and the 
42A. G. Wright considers 9: 1-11: 6 to be a large unit which consists 
of six subunits (9: 1-6; 9: 7-10; 9: 11-12; 9: 13-10: 15; 10: 16-11: 2; 11: 
3-6) each ending with the phrase 'do not know/no knowledge'. In his 
recent commentary and previous studies of 9: 1-16 (1982), 9: 17-10: 20 
(1980) and 11: 1-6 (1983), G. Ogden strongly argues that "As we move 
into ch. 9, we detect a transition from the former Investigative 
approach to one of discourse" (commentary on Qoheleth, p. 142). 
43Murphy sees five units: 9: 1-6; 9: 7-10; 9: 11-12; 9: 13-10: 15; 10: 
16-11: 6; Crenshaw demarcates a different sej of five units: 9: 1-10; 
9: 11-12; 9: 13-18; 10: 1-20; 11: 1-6; Gordis, 9: 4-12; 9: 13-10: 1; 10: 2- 
11: 6; Hertzberg thinks 9: 1-10 forms a subunit of the larger unit 
8: 10-9: 10, while 9: 11-10: 11,10: 12-20; 11: 1-8 are three units. 
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wicked are in the hands of God and that no one knows what is in 
life for them. 'Death' and 'life' are the two key words (9: 3,4,5) 
of this subunit, a theme raised earlier in chs. 2-3. The expression 
of 'love' and 'hate' in 6-. 1,6 forms the inclusion of the subunit 
(9: 1-6) which ends with the phrase 'under the sun'. 
9: 7-10 Be happy! This is the sixth of the seven pieces of advice to 
enjoy life. Its imperative mood, commanding the hearer to do as 
he/she is told, to enjoy life, makes it a subunit by itself. Two 
conditions that were not in the previous advice have been added 
here to accompany the command to enjoy life: good conduct or a 
clean life (9: 8) and a sense of striving for excellency in all 
activities (9: 10). 
9: 11-12 The Many Unexpected Occasions in Life. With no obvious 
logical sequence to follow from the last unit, these two verses 
begin with the phrase MOOR-MM ßi2 113I7J (I returned and saw under 
the sun, cf. 4: 1), and focus on the idea of 'time'(ily), especially 
the time of death (cf. ch. 3). Five unexpected results are observed 
in 9: 11a. The reason is given in 9: 11b and elaborated in 9: 12, 
where the situation of humankind being caught by evil time is 
compared to fish caught by evil nets and birds caught in a snare. 
9: 13-10: 1 The Strength and Weakness of Wisdom. This subunit con- 
sists of an example story with wisdom sayings (9: 13-10: 1) and a 
collection of proverbial sayings that contrast and compare the wise 
and the fool, the rich and poor, king and servant (10: 2-20). 
44 The 
'vulnerability of wisdom' despite its superiority as seen in 9: 13- 
18a is presented in 9: 18b-10: 1. 
44 Graham Ogden, "ix 17-x 20: Variations on the Theme of Wisdom's 
Strength and Vulnerability, " VT 30 (1980): 27-37, demarcates six 
subunits: 9: 17-18; 10: 1-4; 5-7; 8-11; 12-15; 16-20; Murphy, "Eccle- 
siastes (Qohelet ), " (FOTL, 13), pp. 146f., sees no clear structure 
in 10: 5-15 and recognizes 9: 17-10: 4 and 10: 16-20 as two subunits. 
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10: 2-20 Wisdom Sayings. This subunit contains a loosely structured 
collection of sayings that touches on a variety of themes: such as 
comparing the wise and foolish (10: 2-3,10-15); prohibition before 
the king (10: 4); social order (10: 5-7); the many unexpected occa- 
sions where acts and consequences mismatched (10: 8-9); wisdom in 
politics (10: 16-20). 
11: 1-6 The Irregular and the Unexpected. This unit consists of a 
series of sayings about the irregular/unexpected (11: 1) and regular 
/expected (11: 3) in daily human activities. The theme seems to be 
the unpredictability and unknowability of the activity (TOM) of 
God in 11: 5, which leads to the conclusion in 11: 6 advising human- 
kind to do the best they could and hope for the best. 
Enjoy Life Now! 11: 7-12: 7 
Most scholars would agree with the length of this unit, except 
some might want to include 12: 8. It consist of two parts: 11: 7-10 
and 12: 1-7. Two themes, 'Joy' (ffl 1) and 'remember' (7i1), revolve 
around the unit. The first part (11: 7-10) contains the last of the 
seven pieces of advice to enjoy life which is in the form of a 
command. The second part (12: 1-7) containing a vivid description of 
not only the certainty of death, but also its imminence, reinforces 
the first part of the command to enjoy life while there is still 
opportunity. The second part begins with an imperative clause 
(11: 12a) and is followed by three `171? t `f9 phrases that divide the 
part into three portions (12: 1b, 2-5,6-7). The focus of these two 
parts Is not on youth and old age as most scholars believe45 but 
rather, on life and death: enjoy life because there is no activity 
45Scholars such as Crenshaw, Murphy, Loader, Gordis, Wright. 
Lohfink, Lauha, and Zimmerli. In fact, Sawyer has long pointed out 
that old age Is never the interest of Qoheleth throughout the whole 
book in his article, "The Ruined House in Ecclesiastes 12: A 
Reconsideration of the Original Parable, " JBL 94 (1976): 519-31. 
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after death and death will arrive at the most unexpected moment. 
The two part structure alms to contrast life and death, bringing 
the theme on the enjoyment of life to a climax. 
The Concluding Statement 12: 8 
This concluding statement or refrain, echoing the opening remark 
of 1: 2, though with slight variation, sums up the main theme of 
Qoheleth's thought on the 7XjT of human existence. As in 1: 2, it is 
expressed in the superlative form, 7iß 7: ý 
f7fl171 1J d'7Df 7]1. 
The Epilogue 12: 9-14 
Most scholars understand 12: 9-14 as an epilogue. 48 It may be 
divided into two sections: (1) 12: 9-11; (2) 12: 12-14, as indicated 
by the phrases ? T'M) 11111 (And in addition to that, 12: 9) and TTOITT 
711'1 (And in addition to these, 12: 12). There is no conclusive evi- 
dence to suggest more than one 'epilogist' involves in editing the 
epilogue. The role and function of Qoheleth as a sage is stated in 
12: 9-11 In the third person. The instructions to the reader are 
given in the form of imperative in 12: 12-14. It is difficult to 
discern whether the title 1: 1 also comes from the hand of the edi- 
tor of the epilogue. The combination of 'fearing God' and 'keeping 
the commandment of God' in an advice in 12: 13 is rare in the Old 
Testament, though not in contradiction with Qoheleth's thought in 
the book. The epilogist's exhortation is sounded clearly in 12: 13 
and the reason is given in 12: 14. 
46Even conservatives like Derek Kidner agree that "Beyond reason- 
able doubt the remaining verse, 12: 9-14, with their portrait of the 
writer, their warning against unauthorized teachings and their 
summary of the discourse, are an editorial epilogue or epilogues, " 
in Wisdom To Live By (Leicester: IVP, 1985), p. 90. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The above literary structure of the book is based on both form 
and content. There is no clear logical development in the structure 
of the book. The various pericopes are related to themes that run 
across the book and sometimes the pericopes within a larger unit 
form some kind of a development, for example 1: 12-2: 26. The demar- 
cation of the book into various pericopes that express various 
themes of Qoheleth's thought helps one to understand the book as a 
whole. What still needs to be understood is the underlying theolo- 
gical thought of Qoheleth. In order to do so, one needs first to 
delineate the structure of Qoheleth's theological thought. The 
above analysis of the literary structure of the book will assist in 
the analysis of Qoheleth's thought structure in the next chapter. 
Unlike others, I shall argue that the two controlling themes of 
Qoheleth's thought are 7]1 and the advice to enjoy life. 
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E. The Literary Outline 
I. The Title 1: 1 
II. A Thematic Statement 1: 2 
III. The Prologue 1: 3-11 
IV. The Experience 1: 12-2: 26 
A. 1: 12-18 Introductions 
B. 2: 1-11 The Test 
C. 2: 12-17 On Wisdom 
D. 2: 18-23 On Activity 
E. 2: 24-26 An Advice to Enjoy Life 
V. The Reality of Time 3: 1-22 
A. 3: 1-15 Time and Chance 
B. 3: 16-22 Time, Justice and Death 
VI. Life in Society 4: 1-16 
A. 4: 1-3 On Oppression 
B. 4: 4-6 On Activity 
C. 4: 7-12 On One, Two or Three 
D. 4: 13-16 An Example Story 
VII. Advice Concerning Religious Matters 4: 17-5: 8 
VIII. Profit and Wealth 5: 9-19 
IX. The Opportunity to Enjoy Life 6: 1-9 
X. The Unattainability of Wisdom 6: 10-7: 29 
A. 7: 1-14 The Unattainable Wisdom of God 
B. 7: 15-18 Staying Alive 
C. 7: 19-24 The Value and the Unattainability of Wisdom 
D. 7: 25-29 Three Findings 
XI. Wisdom and Justice 8: 1-17 
A. 8: 1-9 Wisdom and the King 
B. 8: 10-15 On Injustice 
C. 8: 16-17 God's Work Unattainable by Human Wisdom 
XII. Wisdom and Joy 9: 1-11: 6 
A. 9: 1-6 Life is Better than Death 
B. 9: 7-10 Be happy! 
C. 9: 11-12 The Many Unexpected Occasions in life 
D. 9: 13-10: 1 The Strength and Weakness of Wisdom 
E. 10: 2-20 Wisdom Sayings 
F. 11: 1-6 The Irregular and the Unexpected 
XIII. Enjoy Life Now! 11: 7-12: 7 
XIV. The Concluding Statement 12: 8 
XV. The Epilogue 12: 9-14 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STRUCTURE OF QOHELETH'S THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT 
The thought of Qoheleth has attracted a considerable amount of 
scholarly attention since the turn of the century. As seen earlier, 
there is no lack of theories which see Qoheleth as an importer of 
foreign concepts or ideologies. The purpose of this chapter, how- 
ever, is not to concern itself with these alleged borrowings, but 
to analyse the structure of Qoheleth's theological thought in the 
book of Qoheleth. 
The most common approach in analysing Qoheleth's theological 
thought is to study the various themes of Qoheleth. The following 
will examine the various proposals on the structure of Qoheleth's 
thought before making my own proposal. 
A. PROPOSED STRUCTURES 
There have been numerous proposals as to the thought structure 
of Qoheleth. 
1. Edwin Good proposes three basic axioms in Qoheleth's thought: 
a) Every man must find the significance of his life within that 
life, not beyond it. b) Distinctions are to be drawn in this life 
between what is good and what is bad, between righteousness and 
wickedness, wisdom and folly. c) The circumstances of life come 
from God. 1 He argues that all these three axioms come together in 
1Edwin Good, Irony in the Old Testament (Sheffield: Almond Press, 
1981): 168-95 (189). 
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7: 29, as he writes, 
... For if humankind refuse the third axiom, if they "seek 
out many dodges" [7: 29b], they are doomed with regard to the 
first two [axioms]. In affecting to ignore and escape God's "up- 
right" treatment of them, they bypass the possibility of life's 
meaning and the perception of the necessary distinctions. 
2. Nobert Lohfink3 argues that the structure of Qoheleth's 
thought consists of two parts. First, Qoheleth recognizes that 
"Death as the limit imposed upon human existence, cutting it off 
from the infinitely greater potentiality of the progress of time, 
forms the framwork at the beginning and the end of the book of 
Qoheleth. " Thus, "death has become the frontier situation which 
forces humans to reflect upon it and leads humans through this 
reflection toward a new attitude, that of hatred of life and 
disillusion. " The knowledge of death leads to the second part, 
where Qoheleth concentrates his thought upon the present moment, 
recognizing that "the happiness of the present moment should be 
embraced with joy and all should accept the gift of happiness in 
the present moment from the hand of God. " 
3. R. K. Johnston, based on Lohfink's thematic insights, argues 
that Qoheleth's thought develops in three stages: "Having noted a) 
a range of limits imposed on man's experience, and b) the resultant 
folly of man's attempt to master his life, Qoheleth c) reasserts 
the sage's advice that man's lot (P7j) is to enjoy OMI or WJIOý)) 
the life that God gives (1113) him. " 4 
2E. Good, loc. cit. , pp. 189f. 
3Norbert Lohf ink, The Christian Meaning of the Old Testament 
(trans. R. A. Wilson; London: Burns & Oates, 1969) : 147-56; R. K. 
Johnston, "Confessions of a Workaholic, " CBQ 38 (1976): 14-28 (21), 
however, understood N. Lohfink in a three-pronged way: 1) death as 
the limit imposed upon human existence; 2) the hatred of life and 
the disillusionment that results from this realization; and 3) the 
reality of the present moment as a gift from God to be enjoyed. 
4R. K. Johnston, op. cit., p. 21. It is doubtful, In his third 
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4. James L. Crenshaw proposes five major theses in Qoheleth's 
thought: a) Death cancels everything; b) wisdom cannot achieve its 
goal; c) God is unknowable; d) the world is crooked; and e) 
pleasure commends itself. Crenshaw believes that "all these five 
theses flow from a loss of trust in the goodness of God, the 
presupposition of earlier wisdom. "5 
S. Gerhard von Rads sums up Qoheleth's thought in three basic 
insights: a) A thorough, rational examination of life is unable to 
find any satisfactory meaning; everything is 'vanity'. b) God 
determines every event. c) Human beings are unable to discern these 
decrees, or "works of God", in the world. 
6. H. -P. Müller argues that "the thought of Qoheleth is shaped 
by the structure of a 'creator' religion. "7 This religious outlook 
prevents any person from passing any judgment upon the creator and 
the created world, even though "the world order established by the 
heavenly creator falls victim to a value vacuum. " Müller thinks 
that for Qoheleth, this 'creator' religion "opens the way to a 
theologically motivated joy In living. " S 
7. According to Bruce Vawter, Antonio Bonora9 argues that Qohe- 
leth's thought revolves around two affirmations: all is vanity 
(': 177 , 1: 2; 12: 8) and God makes everything beautiful (fl , 3: 11). 
point, whether R$'1 (to see) can be equated with f 131 (to enjoy). 
5James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction 
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981): 126-48 (128); of. idem, "The 
Eternal Gospel (Eccl. 3: 11), " in Essays in Old Testament Ethics 
(ed. James Crenshaw and John Willis; New York: KTAV, 1974): 25-55. 
6Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (trans. J. D. Martin; New York: 
Abingdon, 1972), pp. 227-8. 
7H. 
-P. Müller, "Neige der althebräischen >Weisheit< Zum Denken 
Qohaläts, " ZAW 90 (1978): 238-64 (253). 
eQuotation is taken from MUller's own English summary in p. 263. 
°As the article by Antonio Bonora, "Esperienza e timor dl Dlo in 
Qohelet, " Teologia 6 (1981): 171-82, is unavailable to me, this is 
based on Vawter's summary in O. T. Abstract 5 (1982), p. 165. 
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The first concerns human experience and the second refers to reli- 
gious faith. 
8. J. A. Loader, 10 recently argues that Qoheleth's thought is 
structured in a polar pattern11 - thought or pole and counterthought 
or counterpole - which creates a tension that often leads to a 
e 
hebel statement. Loader states that "polar structures occur in 
almost every literary unit of the book" and he arranges Qoheleth's 
thought according to ten areas of different aspects of polarity: 
(1) Conservation, life--abandonment, death (3: 1-9; 7: 1-4); (2) 
Worth and Worthlessness of wisdom (1: 12-2: 26; 4: 13-16; 7: 5-7; 7: 11- 
8: 1; 8: 16-17; 9: 11-10: 11); (3) Risk and assurance (11: 1-6); (4) 
Political power and powerlessness (8: 2-9); (5) Talk and silence 
(4: 17-5: 8; 6: 10-12; 7: 8-10; 10: 12-15a; 10: 16-20); (6) Wealth has no 
value (5: 6-6: 9); (7) Labour with and without product (3: 10-15; 4: 4- 
6; 4: 7-12); (8) The inhuman human (3: 16-22; 4: 1-3); (9) No retribu- 
tion where expected (8: 10-15; 9: 1-10); (10) Toil and joy (3: 12-13; 
3: 22; 8: 15; 9: 7-10; 11: 7-12: 8). Among these, the aspect of `worth 
and worthlessness of wisdom' takes up the largest proportion of the 
overall thought and text, and 'risk and assurance' has the smallest 
share. He also asserts that "the basic idea running through all of 
them is the conviction of emptiness which purposely begins and ends 
the book. " 12 In sum, Loader sees the thought of Qoheleth as being 
10J. A. Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet, argues 
the polarity of Qoheleth's thought in terms of the religio-histor- 
ical development of Judaism in his last chapter, pp. 124-131. 
11 Loader refers the term 'polar structure' "to a thought pat- 
tern, i. e. a structure of contents" and it does not "mean the pro- 
cess of thinking in Qoheleth's brain, but the actual manifestation 
of a pattern in the contents of his literary product. " This is not 
the same as "the formal structure of the literary units in the book 
(p. 1). 
12Loader, loc. cit., p. 9, also recognizes that "it is not suffi- 
cient to take the dominant idea as the only relation between the 
separate units. " They are also related to each other simply by 
sharing one of the ten major aspects of polarities. 
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dispersed throughout the ten topics and the only common element 
between them, besides the idea of hebel, is that they all share the 
same pattern of thought - the polar pattern. 
9. H. W. Hertzberg23 sums up the theology of the book in three 
main ideas: (1) der Ausschliesslichkeit Gottes, the exclusivity of 
everything being determined by God; (2) der Eitelkeit alles 
Irdischen, the vanity of all earthly things; (3) die Gegenwart so, 
wie sie ist, d. h. also aus Gotts Hand, entgegenzunehmen, To accept 
the present, just as it is. that is, as coming from God's hand. 
10. Graham Ogden14 has argued recently that the thought of 
Qoheleth is structured around a thesis - enjoy life - which is 
argued by (1) a programmatic question about humanity's yitrOn or 
'advantage' (1: 3); (2) its hebel answer (negative); and (3) the 
response to enjoy life which flows from that. 
The above proposals for the structure of Qoheleth's thought are 
by no means the only ones but are a good representation of the vast 
scholarly interest in the subject. Though there may be some 
differences in their understanding of the structure of Qoheleth's 
thought, it is not surprising to find some common factors among 
them. 
B. EVALUATION 
There are, obviously, common motifs that most scholars agree are 
central to Qoheleth's thought, though there are also many indivi- 
dual and idiosyncratic proposals. For instance, the concept of 7nil 
13H. W. Hertzberg, Der Prediger (KAT; Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1963). 
14Graham Ogden, Qoheleth (Readings: A New Commentary; Sheffield: 
JSOT Press, 1987), pp. 12-15. 
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has been generally recognized as a main concept in the thought 
structure of Qoheleth without much dispute. The Idea of God has 
also received considerable attention, for example, in Hertzberg's 
theology of Qoheleth and also in von Rad's, Crenshaw's, Good's, 
Lohfink's and Johnston's proposals. Lohfink's recognition of death 
as the main idea of Qoheleth's thought is also adopted by R. K. 
Johnston and even gained a prominent role in Crenshaw's 
understanding. However, Good sees life as the main thought of 
Qoheleth, as exemplified in his three axioms. Good's analysis of 
the concept of "vanity" is constructive and will be examined more 
closely later in this chapter. 
Among the most generally agreed central concepts in Qoheleth are 
hebel and 'joy', although 'death' has also attracted considerable 
attention. Secondary themes such as 'profit' (a primary theme in 
Ogden's thesis), 'portion', 'wealth' and 'wisdom' have also been 
the subjects of thematic analysis. However, there is a defect in 
most thematic analyses, namely, an inability to relate the themes 
to each other and to the total structure of Qoheleth's thought. 
The lack of exegetical analysis of Qoheleth has also caused 
considerable difficulty for evaluating the proposed thought 
structures as mentioned above in (A). J. A. Loader's analysis of 
Qoheleth's polar thought pattern is outstanding in this respect and 
deserves a closer evaluation. Graham Ogden's proposal is also worth 
commenting on as it represent one of the most recent fresh looks at 
Qoheleth. 
1. J. A. Loader 
J. A. Loader's analysis of the structure of Qoheleth's thought in 
the form of polar structures is so complex that it becomes elusive. 
I find the numerous structural diagrams at the end of each unit or 
aspect of polarity most enigmatic. Although he groups the thirty 
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literary units (1: 12-12: 8) under ten aspects of polar thought, 
polarity is not obvious in some of them, such as 'No retribution 
where expected' or 'Wealth has no value'. The tenth aspect - Toil 
and Joy - does not necessarily constitute a polarity but two 
separate entities. In fact, the grouping of the literary units 
under the ten aspects is most obscure. For instance, it is 
misleading to group the unit 4: 17-5: 8 in which Qoheleth gives 
advice concerning religious matters under the aspect of 'Talk and 
Silence'. Similarly, the unit 5: 17-19 consisting of Qoheleth's 
advice to enjoy life is not included in the section where joy is 
discussed, but under the title 'Wealth has no value. ' Furthermore, 
to separate 'Toil' from the seventh aspect 'Labour without Product' 
is unjustifiable. It seems more appropriate to discuss the two 
units (3: 16-22; 4: 1-3) concerning social justice under the aspect 
of 'no retribution is expected' than under 'the inhuman human' as 
Loader does. 
Equally elusive is Loader's analysis of Qoheleth's thought in 
various literary units, structuring them into pole and counter- 
pole. For example, in his analysis of 3: 1-9 under the title 'life 
and death', he sums up the unit as pole = life, conservation; 
contra-pole = death, abandonment; and tension = no security, 
surrender of helpless man to the eventualities of life. But surely, 
the point of Qoheleth's thought in the unit is to question the 
1i1t1' of life which consists of the various occasions (3: 2-8). By 
focusing on the alleged polar pattern, Loader misses the interpre- 
tive key (3: 9) to Qoheleth's thought in this unit. It is also not 
clear how Loader derives the tension from the two opposing poles. 
Another example that demonstrates Loader's misinterpretation of 
Qoheleth's thought is the unit 2: 1-11 which Loader thinks it be- 
longs to the larger unit 1: 12-2: 26 which is concerned with the 
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subject of the 'worthlessness of wisdom'. He purports that the unit 
1: 12-2: 26 consists of two polar thoughts: (1) Thought = generally 
accepted wisdom; Counterthought = folly; and Tension = Relative 
priority of wisdom. (2) Thought = Generally accepted wisdom; Coun- 
terthought = Life's happenstances; and Tension = Worthlessness of 
wisdom. But the unit 2: 1-11 clearly concerns Qoheleth's test on 
mirth (flj? ý1 occurs four times) for profit, and the larger unit con- 
cerns more with the question of 11X1' and 7317 than with just 
wisdom's value as Loader claims. He certainly needs more justifi- 
cation for perceiving the two poles and tensions in the unit. 
It seems evident, based on the above consideration of Loader's 
interpretation of Qoheleth's thought, that he is proof-texting his 
thesis - the polar thought pattern. His alleged polar thought pat- 
tern in every unit is most unconvincing. Dispersing Qoheleth's 
thought into ten areas of different, and often unrelated, aspects 
of polarity is unjustifiable and only reveals his unwillingness, if 
not inability, to relate the various thoughts together to see a 
total structure of Qoheleth's thought. It is not incorrect to say 
that Loader is only interested in the pattern of Qoheleth's thought 
and not the thought of Qoheleth Itself. 
Although Loader asserts that "the persistent tension in the 
poems between polar opposites of all kinds leads to the basic theme 
of vanity, " only ten out of the fifty-eight polar opposites that he 
adduces result in a tension which can be related to the theme of 
vanity. 
is Despite Loader's attempt to demonstrate the relationship 
of the various units of polar thought through a diagrammatic sum- 
mary (cf. pp. 112,132), R. E. Murphy rightly says that such an 
isThe ten polar opposites that resulted a hebel tension are found 
in the units 3: 10-15; 4: 1-3; 4: 4-6; 4: 7-12 (2x); 6: 7-8; 7: 1-4; 7: 8- 
10; 8: 10-15; 11: 7-12: 8. 
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interlocking and schematic diagram summary "is more mysterious than 
the text of Qohelet. "16 It appears that Loader has over emphasized 
the significance of the polar tension and the 'emptiness' theme in 
the overall structure of Qoheleth's thought which-has misled him to 
bypass the presence of other significant themes such as the enjoy- 
ment of life. 
2. Graham Ogden 
Differing from Loader's structural analysis, Ogden has correctly 
identified the various siginificant themes in Qoheleth's thought, 
such as profit, hebel and joy. He has attempted to relate them to 
each other in terms of a programatic question, a negative answer 
and a positive response. Ogden thinks that the positive response, 
i. e. the call to enjoy life, is central to Qoheleth's thought and 
thus, forms the single thesis of his thought. The theme of hebel as 
expressed through the hebel-phrase is not to be taken as the thesis 
of Qoheleth's thought, but only as mere pointer, or a negative 
answer to the programatic question about profit, which leads to the 
thesis - enjoy life - as a response to the negative answer. By 
subordinating all the other themes under the theme of joy, Ogden 
takes a new stand against most of the previous understandings of 
Qoheleth's thought, especially that of Loader's who strongly argues 
that the theme of joy must be subordinated under hebel as the main 
theme in Qoheleth's thought. 
Although Ogden has elevated the theme of joy to become the 
single thesis in Qoheleth's thought, he achieves it by diminishing 
the importance of the theme of hebel unnecessarily, if not unjusti- 
fiably. According to his argument, the theme of profit, as express- 
ed in the form of a programatic question. Is even more significant 
isR. E. Murphy, CBQ 42 (1980), p. 245, rightly points out that 
polarity is not a dominant element in Qoheleth's thought. 
58 
than the hebet theme because the programatic question about profit 
forms the framwork of Qoheleth's argument for the thesis. Surely 
the hebel theme (which occurs 38 times) has a more significant, if 
not primary, place in Qoheleth's thought than the concept of profit 
(JIM which occurs 10 times) as most would agree. 
Ogden's unwillingness to grant the concept of hebel a primary 
place and thus to reduce the complexity of Qoheleth's thought to a 
mere single thesis is a fatal mistake in his analysis of the 
structure of Qoheleth's thought. 
In sum, the major weakness of the existing proposals concerning 
the structure of Qoheleth's thought lies in their unwillingness and 
probably inability to search for and/or establish any legitimate 
relationships between the various thematic elements they have iden- 
tified. It is inadequate just to study the various themes or 
concepts of Qoheleth without relating them to the whole structure 
of Qoheleth's thought. Though Ogden has correctly elevated the call 
to enjoy life to a key position In Qoheleth's thought, he achieves 
it at the expense of another main thought - hebel. Similarly with 
Loader's structural analysis, although he has identified a key 
theme, the 'emptiness' of everything, upon which the structure of 
Qoheleth's thought develops, he might have missed its twin, the 
concept of joy. 
Having analysed the inadequacy of the various proposals for the 
structure of Qoheleth's thought, it is the purpose of this chapter 
to argue for a greater degree of coherence between the primary and 
secondary themes within the structure of Qoheleth's thought. The 
following section will propose, and subsequently argue for a pair 
of concepts as the primary thought structure which will accommodate 
the various secondary themes within Qoheleth's thought. 
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C. THE TWO PRIMARY CONCEPTS OF OOHELETH'S THOUGHT: 
Hebel and Joy 
It Is noticeable that over the past century of Qoheleth studies. 
there has been a transformation in understanding the nature of 
Qoheleth's thought, from a view of it as essentially pessimistic to 
a relatively optimistic view. The phrase []'`77 7T (1: 2; 12: 8) and 
the numerous occurrences of the term 7: I%T are seen more as an 
unifying theme in Qoheleth's thought, rather than as an indicator 
of pessimism. Certainly, the term '3J and its usages are crucial to 
the understanding of Qoheleth's thought. One other reason for 
rejecting the characterization of Qoheleth's thought as pessimistic 
is that the concept of joy has been increasingly recognized by 
scholars to be a major motif in Qoheleth's thought, though they are 
uncertain of the relationship between joy and hebel. With this 
positive recognition, the motif of 'death' receives lesser atten- 
tion and is reduced to secondary importance17 along with other 
motifs such as 'wisdom', 'wealth' and 'toil'. The concept of 
'profit' (f17I1') and 'portion' (p'11), remain significant in 
Qoheleth's thought due to the speculation about the thought's rich 
commerical background. 18 
17Contrast Norbert Lohfink, op. cit., pp. 147-56, who understands 
that "Death as the firm Limit imposed upon human existence, cutting 
it off from the infinitely greater potentiality of the progress of 
time, forms the framework at the beginning and the end of the Book 
of Qoheleth" (147). 
iSJames Williams, "What does it profit a man? The Wisdom of 
Koheleth, " Judaism 20 (1971): 179-93; Graham Ogden in his new 
commentary, op. cit., based on two key terms, 'enigma' (')ßf) and 
'advantage' (111111), argues that the purpose of Qoheleth is to 
search for an answer to the question of 'profit' (Ihn" ). 
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The following is a proposal that 7Vf, 'the absurd' and #fiTUJ, 
'joy'. as two concepts, are fundamental in the structure of 
Qoheleth's thought. The concepts of ']`YT and joy of Qoheleth will 
first be studied which followed by an analysis of their 
relationship to each other within Qoheleth's thought. Thirdly, the 
relationship between these two concepts, and joy, and various 
secondary themes will be studied. The secondary themes include 
'profit' (j171. ), 'portion' (u ), 'wealth' (`17f 9O ), 'wisdom' 
OTIO: )n), 'death' M113), 'remembrance' (ji1ý1) and 'God' (P i'7 ). It 
must be noted, however, that the point of this proposal is not the 
question of how significant the themes of ': Ij'j and joy are in the 
book, but the point is that these two concepts make sense of 
Qoheleth's thought. The former approach only points out the 
importance of the theme as one among many within the book; while 
the latter understands the two concepts as the determinative 
element in the structure of Qoheleth's thought. 
1.7ýfl 
a. Various Understandings of 'DI 
Although this term is frequently studied, very few studies have 
concentrated on its use in the book itself as uniquely employed by 
Qoheleth. Most studies have tried to understand the meaning of the 
term etymologically or from its use in other parts of the Old Test- 
ament. These studies do not do full justice to its use in Qoheleth 
and therefore are liable to misunderstand Qoheleth's thought. Simi- 
larly, translating the term into various alleged synonymous or 
related terms also do no justice to the meaning of the term in 
Qoheleth. The following will examine the various studies of the 
term's usage in Qoheleth after discussing its various translations. 
1) Usual Translations. There are at least twenty English transla- 
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tions, nouns or adjectives, for the term according to its various 
contexts: vanity, meaninglessness, emptiness, transitoriness, noth- 
ing, breath, wind, vapour, transience, enigmatic, perplexity, 
elusive, fleeting, ineffectual, futile, fruitlessness, ephemerali- 
ty, inequity, unbeneficial and profitlessness. The more words used 
to translate, the more certain it becomes that the term is ambig- 
uous in the minds of the translators. The idea that the meaning of 
the term can only be determined by its use in different contexts 
will be examined later in C. l. b, but first we shall turn to examine 
the various studies on the usage of the term in Qoheleth. 
2) Edwin Good. 19 When discussing usage of the term 7]T, Edwin Good 
rightly points out the obvious fact that "The fact that Third 
Isaiah can use hebel to mean a 'vapor' (Isa. 57: 13) does not mean 
that Qoheleth must do so. " It is correct that Qoheleth never used 
the word in the sense of "vapour". The precise meaning of the word 
7: -i must be determined by its various uses in Qoheleth. After 
examining the occurrences of the word in Qoheleth, Edwin Good 
concludes that "the word hebel is used to point out incongruities. " 
He then gives seven examples of incongruities in Qoheleth, 
2° and 
writes, "Qoheleth uses the term hebel to mean something very close 
to 'irony' and 'ironic'. "21 Good is right in his analysis of the 
is Edwin Good, Irony in the Old Testament, p. 77. 
20Ibid. 
, p. 182, "It is incongruous that a man's work may go for 
the advantage of someone he does not know who has not done the 
work. It is incongruous that the wise and fool, good and bad, pious 
and impious, come to the same destiny. It is incongruous that the 
righteous and the wicked are treated as if they were the opposite, 
that the wicked should be praised for doing badly. It Is 
incongruous that a man toils merely to keep up with the Joneses. It 
is incongruous that, although rejoicing is the best thing for man 
to do, it accomplishes nothing. It is incongruous that man should 
foolishly multiply his dreams and his babblings before God. The 
whole of life, the motto says is a tissue of incongruity. " 
21W E. Staples, "The 'Vanity' of Ecclesiastes, " JNES 2 (1943): 95- 
104; idem, "Vanity of Vanities, " CJT 1 (1955): 141-56, suggests the 
meaning of "mystery. " Graham Ogden suggests the meaning "enigma- 
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usage of 7: I'jT in Qoheleth as marking incongruities. But he stops 
short of identifying the precise usage and meaning of the term 
because he is interested in a literary feature (irony) in Qoheleth, 
rather than the philosophical or theological aspect (incongruity or 
absurdity) of Qoheleth's thought. This is followed up later by 
Michael Fox who develops the idea of incongruities further in a 
recent article. 
3) Michael Fox22. In his article entitled "The Meaning of HEBEL for 
Qoheleth, " M. Fox suggests "absurd" or "absurdity" as the dominant 
meaning of the term 7: IY in Qoheleth. He defines it thus: "The 
essence of the absurd is a disparity between two terms that are 
supposed to be joined by a link of harmony or causality but are, in 
fact, disjunct. The absurd is an affront to reason. " 23 Taking issue 
with Edwin Good, Fox attempts a distinction between 'irony'. the 
'incongruous' and the 'absurd'. He argues as follows: 
... incongruities and ironies may be merely puzzling or 
amusing; the absurd is never that. Some ironies may also satisfy 
a sense of justice, as when a man is caught in trap he has set; 
the absurd never does. Incongruities and ironies may lie within 
the grasp of human intellect and evoke a variety of reactions. 
Hebel for Qoheleth, like "absurd" for Camus, is not merely 
incongruous or ironic; it is oppressive, even tragic. The 
divorce between act and result Is the reality upon which human 
reason founders; it robs human actions of significance and 
undermines morality. For Qoheleth hebel is an injustice. 
Fox perceives that 7Sj is more than an intellectual abstraction for 
Qoheleth; it is an emotional outcry, a response based on the 
observation and experience of 7]ßf in daily life. Oppression and 
injustice form the main part of the reality of human experience. 
tic", though he shows approval of the meaning "incongruity. " 
22Michael Fox, "The Meaning of Hebel for Qoheleth, " JBL 105: 3 
(1986): 409-27. 
23Ibid. 
, p. 409. 
24Ibid. 
, p. 410. 
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Fox concludes his study by stating that 
... the book of Qoheleth, taken as a whole, is not primarily 
lamenting the brevity of life or exposing the vanity of worldly 
wealth and pleasures.... His main complaint [is] the irrationa- 
lity of life as a whole, which is to say, of divine behavior.... 
Underlying Qoheleth's hebel-judgments is an assumption that the 
system should be rational, which, for Qoheleth, means that 
actions should invariably produce appropriate consequences. In 
fact Qoheleth stubbornly expects them to do so (3: 17; 5: 5; 7: 17; 
8: 12b-13). 25 
4. Others 
Fox's understanding of 7: IiT to mean "absurd" is recently adopted 
by Crenshaw in his new commentary. But even before Fox's analysis, 
Frank Crüsemann has already suggested the idea when he asserts that 
"A basic presupposition of Koheleth's thinking is that there is no 
connection between what human beings do and how they fare. "26 
However, Crüsemann makes no connection with the term 'ý1 when he 
analyses Qoheleth's thought under the title 'The Collapse of the 
Act-Consequence Connection'. 
Another recent attempt to understand the usage of the term in 
Qoheleth is that of Ogden. He discusses the usage of the term under 
three sections: (1) Scenarios which are described as hebel; (2) 
Parallel and Complementary Phrases; and (3) Qoheleth's Call to 
Enjoyment. 27 He concludes that 
It seems abundantly evident from the representative examples 
of hebet ... that Qoheleth does not mean to claim that life is 
empty, vain, an44neaningless. As he addresses the next generation 
his point is simply that life is replete with situations to 
which even the sage, the philosopher theologian, has no answer. 
It is the word hebel that Qoheleth applies to describe these 
situation. 
... the term hebel in Qoheleth has a distinctive function 
and meaning: it conveys the notion that life is enigmatic, and 
25Ibid. 
, p. 426. 
28Frank Crüsemann, "The Unchangeable World: The 'Crisis of 
Wisdom' in Koheleth, " trans. M. J. O'Connell in God of the Lowly, 
ed. W. Schottroff and W. Stegemam (New York: Orbis Book, 1984), pp. 
57-77 (59). 
27Graham Ogden, op. cit., pp. 18-22. 
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mysteriousi8 that there are many unanswered and unanswerable 
questions. 
Ogden could have been more specific or explicit in his analysis in 
defining the meaning of the term hebel as used in Qoheleth. 
With the above analysis in the background, we shall turn to see 
what the texts say about the term hebel (7V fl). 
b. Qoheleth's Use of '? 29 
1) The 13"? : UT 711 statement (1: 2; 12: 8). The term 7ý1T occurs . 1-9 
seventy-three times in the Hebrew Bible and thirty-eight times in 
Qoheleth alone. The most obvious occurrence is in its superlative 
form in 1: 2 and 12: 8 framing the book proper. 30 1: 2 includes the 
phrase b'? ýiT '7 twice and follows with the phrase ']i1 'I)3, while 
12: 8 reads '7 J 
'T 131'? ýt It is clear that the phrase n'5: 1-11 7 SP 
is qualitatively stronger than the term 7]J, while the phrase `5 J 
`: NT that follows draws attention to the scope of the superlative 
phrase. If the term 7nij is translated as 'absurd', then the super- 
lative phrase can be translated as 'utterly absurd' or 'absurdly 
absurd'. But what does it mean? It is clear that its meaning can 
only be determined by usage throughout the book and not from its 
occurrences in 1: 2 and 12: 8 alone. 
The superlative form in 1: 2 functions as an announcement of what 
Qoheleth is going to argue and declares Qoheleth's perception of 
the subject of his study. At the end of the investigation, Qoheleth 
28Graham Ogden, op. cit., pp. 21f. 
29Cf. 1: 2,14; 2: 1,11,15,17,19,21,23,26; 3: 19; 4: 4,7,8,16; 5: 6(Ev. 
7), 9(Ev. 10); 6: 2,4,9,11,12; 7: 6,15; 8: 10,14; 9: 9; 11: 8,10; 12: 8. 
30Fox believes that the embracing of the thirty-eight occurrences 
of the term with the two superlative formsin 1: 2 and 12: 8 must have 
implied a common meaning inherited in the term as used by Qoheleth 
throughout the occurrences in the book. This belief motivated Fox 
to study and analyse the usages of the term and concludes that 
"absurd" is the root meaning in the use of the term by Qoheleth in 
all of its occurrences. 
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once again repeats his utterance in 12: 8 as support for his 
announcement in 1: 2 and the main investigation (1: 3-12: 7). The 
announcement in 1: 2 is more stronger and more forceful than the 
conclusion in 12: 8 as the phrase t? 7Ij is used only once at the 
end, probably because Qoheleth believes that the investigation (the 
book proper) has convincingly argued for his concept of '). is 
Besides the meaning of " J, one other interesting element in the 
introductory and concluding manifesto that also needs investigation 
is the meaning and scope of the term 7DI1 'everything, all'. It is 
not immediately clear that whether Qoheleth intend the term to 
include literally 'everything'. It transpires only as we go on 
reading the book that the term is used as a general term for the 
whole system but not all the details and does not mean literally 
everything because Qoheleth acknowledges the non-absurdity or 
non-'1'i of some things such as joy, wisdom and wealth (cf. 2: 24,26; 
7: 11; 9: 13,18; 5: 18). He does not see eating, drinking and enjoying 
one's life as absurd, because he affirms that "There is nothing 
better for humankind than that they should eat and drink, and find 
enjoyment in their activities" (2: 24). He also sees value in 
wisdom: "Wisdom is good with an inheritance, an advantage to those 
who see the sun. For the protection of wisdom is like the protec- 
tion of money; and the advantage of knowledge is that wisdom 
preserves the life of him who has it" (7: 11,12); "wisdom is better 
than might" (9: 16). 
The phrase 'under the sun' is often used synonymously for 1: )#-1, 
describing the scope of what Qoheleth pronounces as 7]T. Fox recog- 
nizes the word 7ij "everything" does not mean "truly universal, " 
and is contented to see the t)-sl In 1: 2 and 12: 8 as synonymous to 
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"all that happens under the sun" (i]' J fl1 t1rTfl )TDVI '1ý1K-I )31; and -1. V -1 T 
states that in these verses, 'everything' refers only to "what 
happens in the realm of human existence (under the sun), " instead 
of the "entirety of reality. " 
32 
Contrary to Fox, as I argued above, the phrase = 7X does not 
mean literally everything in the system with all the details. This 
includes the occurrences of the phrase in 1: 14, "I have seen all 
the works which are done under the sun, and behold, all is absurd 
('J1 `JZý f) and striving after wind, " and 2: 17, "Therefore I hated 
life because the work that is done under the sun is evil (l f) to 
me, for everything is 7nf MR ') and striving after wind, " as in 
1: 2 and 12: 8, do not mean literally all the details in the system 
where humankind exist. It is used as a general statement issued by 
Qoheleth whenever he encounters a `7]sT situation. A good example is 
4: 7-8 where Qoheleth describes a particular absurdity existing in a 
domestic situation or more precisely a particular situation of an 
individual; he states it as "I saw a `7]1 [an absurdity] under the 
sun. " However, in other situations when the phrase 7], i '3i occurs, 
the scope of "everything" refers to its immediate context of 
reference; 2: 11b refers to the context of 2: 1-10, like the last 
phrase of 2: 26, "Also this is `7: 'T and striving after wind, " which 
refers to the contexts of 2: 24-26, or 2: 1-26 or possibly 1: 12-2: 26. 
2) The search for JIM' (2: 1,11,22-23; 6: 11). The first occurrence 
of the term 'n after the superlative form in 1: 2 and 1: 14 is in 
2: 1 when the experiment on MIM) is pronounced 7i l1. Qoheleth has 
been searching for 1i1W and has found none; therefore he pro- 
nounces the non-11111' activity ' J. The reason is not Immediately 
31As in 1: 9,13,14; 2: 17; 8: 17; 9: 3,6d 
32 Michael Fox, op. cit., p. 423. 
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given. However, one could easily be misled into thinking that 
Qoheleth has pronounced j'111130 in itself to be 7X . Careful study 
shows that it is not iTWOO itself that the pronouncement is aiming 
at; instead, it is the test that yielded the unexpected experi- 
mental result - no JIM' - that Qoheleth declared "absurd". The 
NN-i, "it", refers to the testing for 11111' rather than s117131 itself. 
The act of enjoying does not lead to the effect of any flln' is 
. The fact that an experiment in the chemistry pronounced 
'VV 
laboratory does not yield the expected result does not prove that 
the substance used in the experiment is valueless. Qoheleth does 
not in 2: 1 contradict his positive encouragement elsewhere to enjoy 
life (cf. 2: 24ff. ). 
After his various experiments (2: 1-10), Qoheleth categorically 
pronounces that all his experiments with iMOO - which constitute 
the search for 111111 - was '7 f 77i "all was absurd" (2: 11). There 1. VY 
is a disparity, to the point of absurdity, between the effort 
invested and the result harvested. 
Again, one should not be misled into thinking that Qoheleth is 
declaring that actions such as wealth gathering (2: 8), drinking and 
dancing (2: 9) and wisdom gathering (2: 3) are to be prohibited 
because they all are '7 J. In Qoheleth's thought, 'ýT refers to the 
mismatch of an action and its expected effect. The declaration of 
7 does not imply the prohibition of any action, it reflects a 
state of realization in Qoheleth's thought. Thus, throughout the 
book Qoheleth encourages rather than prohibiting one to enjoy life, 
"to eat and to drink and to be happy" (2: 24ff.; 3: 12ff.; 3: 22; 
5: 17ff.; 8: 15; 9: 7-9; 11: 7-12: 1). 
The realization of '7n, absurdity, in human activities does not 
mean Qoheleth is encouraging humankind not to work or involve in 
activity. Contrary to that, he asserts that there is a portion, 
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77nß for one in one's activity (2: 10,21; 3: 22; 5: 17,18; 9: 6,9), and 
it is meant to be enjoyed by the one involves in the action, 
especially within the reality of ' rI 'Df "everything is absurd. " 
Although the experiments as described in 2: 1-10 yielded no 117f' - 
that is what is absurd - Qoheleth encourages one to involve in 
activity and to enjoy one's legitimate portion. 33 
In sum, 'nT in Qoheleth's thought refers to the mismatch of 
action and its expected effect. Thus, the acts of enjoyment in 
wealth, in food and drinks, in wisdom (2: 1-11) that do not lead to 
the expected effect of yielding any 1111' are declared absurd. This 
is clearly seen, after a painful search for 111 1, in the 
rhetorical question in 2: 22 which follows with a 7n'#7 answer (2: 23) 
that it is grieving and is absurd to find one's labour yielding no 
117h` . Qoheleth is looking for some enduring value, the 11,11", and 
cannot find any. 
34 Similarly, in a situation when one is contending 
with someone who is stronger than him/her, Qoheleth states that it 
is absurd to utter more words because there is no 11111' to the 
utterer (6: 11; cf. 5: 6). The realization of absurdity in human 
activity constitutes the structure of Qoheleth's thought. 
3) Death nullifies the distinction between wise and fool, righteous 
and wicked, human and beast. Another mismatch of action and effect 
33According to the study of Fabrizio Foresti, "lD) in Koheleth: 
'Toil' or 'Profit', " EphCarm 31 (1980) : 415-30 (430), the term 701), 
'toil', has two semantic meanings: (1) hard, assiduous work, toil, 
(1: 3; 2: 10,11; 3: 9; 4: 4,8,9; 5: 15; 8: 15,17 (as an auxiliary verb) ; 
9: 9; 10: 15), and (2) fruit of work, income, profit, (2: 18-24a; 
3: 13; 4: 6; 5: 14,17,18; 6: 7). 
34This idea is especially clear in Qoheleth's concept of 
remembrance (1: 11; 2: 16; 4: 16; 9: 15; cf. 5: 19; 11: 8) that when 
there is no remembrance, i. e. no enduring quality, in the 
acitivity, it is declared absurd. As Albert Camus, when asked the 
question on how did he picture his life after the grave, answered 
that "A life in which I can remember this life on earth. That's all 
I want of it. " See Albert Camus, The Outsider, English translation 
by Stuart Gilbert, (Hamish Hamilton, 1953; Penguin Books, 1962), 
pp. 117-18. 
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which Qoheleth would declare a 'X3T is in 2: 15, when he discovers 
that both the wise and the fool will face death with no escape in 
spite of their differences. The same is said of human and beast in 
3: 19. The expectation that human and beast, the wise and the fool, 
who live opposing ways of life should inevitably have different 
destinies is somehow nullified by the fact of death which occurs to 
all without discrimination. The effort to live a life of wisdom is 
met with death, something which also greets the fool. However, that 
is not all, for often the wise person dies younger, and sometimes 
with a more dishonourable death than the fool. This is considered 
absurd. It leads Qoheleth to ask the question, Why be wise? 
(2: 15b), and, What is the advantage of being wise? (6: 8). Lest one 
be quick to accuse Qoheleth of resisting wisdom, let it be clear 
that he never opts for being a fool as he recognizes that there is 
much positive value to wisdom (2: 13; 7: 11ff.; 9: 13ff. ). This may 
account for his pronouncement of a 7DT in 7: 6 concerning the 
behaviour of the fool. 
The awareness of how little difference exists between the wise 
and the fool in face of death leads Qoheleth to think of the 
differences between the righteous and the wicked (7: 15; 
8: 10-12,14). He promptly pronounces a 7ýj in 8: 10 and 8: 14, 
especially when he sees that the righteous receives what the wicked 
deserve and the wicked receives what the righteous deserve. It is 
'n T, absurd, that righteous action does not receive what is 
deserved; it is even more absurd that the righteous receives what 
the wicked deserve. 
4) The gathering of wealth that leads to '? 
J. 
This criss-crossing 
of action and effect leads Qoheleth to think further about the 
gathering and transferring of wealth (2: 19,21; 6: 2) and power 
(4: 16) in a community. Why is the gathering and transferring of 
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wealth and power regarded by Qoheleth as a 7]7, an absurdity? There 
are two reasons for this. First, the wealth being gathered by the 
hard work of one person is not transferred to the one who deserves 
it; the wise person leaves his possessions to someone who could be 
a fool (2: 19) or who has not laboured for them (2: 21). In the 
situation described in 6: 2, there is a double absurdity involved. 
First, there is the fact of a person's inability to enjoy all the 
wealth gathered or given by God. That the effort invested to gather 
wealth does not result in the ability to enjoy the wealth is 7n, 
absurd (6: 2). The absurdity is doubled when the wealth that one 
gathered but is unable to enjoy is given to a stranger or foreign- 
er. In the case of the transferring of political power (4: 16), it 
is for the same reason as given in 2: 19 and 2: 21 that Qoheleth 
pronounces a '? J, absurd. One has to transfer one's political power 
to one's successor without knowing whether the successor is good or 
bad, worthy or not worthy. The worst of all, regardless of how suc- 
cessful one's political career is, one will not be remembered by 
those who would be the successors. There is also the case of wealth 
gathered by a lonely man who has no one to give the wealth to; this 
is also 7n-ii (4: 7,8). A closer look at the text shows that not only 
that the act of gathering wealth does not yield the effect of 
having some one worthy of passing the wealth to, but that the act 
of gathering wealth does not yield the expected effect of enjoying 
the wealth - the gatherer deprives himself/herself of the enjoyment 
- also makes it absurd. 
Related to the subject of wealth are three rather obscure verses 
in which the term `7n occurs: "Then I saw that all toll and all 
skill in work come from a person's envy of his/her neighbour. This 
is also ' TJ and a striving after wind" (4: 4); "He who loves money 
will not be satisfied with money; nor he who loves wealth, with 
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gain: this also is ']j" (5: 9); "Better is the sight of the eyes 
than the wandering of desire; this also is ': NT and a striving after 
wind" (6: 9). The text of 4: 4 is ambiguous and is best connected to 
4: 5-6. It suggests that rivalry in human activity may lead to no 
enjoyment in life, and unhealthy competition to gain more wealth 
may also lead to no enjoyment in activity. This is absurd because 
one's action of gathering wealth does not lead to the expected 
result of enjoying one's wealth, but greater discontentment. The 
absurdity in 4: 4 - envy for wealth - may also explain why discon- 
tentment, as expressed in the form of a "better-proverb" in 6: 9, is 
also considered absurd by Qoheleth. Without contentment, one will 
engage oneself in endless activities without reaping any effect 
from the activity, such as the case described in 4: 7-8, which is 
also absurd. The absurdities found in the envying of wealth and 
discontentment in 4: 4 and 6: 9, also form the basis of another 
absurdity in 5: 9 as expressed in the form of a proverbial saying. 
5) Life without enjoyment is '3j. Labouring without 11T11 'profit' 
YY1 
has already been classified by Qoheleth as absurd. In 4: 7,8 and 
6: 2, Qoheleth suggests activity without enjoyment or labouring 
without the ability to enjoy the fruits is also absurd, 'Dj. In 
6: 3-6, Qoheleth argues hypothetically that living a long life (a 
thousand years) without experiencing any joy is worse than prema- 
ture death in a miscarriage because enjoyment in life, especially a 
long life, are reasonable results to expect that do not in fact 
occur. Hypothetically, premature death is better than a long life 
because although both of them, the long lived and the premature 
dead persons, die without enjoying life, the miscarried child need 
not suffer through labouring under the sun. Thus Qoheleth speaks, 
in a relative sense, of his preference for death over a long life 
when there is no joy in one's life. 
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In 11: 8-10, Qoheleth encourages one to enjoy life and the term 
7Xj occurs twice (11: 8b, 10). 
BFor if a person lives many years, let this person rejoice In 
them all; but let this person reme, 'ýer that the days of darkness 
will be many. All that comes is hebel. 9Rejoice, 0 young fellow, 
in your youth, and let your heart cheer you in the days of your 
youth; walk in the ways of your heart and the sight of your 
eyes. But know that for all these things God will bring you into 
judgment. i° Remove vexation from your mind, and put away pain 
from your body; for youth and the dawn of life are hebel. 
The encouragement to enjoy life in 11: 8b and the command to enjoy 
life in 11: 9 are both followed by two hebel clauses (11: 8b, 10). In 
11: 8, Qoheleth encourages one to find enjoyment in all the days of 
one's life and that one should also remember that death is enduring 
and what comes after life is absurd. The absurdity perhaps lies in 
the fact that the activity of the present life leads to no effect 
in the after-life (cf. 9: 10b). In 11: 9-10, Qoheleth commands one to 
find enjoyment early In one's life and make enjoyment one's life 
goal. This life goal should not be disrupted by the reality of 
absurdity which existed even In one's youth. 
There is a contrast between the "lives many years" (TTYtT' i1 : 117T) 
of 11: 8a and the "days of darkness shall be many" (P T' ; TT7i7) of 
11: 8b: a contrast of the finiteness and shortness of the present 
life against the long enduring after-life. Hypothetically, if the 
present short life is already filled with much absurd reality, the 
after-life would be filled with even more absurdities. The purpose 
of encouraging one to "remember" (`1! )1) the many days of "darkness" 
or the infinite of death (11: 8b) is so that one is always aware, no 
matter how long one may live, of the finiteness of the present life 
when contrasted with the infinite of death. Such awareness will 
drive one to grasp every opportunity to enjoy life before time is 
PV; dJ +0 44 
fit 
running out and especially A 
that what comes after is absurd. 
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There is little doubt that the context of 11: 7-10 is concerned 
with the urge to live a joyful life, particularly in one's youth. 
This is followed with a description of the certainty, inescapabi- 
lity and the imminence of death in 12: 1-7. It is, therefore, rea- 
sonable to think also, from this context, that the purpose of 11: 8b 
is to warn that, lest one easily forget that the present life Is 
short and temporary, one should remember that death approaches 
swiftly, death is imminent and certain to come and the days of the 
life after (who knows? ) are many (11: 8b), where all activities will 
cease (cf. 9: 10). Therefore, one should not let the absurdities in 
life disrupt the sole purpose of life, namely, that it is to be 
enjoyed. This is supported by 11: 10, where one is encouraged to 
banish all vexation and unpleasant moments since even the "prime of 
life" - the youthful days - is filled with absurdity, and focus on 
the youthful life that can be filled with joy (11: 9). This inter- 
pretation is also in line with the purpose of 12: 1-7, where the 
certainty and imminence of death is described in order to encourage 
one to find enjoyment in this present life. With this command to 
enjoy one's life in youth, Qoheleth concludes his thought with the 
repeated statement of 1: 2 in the superlative form in 12: 8. 
Although the word ') J in 11: 10 could mean 'ephemeral', 'absurd' 
also fits well in the context. The verse means that one is to 
remove vexation and put away all unpleasant things [in order that 
one may enjoy life (11: 9)] because even in one's youth, the prime 
of life, as in every stage of life, absurdity abounds. The usual 
choice of 7: ) to precede 7] , all or everything is absurd, is 
discarded in favour of the nouns "youth" and "the prime of life" is 
absurd, though the meaning is not very different as defined by the 
context. If taken as "ephemeral", 11: 10 could mean that one's 
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youthful days are short and ephemeral. One should not think that 
time is on one's side. 
For those who are not able to enjoy their wealth there may be a 
divine cause according to 2: 26, where the opportunity to enjoy life 
is taken away by God from the "sinners" (MOOD, though this involves 
a. certain degree of absurdity. The absurdity lies in the fact that a 
A 
sinner is punished by allowing him or her to gather and collect, an 
act of blessing to the righteous, only to give what has been 
gathered and collected to someone else to enjoy, thus depriving the 
sinner the right to enjoy the fruits of labour. This mismatch of 
acts and consequences is declared absurd (2: 26b). 
6) Three ambiguous passages, 'absurd' or 'ephemeral'? There are 
three occurrences of the term ): NT that suggest the meaning of 
"ephemeral" or "fleeting" (6: 12; 7: 15; 9: 9), though the sense of 
absurd could also fit in equally well. In 6: 12, "his absurd life" 
(17JT) is used in the general sense of the word and may be 
understood to mean a life that is filled with absurd events. In 
7: 15, "in the days of my absurdity" ('71 ) may imply the same as 
6: 12, a life that is filled with absurdity, as described in 7: 15b. 
Lastly in 9: 9, "all the days of the life of your absurdity [i. e. 
your absurd life]" (1j) is also understood in the same sense as 
the above. 
However, if hebel is taken to mean 'fleeting' or 'ephemeral', 
6: 12 would mean "For who knows what is good for humankind while 
they live the few days of their fleeting or ephemeral life"; 7: 15 
would mean "In my fleeting life"; and 9: 9 "all the days of your 
ephemeral life. " All three passages could be describing the short- 
ness and ephemerality of life. 
When taken to mean absurdity, all three instances refer general- 
ly to the absurdity in life. Besides these three verses, there is 
75 
one other occurrence of the term in the plural form []'7: I T in an 
obscure verse (5: 6). Since it is in a context referring to 
excessive speeches or words, it may be understood in a similar 
sense to 6: 10,11 that contending with one who is mightier is absurd 
because it leads to no 11711'. 
Summary. To sum up what the text says about the term, 7]i1 is used 
in six ways: (1) The superlative form in 1: 2 and 12: 8 announces and 
concludes the subject of the book; it is the absurdity of human 
existence under the sun as studied by Qoheleth (cf. 1: 14; 2: 17). 
(2) All activities that do not yield any 11'111', profit, are 
declared `? j, absurd (2: 1,11,22-23; cf. 6: 11). (3) When certain 
actions are taken (e. g. attempting to be wise and righteous) to be 
assured of a different and distinctive consequence (e. g. to be 
blessed, prosperous and have a long life), and when such expecta- 
tions are nullified by the element of death (2: 15; 3: 19) or the 
delay in carrying out justice (7: 15ff.; 8: 10,14), Qoheleth declares 
them absurd. (4) In the case of transferring wealth or power, 
Qoheleth pronounces an absurdity when a) the wealth gathered by the 
labourer is passed on to someone unknown who could be a fool 
(2: 19), or b) the wealth gathered by a wise person is passed onto 
someone who actually is a fool (2: 21), or c) the wealth gathered by 
a hard-working labourer is passed onto someone who has never 
laboured for it (6: 2), or d) the wealth is gathered by a labourer, 
who only knows how to work but has no one to pass on the wealth to 
and has deprived himself or herself of the ability to enjoy the 
fruits of the effort invested (4: 7). (5) The thought that life is 
to be enjoyed - enjoyment as the primary goal In life - leads 
Qoheleth to declare absurdity when, a) the labourer gathered wealth 
but was not able to enjoy it (6: 2; 2: 26b), or b) the labourer 
gathered wealth for a stranger who did not work to enjoy it (6: 2), 
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or c) a labourer lives a long life and yet finds no joy or 
enjoyment (6: 3-6; cf. 11: 8,10). (6) Though the term ' TJ has the 
meaning of 'absurd' throughout the book, it could also mean 
ephemeral or fleeting in 6: 12; 7: 15 and 9: 9. 
Qoheleth uses the term '7ýij in the above six ways to mean the 
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same thing: action does not lead to any expected effect is absurd. 
The recognition of the absurd realities in human activities forms 
the basic framwork of Qoheleth's thought. Everywhere Qoheleth turns 
to observe or experience, there is absurdity. Both Fox and Ogden 
are right in seeing 7X1 to mean something other than 'empty', 
'vain' or 'meaningless'. But it is imprecise to take 7X i1 as "enig- 
matic" or "mystery" as Ogden did, because they are only descrip- 
tions and do not explain why Qoheleth designates his observations 
and experiences of human actitivties as '7ýT. Pronouncing the 
mismatch of action and its expected effect in human activity as '7ýiý 
or absurdity is a more precise meaning and usage for the term. But 
that is not the entire thought of Qoheleth. His thought does not 
stop at this state of realization of the absurdity, but moves on to 
champion the idea of experiencing joy in life as priority. He 
encourages the enjoyment of life as the wisest course for one who 
recognizes the absurd reality in human activity. 
3s 
Of the above usages of the term by Qoheleth, the concept of 
enjoyment in life stands out uniquely in Qoheleth's thought at 
least in four special ways. First, joy generated from labour is a 
well deserved `portion', a p7n; it is appropriate and legitimate 
that one should possess it (2: 10,21; 3: 22), whether or not the 
event or situation itself generates any 111W and is therefore 
35Similar thought may be found in R. B. Y. Scott, Proverbs; 
Ecclesiastes (AB, 18; New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 201-04, that 
despite the thesis of the book is hebel, there is the practical 
aspect of Qoheleth's philosophy, a call to enjoy life. 
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absurd. Second, joy generated from labour corresponds to God's 
intention for humans (9: 7). Third, joyless life is seen as a 
punishment by God (2: 26), thus emphasizing the significance of joy 
in Qoheleth's thought. Fourth, a joyless long life is deemed worse 
than a still born child (6: 3-6) and a long life of a thousand years 
with hundreds of children makes no compensation (6: 3; 11: 8a). 
Probably this is to point out the fact that dead or alive, one must 
possess joy in order to compensate for absurdity (6: 3-6; 11: 8ff. ). 
In view of Qoheleth's unique ideas on the concept of joy, the 
following will analyse the concept of joy as a twin theme along- 
side X7]1, the two concepts forming the dual structure of Qoheleth's 
thought. 
2. Joy (i tj?? ?) 
The concept of joy in Qoheleth is best presented in the seven 
passages devoted to the subject (2: 24-26; 3: 12,13; 3: 22; 5: 17-19; 
8: 15; 9: 7-9; 11: 7-12: 1). It is also expressed in the seventeen 
occurrences of the word nnýP "joy, rejoice" in the book38 and its 
synonyms such as 710 "good" (2: 1,24; 3: 12,13; 6: 3,6; 9: 7; 11: 7-9) 
and the phrase "to eat CM) and to drink (lila})" (2: 24-26; 3: 12,22; 
5: 17-19; 8: 15; 9: 7-9; 11: 7-12: 1). A less common word for "pleasure" 
in the book is rMl (5: 3; 8: 3,6; 12: 1,10) which sometimes means 
"matter, business" (cf. 3: 1,17; 5: 7). A rare word used by Qoheleth 
for "rejoice" is VJ1fT (2: 25). 37 
362: 1,2,10 (2x), 26; 3: 12,22; 4: 16; 5: 18,19; 7: 4; 8: 15 (2x); 9: 7; 
10: 19; 11: 8,9. 
37For a discussion of the meaning of 71ai7, cf. C. F. Whitley, op. 
cit., p. 28; for a study on rhri cf. W. E. Staples, "The Meaning of 
p9TT in Ecclesiastes, " JNES 24 (1965): 110-12. 
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a. Various Understandings of Joy ? 
As early as 1857, the passages referring to joy in Qoheleth were 
seen as markers of the literary structure of the book. 
38 However, it 
was not until recently that these passages were studied in detail 
by R. N. Whybray and Graham Ogden with the emphasis on seeing joy as 
a leading concept in Qoheleth's thought. 
1) R. N. Whybray In his careful study of the seven passages that 
suggest the theme of joy, R. N. Whybray rightly observes that these 
passages not only "punctuate the book, forming a kind of 
Leitmotiv. they also increase steadily in emphasis as the book 
proceeds. " 
39 He further remarks on the seven passages that "the last 
[11: 7-12: 1a], the most elaborate of them all, directly addressed to 
the reader, introduces and dominates the concluding section. " He 
then concludes his study as follows; 
1)What good things God has given us are intended for our 
enjoyment, and in the giving of them he has shown his approval 
of our actions. To enjoy them is actually doing his will. 2) We 
must accept our ignorance of God's purposes and of the reasons 
why he has permitted evil to exist in the world; and we must 
take life as we find it and enjoy what we can, because a) we 
cannot change the fate which God has chosen for us, b) we 
cannot know what God has in store for us, c) life is short and 
death inevitable. 3) The recognition that toil is part of what 
God has allotted to us in life, and that reliance on our own 
efforts is vain, enables us to find enjoyment even in our toil. 
Whybray's conclusion significantly focuses on the relationship 
between God and joy, putting all the related subjects such as toil, 
wealth, portion and profit under the idea of God, the sovereign and 
distant ruler. Such a focus of interest, however, has perhaps over- 
looked some details regarding the concept of joy as it is presented 
38An unsigned article, "The Scope and Plan of the Book of 
Ecclesiastes, " The Princeton Review 29 (1857): 419-40; its thesis 
was later adopted by Walter Kaiser, Jr., Ecclesiastes: Total Life. 
39R. N. Whybray, "Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy, " JSOT 23 (1982): 
87-98 (88,92). 
79 
in the book. Whybray's study has also fallen short of establishing 
the concept of joy as a main theme within the structure of Qohe- 
leth's thought, except in a remark that the above conclusion on the 
seven passages on joy is "borne out" In the rest of the book. 
2) Graham Ogden40 and others41 In the last of a series of three 
studies on the concluding pericopes (9: 17-10: 20; 11: 1-6; 11: 7-12: 
8), Graham Ogden concludes, 
[In] the final pericope of the book (i. e. 11: 7-12: 81, this 
rhetorical device [the prior indication of the twin themes of 
the pericopel enables us to grasp the fact that the call to 
enjoyment and concurrent reflection on the inevitable future of 
humanity in death, is indeed the central theme of the book. 42 
The conclusion is based on his analysis of the relationship between 
the twin themes of enjoyment and remembrance in 11: 7-12: 8 and their 
occurrences in the rest of the book (5: 17-19; 9: 7-10,15). But this 
merely points out one of the major themes in Qoheleth's thought 
rather than presenting the role the theme plays within the thought 
structure of Qoheleth. Instead of taking the analysis a step 
further into the relationship between the twin themes of joy and 
remembrance and the superlative phrase in 1: 2 and 12: 8, Ogden 
limits his studies to the rhetorical device of the twin themes in 
these articles. In fact he has some difficulty in establishing the 
relationship between the themes themselves, that is to say, how the 
theme of "remembrance" relates to the "call to enjoy life. " Such a 
recognition of the twin themes as a major rhetorical device in 
Qoheleth is nothing more than what is argued in J. A. Loader's 
thesis regarding the polar pattern of Qoheleth's thought. The 
40G. S. Ogden, "Qoheleth xi 7-xii 8: Qoheleth's summons to enjoy- 
ment and reflexion, " VT 34 (1984): 27-38; idem, Qoheleth, pp. 12-15. 
41Walter Kaiser, Jr., op. cit.; cf. N. Lohfink, op. cit.; R. K. 
Johnston, op. cit. 
42G. S. Ogden, "Qoheleth xi 7-xii 8, " p. 38. 
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recognition of a polar pair or binary opposition, such as the wise 
and the fool, is nothing new in the study of wisdom literature; it 
is more significant and difficult, however, to recognize the rela- 
tionship of such a contrasting pair within the structure of Qohe- 
leth's thought. 
In his recent commentary, Ogden Identifies Qoheleth's thesis as 
"life under God must be taken and enjoyed in all its mystery" and 
sees this thought as the positive "advice on how to live in a 
society plagued by so many enigmas (hebel). "43 He argues that the 
response to the programatic question about 117,11 and its negative 
answer of 7njj is central to Qoheleth's thought, that is , the call 
to enjoy life. 
b. Qoheleth's Concept of Joy 
44 
Now let us turn to consider the passages on enjoyment in Qohe- 
leth. The concept of joy in Qoheleth, as will be argued, does not 
contradict the concept of `7T 'v1, rather, they support one another, 
presenting themselves as the two concepts within the structure of 
Qoheleth's thought. The following analysis will attempt to show 
that the concept of joy is fundamental within his structure of 
thought, and that, joy and '1J exist in parallel, complementing 
each other. 
Qoheleth's concept of joy consists of four interrelated yet 
different elements: (1) the source of joy; (2) the absence of joy; 
(3) the encouragement to enjoy; 4) the caution to one who enjoys. 
In each of the passages on joy, one or more of the four element(s) 
is present. 
43Graham Ogden, op. cit., p. 14. 
44Cf. 2: 1,2,10,26; 3: 12,22; 4: 16; 5: 18(19), 19(20); 7: 4; 8: 15; 
9: 7; 10: 19; 11: 8,9. 
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(1) The source of joy. Where does joy come from? Clearly, for 
Qoheleth joy comes primarily from God as a gift to human beings; 
God is the primary source of human joy (5: 18). This concept can be 
seen in almost all the passages on joy (except 2: 10 and 3: 22) which 
either directly end with or imply the idea that enjoyment in life 
is a gift (j lt]) of God or God gives Qf)) joy to humankind (2: 24b, 
25; 3: 13b; 5: 17b, 18,19; 8: 15; 9: 7,9). 
But what and how does God give? God gives joy by means of 
granting "wealth, possessions, honour" (6: 2) as the fruits of 
activity together with the ability to enjoy them. However, there 
are situations where God grants no ability to enjoy the fruits of 
one's labour even after giving the fruits themselves (6: 2). When 
such a situation occurs, not only is the situation considered as 
absurd (7: 7), but the person involved is seen as deprived of joy 
and is no better than the "still born" (6: 3). As the divine giver, 
God has every right to exercise his sovereign will whereby human 
beings are regarded as passive receivers. This is especially seen 
in 7: 13,14 where human beings are to accept the perils of life, 
"time and chance happen to them all" (9: 11). 
The concept that God is the giver is further accentuated through 
Qoheleth's anthropology in which human beings are finite, thus 
"cannot find out // cannot know what God has done" (3: 11; 7: 14,24, 
27-29; 8: 17; // 8: 9; 9: 1,10,12; 10: 14,15; 11: 2,5,6). Human beings 
depend solely on God as the primary source of joy. Since God has 
the power to give and not to give (6: 2) according to his own divine 
will - and human beings have no say in this - human beings become 
the passive receivers of joy. 
But does joy come solely from God the active giver to human 
beings the passive receivers? Are there any other means of 
obtaining or generating joy? To answer these questions in the light 
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of Qoheleth's concept of joy, one needs to know what it means to 
say that enjoyment in life is the gift of God or that God is the 
primary source of joy in life. 
To say that enjoyment comes from God as a gift to human beings 
is to recognize the fact that God is the primary source of joy. But 
it is not the same as saying one must seek approval from God before 
one can obtain joy in life. In 9: 7 Qoheleth argues that when some- 
one enjoys their portion, the fact that they are enjoying is 
already (IM) a proof that God has approved and granted the gift to 
enjoy life. One's portion (P717) is either the immediate result 
(i. e. the joy in activity) or the consequent result (i. e. wealth, 
honour) generated from activity. This verse, however, presents some 
ambiguity in the relation between the giver and the receiver. In 
enjoying life, individuals experience God's approval for their 
actions. But what about when one does not experience joy in life? 
Does it imply God has not granted joy to the individual? It is a 
possibility (2: 26; 6: 2), but it could also be caused by the fact 
that one is not interested in having joy (4: 8; cf. 6: 3,6a). The 
presence of joy in one's life means that God has given joy, but it 
is not always true the other way round. When there is no joy in 
life, it Is not always because God has not given joy for there is 
the possibility that the absence of joy is self-inflicted. The 
absence of joy in Qoheleth's thought will be discussed after 
considering an earlier question: are human beings passive receivers 
of joy, given that God is the primary source of joy in life? The 
answer lies in two exceptional verses (2: 10; 3: 22). 
The two verses are exceptional because they mention joy as the 
legitimate possession of one whose portion is generated by activi- 
ty, while making no mention of God as the giver. In 2: 10, "for my 
heart found pleasure in all my activity, and this was my portion 
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(77n) for all my works"; and 3: 22, "there is nothing better than 
that a man should enjoy his activity, for that is his portion 
(p'11)", joy is said to be. a direct product of one's activity as 
one's lot or portion (P7n). Although portion generated from activi- 
ty generally refers to the result of one's labour such as wealth, 
possessions and honour, it is here referring to the by-product of 
human activities, namely, joy, regardless of what the end products 
may be. 
Moreover, more than half the passages on joy are related to 
activity or labour (2: 10,24a; 3: 13a, 22a; 5: 17,18; 8: 15; 9: 9). In 
8: 15, mirth is said to be joined with (III'? ' < fll`V), "be joined to, 
or attend") the labourer in his/her activity. When one works or 
involves in activity, joy is being experienced. That puts the 
labourer in the active role of generating joy. There is little or 
no direct 'gives-receives' relation with God, except indirectly 
when one sees that even the ability to labour comes from God (5: 18). 
This is the joy of activity. Work or activity itself generates joy 
regardless of what the effects or fruits of the activity may be. To 
work is to enjoy; to be involved in activity is to enjoy life. The 
Immediate source of joy is activity. Joy derives, in the first 
instance, from human activity and not God, unless, of course, one 
wants to push it further to the first cause of all things (as 
implied in 5: 18). 
Thus, for Qoheleth, though God may be considered as the primary 
source or more precisely the first cause of joy, human beings are 
not always seen as the passive receivers of joy. Human activities 
are the more immediate source of joy as joy is generated from works 
and daily activities. It is the joy of working or acitivity. 
This idea gains further support from 10: 19 when Qoheleth consi- 
ders "bread, wine and silver" as the immediate source of human joy 
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and not God. Thus, in Qoheleth's thought, the concept that joy 
comes from God as a gift does not eliminate any immediate source of 
joy in life, such as activity, wealth or food. It only asserts that 
God is the first cause, the primary source of joy and is actively 
involved in the giving and withholding of joy in one's life (6: 2). 
However, if God is the primary source of joy and human activity or 
wealth the immediate source of joy, then why is joy not always 
present in life? There are times when joy is absent even when human 
activities have occurred (4: 8; 6: 2; cf. 2: 26). This leads us to con- 
sider the absence of joy in Qoheleth's thought. 
(2) The absence of joy. There are several reasons in Qoheleth's 
thought for joy to be absent - whether such absence is genuine or 
not - especially in a life that is filled with activities. 
(a) In 2: 26, the punishment of God on the "sinner" is seen as a 
reason for the absence of joy. The opportunity for the "sinner" to 
enjoy what he/she has gathered and collected is being taken away by 
God from him/her. But since one may have already engaged in the 
activities of "gathering and collecting", it is possible that one 
has already experienced joy in the activities themselves. Thus, it 
may not be appropriate to consider this situation as a true or 
genuine absence of joy, except in a moral or religious sense. 
(b) The situation mentioned in 6: 2ff. seems to imply a genuine 
case in which no joy is found in a long life. The immediate reason 
is not given, except to point out that God is the primary cause, 
"God does not enable him (a]D'V_-9)1) to enjoy". But since 
"wealth, possessions and honour" are granted by God to the indivi- 
dual, it may be assumed that labouring is involved in reaping these 
benefits, and thus, joy in the material sense might have already 
been experienced in the course of human activities. But since the 
text explicitly maintains that this person experience no joy in 
85 
life, joy, then, is considered genuinely absent from life. Thus, it 
is possible that even engaged in activity, one does not necessarily 
have to experience joy. One has to choose to have joy in one's 
activity. 
(c) In 4: 8, a situation Is described in which the labourer is 
too busy to experience joy in life or toil. The only reason given 
for the absence of joy is the rhetorical question, which the 
labourer never asks, "for whom am I labouring and depriving myself 
of pleasure? " The absence of joy from the life of such an 
Individual may be blamed on the lack of interest in living and 
experiencing joy. Neither God nor the 'portion In activity' Is to 
be responsible for the lack of enjoyment In such a life. This 
allows for another possibility besides (b), In Qoheleth's thought, 
for joy to be genuinely absent from life if one is not interested 
in enjoying life at all. In the case of (a) joy is said to be 
absented only in a moral or possibly spiritual sense. 
In any respect, the absence of joy is unwanted and is regarded 
by Qoheleth as the most grievous thing ("an evil disease" tt1; T Vj 
17111 [6: 2]) that could happen. and something that should be avoided 
at all costs. This leads Qoheleth to emphasize that it is impera- 
tive to choose to enjoy life. 
(3) The urge to rejoice. There are two underlying reasons, based on 
the above points (particularly [1] and [2]). that prompt Qoheleth 
to emphasize the urgency to enjoy life. First, the reality that joy 
could be absent from one's life (2: 26; 4: 8; 6: 2ff. ) which makes 
such a life undesirable, "an evil disease" and "no better than the 
still born". Second, to enjoy life is to do the will of God (9: 7). 
But there is a third reason in Qoheleth's thought why it is 
imperative to enjoy life. It is found in the connection between joy 
and remembrance (5: 18,19; 11: 8ff.; cf. 9: 10). 
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17 Behold, what I have seen: it is good and beautiful to eat and 
to drink and to see good In all the labour that one labours 
under the sun the few days of one's life which God has given 
one, for this is one's portion. 1sAlso every person to whom God 
has given wealth and possessions and power to enjoy them, and to 
accept one's portion and to enjoy in one's labour - this is the 
gift of God. is 
s For one will not much remember the days of one's 
life because God keeps one occupied with joy in one's heart. 
Qoheleth states in 5: 17-18 that it is appropriate for one to find 
enjoyment in one's activity within all the days of one's life 
because that is one's portion and is a gift of God. This is 
followed with two '7 clauses in 5: 19.45 The first '7 clause consists 
the Qal imperfect 77T' (he shall remember) and the second '7 clause 
contains the Hiphil participle 1 (cause to occupied, < T]y 'to V-1- TV 
occupy', cf. 1: 13; 3: 10). 
46 There is little doubt that the reason 
one shall not remember much the days of one's life (5: 19a) is 
because one's life is filled with joy which comes from God as one's 
portion and as a gift (5: 17-18) and that God "keeps one occupied" 
with joy (5: 19b). The 'J particle in 5: 19b is generally translated 
as "because" or "for" (LXX, Vulgate, Luther, RSV, NIV, Barton, 
Crenshaw). 
45Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, pp. 169-70, spits 5: 
19 into two clauses 19a and 19b, with the first clause (5: 19a) 
follows 5: 17 and the second clause (19b) follows 5: 18. His 
translation of 5: 17-19 is as follows: 
17Here is what I have discovered: it is meet and proper for a 
man to eat, drink, and enjoy himself in return for the toil he 
undergoes under the sun in the scant years God has given him, 
for that is man's portion, Ma) and not long will he remember 
the days of his life. 18 Indeed, every man to whom God has given 
wealth and possessions and granted the power to enjoy them, 
taking hits ? hare and rejoicing in his labour, that is the gift 
of God, 
19b for It is God who provides him with the joy in his 
heart. 
48Although most interpreters agree that 11f1) means "to occupy" 
(Barton), the root can also mean "to answer" (Gordis) or "to 
afflict", though the third meaning - to afflict - is a little odd 
in this context. Crenshaw thinks all three are possible. 
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This interpretation has support from Barton who wrote, "One will 
not brood over life's brevity, if it is full of proper enjoyment. "47 
But Gordis disagrees and argues that "joy deadens man's sensibility 
to the brevity of life is, to be sure, a perfectly sound idea, but 
it does not occur elsewhere in the book. Koheleth regards joy not 
as a narcotic but as the fulfillment of the will of God. " 48 To argue 
against Gordis, it is not necessarily to think of joy as a "narco- 
tic" because when one is happy, It could be a natural instinct or 
response not to remember, perhaps the absurd reality In life, 
especially when one's life Is filled with joy. Furthermore, not 
remembering things of the past is not a foreign idea In Qoheleth's 
thought (1: 11; 2: 16; 9: 15). If enjoying life is doing the will of 
God, the by-product of being joyful - not remembering "the days of 
one's life" - could also be seen as fulfilling the will of God. 
What are "the days (1'111 '131) of his life" that one will not 
remember when one is occupied with joy? There are four possibili- 
ties: (1) literally all the days, every day that one lives (cf. 
5: 17); (2) all the joyful days; (3) all the evil days, the absur- 
dity in life (cf. 9: 9); and (4) the days of death or after-life 
(11: 8; 12: 1). Options (1) would suggest that the reason one will 
not remember any days of his life is because one's life is filled 
with joy. This sounds like hedonism and joy functions like a hallu- 
cinogenic drug. Option (2) would suggest the meaning that because 
one is joyful, one will not remember the joyful days of one's life. 
There is no point to this causal effect. Thus, although options (1) 
and (2) are probable interpretations they do not make much sense in 
Qoheleth's thought. Option (4) would suggest the meaning that one 
47G. A. Barton, Ecclesiastes, p. 128. 
48R. Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World, p. 255. 
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does not remember the days of death because one's life is filled 
with joy. This does not make much sense either in the context of 
5: 19 and may also be a contradiction of 9: 10 because Qoheleth 
asserts there that all activities cease to exist in Sheol and, 
therefore, there is nothing there for one not to remember If 5: 19 
is interpreted in this light. Furthermore, the absurdity in the 
present life would be a more Immediate matter not to be remem- 
bered by one than the future days of death. Option (4) also runs a 
danger of contradicting "the days of darkness" in 11: 8 If it is 
correctly interpreted as the days of death, a point which will be 
discussed below. If these assumptions are correct, they leave 
option (3) as the most probable alternative. Thus, 5: 19 may be 
understood as saying that the reason God gives joy is so that when 
one is joyful, one will not remember the evil days in life. This is 
fully consistent with Qoheleth's concept of 7niY that life is filled 
with absurdities; and therefore the wisest course for one to take 
is to enjoy life as God's gift and forget about the absurd elements 
in it. 
Now let us turn to 11: 8, "For If a man lives many years, let him 
rejoice (flJtl' , jussive) 
in them all; but let him remember MP) 
that the days of darkness will be many, " which seems to contradict 
5: 19.5: 19 and 11: 8 are the only places in the book where joy and 
remembrance exist together as twin themes. In both verses, Qoheleth 
gives the same advice to enjoy life, except in 5: 19 the advice 
follows with "he will not much remember the days of his life", 
while 11: 8 follows with "remember your days of darkness. " The clue 
to this enigma lies with the interpretation of the phrase "the days 
of darkness" and its relation with 9: 10. If "the days of darkness" 
refers to the days of death (cf. 12: 1), then Qoheleth is saying In 
11: 8 that the reason one should enjoy life is because the days of 
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"darkness", death, are inescapable and imminent (cf. 12: 1-7) and 
are enduring. One ought not to forget that this present life is 
short and all activities cease at Sheol (9: 10). This interpretation 
gains support from 9: 10 that since all activities cease in Sheol 
one should treasure and find enjoyment within the finite days of 
the present life. However. If "the days of darkness" in 11: 8 refers 
to the evil and absurd elements in life, then not only does it not 
fit into its context (11: 7-12: 7), it also runs into the difficulty 
of contradicting the meaning of "the days of his life" In 5: 19 as 
suggested above. Thus, the "days of his life" in 5: 19 is best 
interpreted as the evil days or absurd elements in life. 
To sum up the above, one may say that in Qoheleth's thought, the 
reasons that one should enjoy life are as follows: (1) by enjoying 
life, one Is doing the will of God (9: 7); (2) the absence of joy in 
life makes life not worth living (6: 2ff. ); (3) life is short and 
death imminent, and all activities will cease in Sheol (9: 10; 
11: 8ff. ); (4) it is the intention of God that by granting joy, one 
should not remember the evil days and the absurdity In life (5: 19). 
Given all these reasons that one ought to enjoy life, Qoheleth does 
not in any sense promote hedonism. A final word of caution is added 
to his concept of joy, balancing out the emphasis on the importance 
of enjoying life. 
(4) The caution to the one who enjoys. Qoheleth subtly introduces a 
word of caution in the concluding passage on joy to qualify his 
encouragement and command to enjoy life in 11: 9. The caution comes 
at the appropriate place and time so as not to cause confusion over 
the importance of enjoying life as it has been expressed earlier. 
It comes in a statement issued right after the command to rejoice, 
"but know that for all these things God will bring you into judg- 
ment. " This judgment motif is in accord with the epilogue In 12: 14 
90 
as well as in line with the fundamental concept that God is a 
sovereign deity in Qoheleth's thought. Though judgment has never 
been a fully developed theme in Qoheleth's thought, it comes In the 
last (11: 7-12: 1) and the first (2: 24-26) joy passages and also 
insinuated indirectly in 3: 14b, relating 'fearing God' with 
enjoyment. In 2: 26, the first of the passages on joy, the absence 
of joy is seen as a judgment of God on the "sinner". It is essen- 
tial and appropriate for Qoheleth, in his last passage on joy 
(11: 7-12: 1), to remind his readers of the warning Issued in the 
very first joy-passage. 
However, although in 2: 26, the judgment of God on the "sinner" 
is to deprive the "sinner" of enjoying the fruits that he/she has 
gathered and collected, it Is not certain what God's judgment will 
be in 11: 9. It is clear that God will judge one for all "these 
things", such as one's "walk in the ways of one's heart and the 
sight of one's eyes. " How and why God judge one for one's "ways" 
and "sights" is not clear at this point. But in the light of 2: 26, 
It is probable that the judgment to be executed, if found guilty, 
will be depriving one from enjoying life, if God does look into 
one's "ways" and "sights" (3: 17) soon enough (8: 11). 
49 
Summary. With the warning of a possible judgment at the last 
passage on joy (11: 7-12: 1) echoing the first one (2: 24-26), Qohe- 
leth concludes his thought on the enjoyment of life. Nowhere is his 
concept of joy subordinated to a greater theme, such as the concept 
48G. Ogden, Qoheleth, p. 196, has an interesting suggestion with 
insight from the nature of yitrön, enduring profit or profit beyond 
this present life. He writes that "if Qoheleth is exploring the 
possibility of a yitrÖn extending beyond the limits of this present 
existence, then such a future 'reward' stands or falls upon our 
present response to God's major gifts of life and work, and on his 
justice. " But life after death is not Qoheleth's interest and the 
judgment on the "sinner" in 2: 26 present a judgment in this life. 
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of '11 . In Qoheleth's thought, the ultimate source of joy is God, 
but it is often related more closely with the immediate source of 
joy, such as wealth and the portion (i fl) in activity. Although the 
absence of joy may be seen as an act of punishment from God on the 
sinner, lack of interest on the part of the human being in enjoy- 
ment can also be responsible for it. However, a long life without 
joy is regarded by Qoheleth as absurd and not worth living. Thus, 
the call to enjoy life is crucial to Qoheleth's thought and he sees 
life, especially an joyful life as a gift of God. The encouragement 
to enjoy life is so imperative that Qoheleth demands one to remem- 
ber the duration and absurdity that lies in the after-life, so that 
one would treasure and find enjoyment in the present life. To 
distinguish his call to enjoy life from any hedonistic way of life, 
Qoheleth qualifies his concept of joy with a word of warning that 
God will judge one's every activities. With this Impending judgment 
of God in mind, one is encouraged not to let the absurdities in 
life, d'7ý'R 7SR , disrupt the aim of life - to be enjoyed. 
3. The Relationship Between hebel and Joy in Qoheleth's Thought 
So what is the relationship between hebet and joy? How are 
they related to each other as the dual structure of Qoheleth's 
thought? 
Though there is less dispute over the centrality of the theme 
hebel, the centrality of the theme 'joy' has caused some concern. 
For Instance, J. A. Loader5° argues that there is only one fundamen- 
tal idea in the book: the declaration of 7ýj. The 'call to enjoy 
soJ. A. Loader, Ecclesiastes: A Practical Commentary (trans. John 
Vriend; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1986), p. 14. This is a 
translation from his Dutch edition, Prediker: Een praktische 
bijbelverklaring, 1984, which is based on his earlier monograph in 
BZAW 152. 
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life' is for him subordinate to this fundamental idea of ']i1 YV 
because it always occurs in connection with Qoheleth's conviction 
regarding the n'7ýj1 7] of everything. The 'call to enjoy life' 
passages also always refer to the 7]iT of life and to the fact that 
God as the giver of joy can terminate it at any time. But Loader's 
argument for ' TJ being the only fundamental idea of the book is too 
severe. The fact that the 'call to enjoy life' passages always 
occur with 7: passages does not necessarily mean that one is 
subordinate to the other; it is also possible that they co-exist 
together and possibly complement one another. In fact, a careful 
examination of these passages and their usage in Qoheleth suggests 
that they are not in opposition to each other, neither do they 
contradict each other. 
51 Instead of denying and cancelling each 
other out, they confirm each other as the primary element in human 
existence according to Qoheleth. 
Different from Loader who thinks 7DT is the overarching concept 
of Qoheleth's thought, Ogden argues that those '7tJ phrases are 
points where Qoheleth answers his own programatic question about 
111W, thus the theme of is only secondary importance in 
Qoheleth's thought. Central to Qoheleth's thought is the call to 
enjoy life as a response to the programatic question and the 
negative answer. Instead of seeing both the call to enjoyment and 
the theme of 'n% as the two concepts which are fundamental to the 
structure of Qoheleth's thought, Ogden narrowly thinks that only 
one of the two: the theme of ']T and the call to enjoyment, forms 
51R. N. Whybray in his article "Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy, " JSOT 
23 (1982): 87-98 (92), remarks that "It seems to me that ... Qohe- 
leth, without a doubt, consistently expressed the view that human 
life is 'a sorry business' (1: 13) and that it is 'vanity'. However, 
he regarded this not as a contradiction of his positive teaching 
but as actually providing support for it. " 
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the heart of Qoheleth's thought and he chooses the call to enjoy- 
ment unnecessarily. 
Further support for seeing the two concepts as dual structure of 
Qoheleth's thouhgt may be drawn from the "hebel-joy" and "joy- 
hebel" structure. Qoheleth begins with the "hebel-Joy" (1: 2-2: 26) 
structure and ends with the "Joy-hebel" structure (11: 7-12: 8), thus 
pointing toward a twin thematic significance. Loader, however, 
mistakes such structure as suggesting the subordination of 'Joy' 
under 'Vanity' so that the 'Vanity' theme embraces the 'Joy' motif. 
In fact, I have also observed that the words 'T and floc]? ) are 
VV T11 
distributed in the book in such a way that the frequency of the 
word 'J j decreases as the book progresses while the mood of the 
word i11 i is being intensified; that is 26 out of 38 times the word 
7 
V( occurs 
in chs. 1-6 in twenty-two verses and only 12 times in 
chs. 7-12 in eight verses, while the word MM I occurs 10 out of 17 
in the first six chapters and 7 out of 17 in the last six chapters 
where major joy-passages occurred (8: 15; 9: 7-9; 11: 7-12: 1). The 
'enjoy life' passages become more emphatic as the seven passages on 
joy develop; this is supported by R. N. Whybray who observed that 
the mood changes to the imperative in 9: 7-9a and 11: 7-12: 1a. 52 
As the study of the concept of joy has shown, almost all the 
seventeen appearances of the word W1b 1 'joy' (2: 1,2,10 (2x), 26; 
3: 12,22; 4: 16; 5: 18,19; 7: 4; 8: 15(2x); 9: 7; 10: 19; 11: 8,9) occur in 
a context where `7: ýT is also found. But none of these contexts 
suggests the subordination of one to the other. For instance, both 
7ni1 and joy occur twice in the context of Qoh. 11: 7-10 and they do 
not contradict but complement one another as co-existing elements 
in human life. Qoheleth affirms the existence of both joy and 'ý1 
621bid., pp. 87f. 
94 
as parallel elements in reality. He encourages one "to rejoice" 
because that is one's 'portion' (11: 9,10; cf. 2: 10;, 3: 22) and at the 
same time, he also affirms the "absurdity" ('ýj) in daily human 
experience, though he urges one not to let this absurdity disrupt 
the aim of life - to be enjoyed. 
Throughout the book, joy and hebel stand side by side as dual 
concepts in Qoheleth's thought and he never tries to set one 
against the other. In 11: 7-10, one is commanded to enjoy this 
present life because death is certain and imminent and what comes 
after death is 7]Z (11: 8b). It is clear in Qoheleth's thought that, 
life without enjoyment is an example of absurdity (`ST) (4: 8; 
6: 2-6; cf. 11: 7-10). The absence of joy in life has various causes 
and only in a specific situation, where one is not interested in 
enjoying or experiencing joy, can joy be considered genuinely 
absent in one's life, and such life is deemed not worth living. It 
is also clear from the analysis of Qoheleth's concept of joy that 
the source of joy is anything but 'X3j; it never generates joy. 
Thus, 7M is either a description of, or a judgment issued to, a 
situation or event, while joy is a prescription to one whose life 
is presented with the reality of 'i1. With the existence of various 
0'133'7 in life, such as the ineffectual gathering of wealth and 
impermanent attempting to be wise, Qoheleth has clearly reflected 
life's reality. Through his concept of joy, Qoheleth has responded 
to the reality of absurdity with a new faith in life. The absence 
of either of the two, hebel or joy, renders Qoheleth's thought 
incomplete. The two concepts formed the basic structure of Qohe- 
leth's thought. All the other secondary themes may be discussed 
within this structure of thought. As will be studied later, the 
discussion of various secondary themes in Qoheleth's thought is 
related subordinately to the two concepts, and they, as secondary 
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themes, never stand as an independent idea, unrelated to the struc- 
ture of Qoheleth's thought. 
4. Conclusion 
The concept of joy and the concept of hebel form the fundamental 
structure of Qoheleth's thought. Qoheleth's concept of `)3J reflects 
his understanding of the reality in which he lives. With this 
realization, Qoheleth does not opt for a pessimistic view of life; 
instead, he makes it crystal clear that the wisest course to take 
is to enjoy life. But since God is the first cause and the primary 
source of joy in life, one should 'fear God', knowing that God 
judges (2: 26; 11: 9b) and remember that God is still the giver (jlj)) 
of joy, and borrowing Qoheleth's words, who can "dispute with one 
stronger than he? " (6: 10). 
D. THE VARIOUS SECONDARY THEMES AND THEIR RELATIONS 
TO THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF QOHELETH'S THOUGHT 
There are various important themes that are secondary to the two 
primary concepts in Qoheleth's thought. They are secondary because 
they are themes that Qoheleth explores in the course of arguing his 
views on hebel and joy. Structurally, these secondary themes are 
subordinate to the two concepts within the structure of Qoheleth's 
thought. What follows is a study of the relationship between the 
two primary concepts and the various secondary themes within the 
structure of Qoheleth's thought. 
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1.11X1' 53 and I71T 
54 
The concept of JIVI 'profit' has long been a topic of scholarly 
Investigation. 55 However, p711 'portion' is left mostly unnoticed. 
56 
The two terms have a close relationship with one another as well as 
with 7n YT 
and joy. While Qoheleth categorically denies the possibi- 
lity of the existence of any 11'111', enduring profit, in all human 
activity, he repeatedly affirms that there exists a 1-; 'fl in human 
activity. While there is no 11711', thus making all activity 'ý , 
Qoheleth nevertheless asserts that within such activity, there is a 
p711 for one to enjoy. Activity and Pýrl seem to co-exist together 
(2: 10; 3: 22). 
The questions concerning the origin and nature of this p711 are 
of equal importance. It has generally been considered that the 
'portion' comes from God, and is given to those whom he favours. 
The key passages are 5: 17 and 18. Though this cannot be denied, it 
must be argued that there is a more immediate origin; it derives 
from activity itself (2: 10; 3: 22). That is the p'n of joy for the 
one who labours: the joy of activity. But P)M may be terminated as 
activity comes to a pause. In Qoheleth's thought, the phrase "one's 
portion QOM" in activity can have two levels of meanings: (a) the 
portion that derives from activity itself (3: 22; cf. 2: 10; 9: 6), 
i. e. the joy of activity; and (b) the portion that is the conse- 
quence of the activity (2: 21; 5: 17,18; 9: 6,9; 11: 2), i. e. wealth or 
possession. These two levels of meanings are supported by the fact 
that the verb 1Il) 'to give' is always associated with the meaning 
53Cf. 1: 3; 2: 11,13; 3: 9; 5: 8 (Ev. 9), 15 (Ev. 16); 7: 12; 10: 10,11. 
54Cf. 2: 10,21; 3: 22; 5: 17 (Ev. 18), 18 (Ev. 19); 9: 6,9; 11: 2. 
55James Williams, op. cit.; W. E. Staples, "'Profit' in Ecclesias- 
tes, " JNES 4 (1945): 87-96. 
56D. J. Kambi, "The Root HLQ in the Bible, " VT 23 (1973): 235-39. 
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of level (b), with either God or the human being as the giver or 
taker of the portion; on the other hand, the portion, or joy, that 
derives from activity itself, as in level (a), cannot be given or 
taken away from the labourer, unless perhaps one-has in view only 
the primary cause of activity or joy, or takes the position that 
the labourer does not enjoy his/her activity at all. 
The relationship between 11711' and 'J J, ý77TT and P11071; profit and t. VVV "" T 
absurd, portion and joy, may be seen as follow: 
God ---ý Human Activity ---ý No 11`111 ') T [descriptive] 2'VY 
(ýIl)) (7t]v) P' 
fl a 
ZT1t 7a (prescriptive] 
p71Tb'Wfl ib 
Although labour or any activity (gathering wealth and wisdom) that 
leads to no profit is absurd, activity itself may generate joy as 
one's portion. Action or investment of effort that does not yield 
the expected effect or 'profit' (111W) renders the event or 
situation 'absurd' MIR). However, within the absurdity, one can 
almost always find a 'portion' (j2 1) in the activity itself, if not 
beyond, and 'joy' is one of the most fundamental elements in the 
77iT and is the most sought after 'portion' of all. To enjoy (i fl 1) 
one's portion (P ) in activity is doing the will of God. 
Closely related to 7711 and flfl l as well as ` ni and 11111' is the 
term, 713y, for "toil, activity, work, or labour. " The root 7ny 
occurs 35 times in the book, 22 times as the substantive. According 
to the analysis of Fabrizio Foresti, the term means either 'activi- 
ty, toil, or work' in 1: 3; 2: 10,11; 3: 9; 4: 4,8,9; 5: 15; 8: 15,17; 
9: 9; 10: 15 or 'the fruit of work, income, profit' in 2: 18-24a; 
3: 13; 4: 6; 5: 14,17,18; 6: 7.57 He concludes that "the two meanings 
57Cf. Fabrizio Foresti, op. cit., analyses the range of possible 
semitic roots before studying the distribution of the root in the 
Hebrew Bible and finally its occurrences in Qoheleth. 
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are strictly related to each other: the first has given origin to 
the second, according to a process largely attested in Semitic 
linguistics. " This finding supports the above analysis on the 
concept of 77n and joy; that joy can be generated either from 'DV 
'activity' or 'work' itself as a P7Tj 'portion' to the labourer, or 
from '179 "the fruits of work or income" as a legitimate p711 V.. 
'portion' to the labourer. 58 
2. Wealth (: NT T, 77}yß IM)) 
TT vv 
Closely related to the themes of riin' and a'11 is the theme of 
wealth. Qoheleth employs terms like, `1717, 'riches', fl' 9 'posses- 
sion', : Ii1T 'gold', and 1OD 'silver'. 'Wisdom', fit]: 
n, also may 
be 
considered as analogous to wealth in 7: 12. In Qoheleth's thought 
wealth (2: 7,8,18ff.; 4: 8; 5: 9-6: 9) is often set in a broader 
context where 'n-il and/or joy is discussed. The ineffectual gather- 
ing, collecting or transferring of wealth may lead to absurdity. 
But Qoheleth has never in any sense discounted the gathering of 
wealth from his own course of action because wealth could also lead 
to enjoyment. Qoheleth has never in any sense seen wealth as evil. 
In fact he even thinks it is absurd if one labours and does not 
accumulate wealth or enjoy wealth (6: 2). He sees wealth as good and 
encourages one to enjoy all that has been earned with gratitude 
(9: 7). Wealth is seen negatively only when it is related to the 
search for 117h'; the gathering or enjoyment of wealth may not lead 
to any 1111'. enduring profit, and that is absurd. 
SeHinckley G. Mitchell, "'Work' in Ecclesiastes, " JBL 32 (1913): 
123-38 (126) has an interesting observation of Qoheleth's use of 
the words for 'work': 709 and ROD. Mitchell observes that "11v is 
constantly, but 71Dy never, used of divine activity or the outcome 
of its application, though both have been used of human acitivity. " 
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3. 'Wisdom' m rT 
.I, 
Although wisdom may be seen as an analogous to wealth, "For the 
protection of wisdom is like the protection of money; and the 
advantage of knowledge is that wisdom preserves the life of him who 
has it" (RSV), S9 it may be discussed here as a distinctive quality 
of life. The theme of wisdom (1: 12-2: 26; 4: 13-16; 7: 5-7; 7: 11-8: 1; 
8: 16,17; 9: 11-10: 11) is discussed mostly in relation to joy and the 
absurd. It is absurd when the possession of wisdom does not lead to 
any remembrance and when death nullifies any distinction between 
the wise and the fool. Though in the first person narrative in 2: 1- 
10, Qoheleth seems to deny the value of wisdom, but in fact he Is 
only claiming the no j1'1I1' of all human activities including the 
accumulation of wisdom. He in fact praises wisdom In the following 
verse, 2: 13 (cf. 7: 19; 9: 18). Since Qoheleth praises wisdom as well 
as quoting traditional wisdom sayings with approval or relative 
approval, and if Whybray's analysis of Qoheleth's use of quotation 
is right, then it is difficult to argue that Qoheleth sets out in 
his thought to refute the traditional sages. 
Qoheleth's concept of wisdom, when related to 'knowledge' and 
'skill' (cf. 2: 21) as synonyms, is threefold: (1) it is associated 
with the natural or the physical world; (2) it is associated with 
human beings, as social beings in the sociological world; (3) it is 
associated with God, the spiritual realm. As an ancient sage, Qohe- 
leth is more interested in the sociological world where he 
discusses themes such as social justice, political administration 
and relationship with neighbours. When discussing the 'spiritual' 
realm, Qoheleth loves to use phrases such as 'cannot find', 'cannot 
59This reading is supported by BH, Barton, Levy, Rashi and 
Gordis. The NIV has "Wisdom is a shelter as money is a shelter" 
(7: 12a); cf. C. F. Whitley, p. 65. 
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know' and `who knows? ' to classify the area of his ignorance and 
impotence. With only passing reference does Qoheleth mention the 
physical or natural world, of which the modern day scientific 
wisdom does a better job. 
It is through his wisdom about the sociological world that Qohe- 
leth formulates the concept of 'TJA and constructs the concept of 
joy, inserting in between, his ignorance of the divine world. 
4. Death 11113 
h 
Death is another theme in Qoheleth's thought that relates 
closely to the concepts of joy and 7n. Death is the element that 
forces Qoheleth to invalidate any distinction between human and 
beast, the wise and the fool, because one fate awaits all, death. 
The invalidation of their distinctions by death leads Qoheleth to 
declare the '31 statement in 2: 15 and 3: 19. The non-rin, of the 
wise over the fool (2: 15; 6: 8) also leads to another declaration of 
absurdity. But on the other hand, the certainty and imminence of 
death and the absurdity that lies beyond death prompts Qoheleth to 
encourage his readers to enjoy their life while they can (11: 7-12: 
1; 9: 7-10). The inescapability and imminence of death as the theme 
of the concluding pericope (12: 1-7) is to accentuate the urgency 
and importance to enjoy life (11: 8). In Qoheleth's thought, death 
is not regarded as the worst thing that can happen in one's life 
because a long and labourous life that finds no place for joy is 
worse than being born dead. The reality of death not only leads to 
the existence of some absurd elements in life, but also encourages 
one to find enjoyment in this present life. 
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5. Remembrance j177 T 
This is a most neglected theme in Qoheleth studies. It appears 
as a constant thought of Qoheleth (1: 11; 2: 16; 5: 19; 9: 15; 11: 8b; 
12: 1a). The theme occurs together with the theme of joy in 5: 19 and 
11: 8b. In 1: 11 and 2: 16, it occurs with the '? J 
theme. One suspects 
that remembrance is also closely related to the concept of enduring 
profit, f11C1' (1: 11; 2: 16), as remembrance is something transcen- 
ding the boundary of time. 60 The absence of remembrance leads Qohe- 
leth to issue the '] judgment (2: 16; cf. 9: 15). But beyond that, 
remembrance, as in awareness, of the days of death, the days of 
darkness', becomes a cause for one to see the enjoyment of life as 
an imperative task (11: 8-12: la). More subtly in Qoheleth's thought, 
is that, not being able to remember the elements of absurdity in 
life is seen as an intented effect of enjoying life which comes as 
one's portion from God as a gift (5: 19). 
6. God n'j7K 
The word n1i7K occurs forty times in the book and is almost 
'omnipresent' in the thought of Qoheleth, but Qoheleth never claims 
he knows much about God. He constantly reminds his readers that 
human wisdom is impotent when it comes to the knowledge of God. For 
Qoheleth, God is the primary source of joy. But in his concept of 
he seldom thinks that God creates the absurd reality. It is 
the daily activities which surround human beings that Qoheleth 
finds full of absurdity. He makes no attempt to regard God as the 
source of absurdity, though he sees God as the primary source of 
soOne is reminded of Albert Camus in The Outsider, in response to 
the question how he pictured his life after the grave, answers that 
"A life in which I can remember this life on earth. That's all I 
want of It. " 
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joy. Though he never emphasizes the judgmental acts of God in life, 
he always affirms that acts of justice by God will be carried out 
at the right time (2: 26; 3: 17; 7: 17; 8: 10-13; 11: 8b). A delay in 
the carrying out of justice prompts Qoheleth to consider certain 
situations where act and consequence has little relation as absurd. 
Although he firmly asserts that God's way and mind is beyond human 
reach (3: 10-14), he is unwilling to see God as the source of absur- 
dity in reality, rather, he prefers to see God as the primary 
source of joy. 
This Idea of God as the primary source of joy leads Qoheleth to 
include one of the common elements in the wisdom world in his con- 
cept of God, namely, the idea of 'fearing God'. This idea occurs 
five times in the book (3: 14; 5: 6 [Ev. 71; 7: 18; 8: 12,13; 12: 13). 
The first (3: 14) and the fourth (8: 12,13) occurrences are related 
to the concept of joy, while the others are words of caution (5: 6 
[Ev. 7]; 7: 18; 12: 13). In 3: 14, after describing the superiority of 
God over human beings, Qoheleth Introduces 'God fearing' as a 
cautious way of life (3: 14) intended by God. This is supported not 
only by 7: 18 where Qoheleth firmly believes that the God-fearer 
will come out well in the face of the 'left' or 'right' decision, 
but it also receives a strong echo in 12: 13 as a final word of 
caution at the closing of the book. 
Summary. The various secondary themes in Qoheleth's thought as 
discussed above are closely related to the dual structure of 
Qoheleth's thought. Together with the concepts of hebel and joy, 
they form the total structure of Qoheleth's thought. Without the 
arguments of these secondary themes, Qoheleth is not able to 
present his understanding of reality in full and thus, not able to 
formulate a total structure of his thought. When these secondary 
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themes aYe joined to the two primary concepts. Qoheleth's thought 
which is both descriptive and prescriptive forms a unity and 
coherent whole. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has been devoted to the study of the structure of 
Qoheleth's theological thought. It differs from other proposals in 
its understanding of the dual structure of Qoheleth's thought, the 
two concepts - 'nil and joy - as the primary structure to which all 
the other secondary themes lend their support to form a coherent 
structure for the theological thought of Qoheleth. The prescription 
from Qoheleth to all humankind who live in a world that is filled 
with absurdity is "to eat and to drink and to be merry. " This call 
to enjoy life is in itself a theological statement of faith, as is 
recently recognized by Graham Ogden. While others either saw the 
concept of 47 J as the only primary theme of the book or were 
unwilling to organize and to relate the various themes in Qohe- 
leth's thought into some coherent structure, this chapter has 
argued that a coherent structure exists in Qoheleth's theological 
thought; theological in the sense that not only the presence of God 
is presupposed in his world view and discussion of the way of life, 
but is built into the structure of his thought. His thought is 
theological in the sense that he explains to his readers in a 
coherent manner the things he believes, the reality he understands 
and the life that he loves to enjoy. Based on this understanding of 
the structure of Qoheleth's theological thought, I will attempt a 
theological reading of the book in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A THEOLOGICAL READING OF QOHELETH: 
Qoheleth's Theological Thought in Its Sequential Unfolding 
Following the analysis of the structure of Qoheleth's theo- 
logical thought in Chapter Two, this chapter presents a theological 
reading of Qoheleth, as his thought unfolds through the chapters of 
the book. This reading is based on the final form of the MT as we 
have it in the Hebrew Bible and the thought structure as argued in 
the previous chapter. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The book of Qoheleth consists of A) Title (1: 1)1; B) Main Body 
(1: 2-12: 8); C) Epilogue (12: 9-14). 2 For the purpose of this chap- 
ter, the main body (1: 2-12: 8) will be the focus of the reading. 
1The book begins with a self declaration, "The words of 
Qoheleth, the son of David, king in Jerusalem" (cf. 1: 2a, 12,16; 
2: 7,9,12; 7: 27; 12: 9,10). Speculation on the historical identity of 
the author of the book or 'Qoheleth' does not help in understanding 
Qoheleth's thought as presented in the book. Neither does 
identifying the form of the book as being similar to the didactic 
autobiographies of the Akkadian texts, as did Tremper Longman III's 
article "Comparative Methods in Old Testament Studies: Ecclesiastes 
Reconsidered, " TSFB Mar. -Apr. (1984): 5-9 (7), help to understand 
Qoheleth's thought in its own terms. The use of title and first 
person speech may imply that the author's intention was to present 
an historical reality to the reader rather than a fictitious story. 
The didactic autobiographical form, in a way, reminds one of the 
'teaching' nature of the wisdom book. 
2Gerald Sheppard's attempt to present "The Epilogue to Qoheleth 
as Theological Commentary, " CBQ 39 (1977): 182-89, is less success- 
ful In presenting a "theological commentary" on Qoheleth than a 
"theological commentary" for biblical wisdom and the canonical 
non-wisdom traditions. 
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Framed by two statements on 'if, 1: 2-12: 8 forms the main body of 
the book. It contains Qoheleth's theological thought in which he 
not only presents the two concepts of 'n1 and joy (i. e. flR? 1 and vY., 
the expression 'to eat and to drink', 1O and 7DK), but also elabo- 
rates them through the argument of various themes such as 111r1' 
(profit), 1? 711 (portion), 'Q. V (activity, fruits of labour), '103V 
(riches), 90: ) (silver). Xill (gold) for `wealth, ' 1U): )TT (wisdom), 
iT 1D 1 (mirth), 11771 (remembrance) and ti' '? (God). 
1. The 3'7if 7nfl Statements (1: 2; 12: 8) 
01'2. T 7DTT "Absurdity of absurdity, utterly absurd" is the most 
intriguing observation of Qoheleth's wisdom on daily human activi- 
ties in which actions often do not yield reasonably expected 
results, or else acts and consequences correlate in the most unex- 
pected manner. This is what Qoheleth means by )S, 'absurd'I 
3 
The numerous occurrences of the root ': fl In the book and the two 
ýi statements in the superlative form found at the beginning and 
end of the main body, show that 7J1 is a crucial idea of Qoheleth. 
The first 'ý1' statement (1: 2) Is followed by the Prologue (1: 3-11) 
and the second statement (12: 8) by the Epilogue (12: 9-14). In 
between these statements on absurdity, Qoheleth unfolds his thought 
on the absurdity of daily human activities. But that is not all 
that Qoheleth argued through his observations and experiences, for 
the existence of various absurdities in life will necessarily 
demand some advice for humankind whose existence Is threatened by 
the reality of the absurd in everyday life. This demand leads to his 
3This understanding of the meaning of )Dfl is in fundamental 
agreement with that of Michael Fox in his article "The Meaning of 
HEBEL for Qoheleth, " JBL 105 (1986): 409-27. A similar interpreta- 
tion of 7: Ifl as 'absurd' Is found also in Crenshaw's new commentary 
on Ecclesiastes (0TL; London: SCM Press, 1988). 
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advice: enjoy life and be happy. Thus, 'flfl as the primary thought 
in Qoheleth's investigation is accompanied by the advice to enjoy 
life. The relationship between these two concepts provides the 
coherence for Qoheleth's theological thought. 
2. A Poem on Endurance (1: 3-11) 
Qoheleth begins his argument for absurdity by exploring the 
reality of the absurd, focusing on the search for j17I1'. This is 
introduced by a thematic rhetorical question in 1: 3, "What is the 
profit (j11tl') to a person in all his labour (i7t]v) that he toils 1. IF 
at ('Jv"V! ) under the sun? " This programmatic rhetorical question 
receives the negative answer - There is no 11111' - at various 
points in the rest of the book (1: 3; 2: 11,13; 3: 9; 5: 8 (Ev. 91,15 
(Ev. 161). The negative answer also forms part of the basis for the 
'7IJ statements, though the nature of f11n' referred to in these 
YYý 
cases is unclear. 
The poem (1: 4-11) which follows the rhetorical question helps in 
part to define the scope and limits of the phrase "under the sun" 
(1: 3) which describes the sphere within which Qoheleth conducts his 
search for 111111. This in turn helps to clarify the nature of 11111' 
for which he is searching - the enduring profit. The poem also 
relates to the world of the reader which makes the evidence of his 
argument practical and relevant to everyday life. The poem charac- 
terizes both the natural world (1: 4-7) and the world of humankind 
(1: 8-11), focusing on two aspects of their activities: (1) the 
consistent-circularity and regularity of the natural phenomena; and 
(2) the enduring and ceaseless as well as the non-enduring and 
non-lasting effects of their activities and non-activity. The first 
is characterized by the series of participles (Ri, 1jil, 1 313.9? t10. 
: 1: 110); while the second is characterized by the term ä71y (1: 4b), 
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ji'IDT p ('no remembrance', 1: 11; cf. 2: 16, 'no enduring remem- 
brance') and j17C1' ('enduring profit'. 1: 3) and possibly D )1I 
('endurance? '; thus 1: 8a, "All things [the natural phenomena] are 
enduring"). 
4 
The first part of the poem (1: 4-7) describes the natural world: 
earth, sun/fire, wind/air and rivers/water, which form part of the 
supporting system for human existence. These natural substances run 
their set courses faithfully, regularly and repetitiously. The 
point of describing them is not to point out their 'futility' ('ýi1 
never appears in the poem), but rather the opposite, to characte- 
rize the nature of their activities and the realm where humankind 
lives. 
The observation of the regularity within the activities of the 
natural world is then reflected onto the world of humankind, draw- 
ing forth three reflections: (1) Humankind marvels at the consis- 
tency, and regularity of the natural phenomena (1: 8); 
5 (2) the 
cyclical nature of the natural phenomena suggests to humankind that 
history might be capable of repeating itself; everything repeats 
itself, thus nothing can be claimed a new discovery (1: 9-10); (3) 
Not only does history repeat itself, but that history is never 
remembered (1: 11); nothing which happens on earth endures, while 
4The adjective D7 Is generally translated as 'weary' or 
'wearisome' (cf. Deut. 25: 18; 2Sam. 17: 2). But the verb y]' or VV 
and the noun y'1' frequently means 'activity' (Gen. 31: 42; Job 
39: 11,16) or 'result of activity' (Deut. 28: 33; Ps. 78: 46; 109: 11; 
128: 2; Neh. 5: 13; Hag. 1: 11; Isa. 45: 14; 55: 2; Jer. 3: 24; Ezek. 23: 
29; Job 10: 3), cf. BDB p. 388. R. N. Whybray in his forth coming 
article "Ecclesiastes 1: 5-7 and the Wonders of Nature, " in JSOT, 
suggests the translation, "all things are constantly in activity" 
(1: 8a). Here I take the meaning a step further to mean 'endurance' 
(cf. BDB, p. 388, # 3021, "2. grow or be weary, from toil, exer- 
tion, endurance"). 
sSee R. N. Whybray's forthcoming article in JSOT, "Ecclesiastes 
1,5-7. " 
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the earth endures forever (1: 4b). A sense of irony is present when 
1: 9-10 are compared with 1: 11. The 'no remembrance' of former 
things (1: 11) leads to the-non-enduring effect of history (because 
history was not remembered), which in turn causes one to claim 
incorrectly a new discovery (because one does not remember that it 
has previously occurred), though such 'new discovery' is not 'new' 
at all (1: 10). There is a vicious circle envisaged here. The empha- 
sis is, however, not on the illogicality of claiming a new discov- 
ery (as the poem excludes any sense of beginning and end, first and 
second), but on the ultimately ephemeral nature of human activity 
which is in direct contrast with the enduring and continuous nature 
of natural phenomena. This leads back to the rhetorical question of 
1: 3, asking whether there is any enduring profit in all human 
activity. Thus the poem, in part, has answered the rhetorical ques- 
tion that there is no J11111, no enduring profit, in any human 
activity as they labour 'under the sun' - that is to say, under the 
enduring regularity and circularity of the natural phenomena. 
Everything under the sun goes on and on, and humans cannot find any 
flln' (enduring profit) In their activities. 
However, if the focus is on each of the individual cycles of the 
natural phenomena, then their activities could be interpreted as 
having no enduring effect because as each cycle appears, the 
previous cycle vanishes as if nothing had happened or even existed 
before, then it is analogous to the non-enduring effect of human 
activities: `There is no remembrance (j117T) of former things, nor 
will there be any remembrance of later things yet to happen among 
those who come after' (1: 11; cf. 2: 16; 9: 15; 11: 8b; 12: 1a). 8 Thus, 
6As discussed earlier in Chapter II, the absence of 'remem- 
brance' in human acitivty leads Qoheleth to issue the ']l1 (absurd), 
declaration. 
110 
it points once again to a negative answer to the j1711' question. 
On the one hand, daily human activity is like the individual 
ephemeral cycles of the natural phenomena; it meets with no endur- 
ing effects, or more specifically, no enduring profit. On the other 
hand, the day-in and day-out activity of everyday life is like the 
ceaseless, continuous and enduring system of the natural phenomena, 
'one generation comes and one generation goes' (1: 4a), the earth 
stays 'forever' (D'11)) accompanying the ceaseless motion of 
nature's activity as well as human daily activity. 
In sum, the prologue (1: 3-11) serves two purposes: (1) it intro- 
duces Qoheleth's programmatic question on 11111' which inevitably 
leads to one of the main themes of the book, the declaration of 
'7 1, `absurdity' on human daily activity; and (2) it defines the 
scope and limits of his empirical and theological thought orienting 
the reader to the world of human existence, i. e. a world where 
human activity has no enduring profit within a system of regular, 
circular and enduring natural phenomena. 
3. Profit and Portion (1: 12-2: 26) 
After orienting the readers to the scope and environment of his 
search for j111' (enduring profit), Qoheleth turns to ; TT). 1 (wis- 
dom), tWnt]ýU (mirth, pleasure) and 7Dl) (toil or fruits of toil; cf. 
2: 18) as the themes of his explorations and observations arguing 
for the non-fl11' and `7njj in human activity. However, that is not 
all that Qoheleth does because the no 11711' answer and the '1 1. VV 
declaration introduce a broader and more serious question on human 
existence: i. e. what is the wisest and best course of action for 
humankind in a world where there is no 117E and thus is a world of 
absurdity, an environment where actions do not yield the expected 
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effects? The answer as he argues, is found in the concluding part 
of this unit in the form of a 'better'-proverb (2: 24-26). 
(1) Qoh. 1: 12-18 
It Is Qoheleth's instinct as a sage first to argue from his 
perception of the world through wisdom, since the ancient sages had 
long proclaimed to the world that wisdom was the key to successful, 
profitable and quality living. Consequently, his perception of the 
world leads him to utter a 77J statement: the world as perceived 
through his wisdom is filled with the elements of the absurd (1: - 
14b). He emphasizes the extent of his search as 'all that is done 
under the heavens, ' without describing more specifically what he 
has acquired through his wisdom at this point. The 'niT declaration 
is followed with an aphorism in 1: 15, quoted in support of his 
statement that the reality of the absurd is something beyond human 
power to change. Lest anyone question his wisdom, he goes on to 
emphasize its quality as the best available in the nation (1: 16- 
17a), but only In order to reassert his earlier claim (1: 17b). In 
support of his claim, another aphorism is quoted (1: 18), that the 
more wisdom one possesses, the more burden one will acquire because 
wisdom enables one to perceive better the reality of absurdity. It 
must be pointed out that nowhere in this unit does Qoheleth condemn 
, [Mrl as 'n1T, rather it Is this M XT that enabled him to perceive 
and thus to argue that the world is full of 'niT. 
(2) Qoh. 2: 1-26 
After arguing that the world, as he has perceived through his 
wisdom (1: 12-18), is full of absurd reality, Qoheleth sets out to 
elaborate further on what he sees as absurd. The first aspect of 
life which he tests (1 )) is s1tT9 1. 
He introduces the test with a 
general '7S statement in 2: 1, that "it is absurd (ýý1 MR-01)" 
(2: 1), though the reason for declaring what as 7Tj is not immedi- 
112 
ately known. The introduction is followed by a description of his 
test of M7121 in various human daily activities (2: 1-11): physical 
(2: 1-3), material (2: 4-6), the pleasure of lordship (2: 7a), of 
possessing great wealth (2: 7b-8a), sensual pleasure (2: 8b), the 
pleasure of being the greatest person - the wealthiest and wisest 
king - in the world (2: 9) and the pleasure of being able to do 
whatever one desires (2: 10). Finally he declares them 'all' to be 
7XT because he finds no 111h', no enduring profit, in any of these 
activities (11711' I'M 1117 I11971 ': ITT 77i1) (2: 11). Thus, mirth that 
does not yield any enduring profit as the expected effect is 
absurd. 
However, although the negative answer to the J111' question is 
the conclusion (2: 11) to the entire test on 'mirth', Qoheleth makes 
an interesting observation. For the first time, Qoheleth argues, 
despite his negative conclusion, that there is a PI7, a 'portion' - 
enjoyment - for humans who are involved In activity (2: 10; cf. 
3: 22). In other words, activity in itself is a PEiT, an enjoyment to 
the person who is involved in it, though it does not yield any 
117n', 'ongoing' or 'enduring' profit (2: 10,11). 
7 As long as there 
is activity, there is a p7n for the labourer. But when activities 
cease, so does the P7t1. There is no 11111' in these activities and 
they are absurd, '7JT (2: 11), because action does not yield any 
7For the discussion on the difference between 11'1111 and P711, see 
Chapter II, D. 1. This idea of p71T appears again in 2: 21; 3: 22; 
5: 17,18; 9: 6,9; and 11: 2, where Qoheleth presents his idea of 
enjoyment in life. Though Qoheleth's search for j11C11 has led to a 
declaration of the 'XT statement, his later discovery of P711 as joy 
in activity presents a new idea - the idea of joy - in human 
activities where 771T is found. This new idea, with an optimistic 
view of life, intensifies as the book progresses toward ch. 12 and 
at various Intervals is like a high-pitched note shattering the 7]il 
mood of pessimism, bringing new life to a demoralizing world. 
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enduring profit. Qoheleth expects an enduring profit (dill') from 
the test on ýiTTt]ýl and found none, but instead, he finds a p7iT in 
human activity. 
The 'no JIM" and 'J statements in 2: 11 is followed by the 
main theme - the search for 11111' in wisdom - of the unit 2: 12-17. 
Here Qoheleth compares wisdom with folly and readily admits that 
there is temporal profit or advantage8 in wisdom over folly as 
light over darkness. But this admission is soon undermined by the 
perception that death nullifies any distinction between the wise 
and the fool, and that there is no enduring remembrance of them 
after death (2: 16). Despite the acts of the wise being distinc- 
tively different from and more profitable than those of the fool, 
especially in reference to the consequences of their acts and 
quality of life, death nullifies this distinction. Thus, it is 
still absurd even when there is temporal profit to the wise over 
the fool because such temporal profit is nullified when death 
arrives and thus no enduring profit is envisaged beyond death. This 
incongruity of act and consequence leads Qoheleth to proclaim that 
life is filled with the absurd (2: 15-17). Death not only nullifies 
the expected difference between the wise and the fool, but also 
that between the beasts and humans mentioned later in 3: 19. Death 
brings a cessation to all activities (cf. 9: 10) and there is "no 
enduring remembrance" (2: 16; cf. 1: 11) after death for the wise or 
the fool. Thus there is no 117h', no enduring profit, for being 
8The word 11'111' must be understood here in a weaker sense than 
is generally the case in most of the rest of the book. This weak 
sense occurs in three other verses, 5: 8,7: 12 and 10: 10 with 
reference to wisdom and knowledge, though the syntax is somewhat 
obscure in 5: 8. Temporary 'profit' or 'advantage' Is acknowledged 
in these verses. It is never referring explicitly to the 
consequences or returns of human toil or activities, in which case 
no 11`111' is proclaimed. 
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wise or foolish (2: 15). Qoheleth promptly issues a statement of 
absurdity OST) (2: 15b; cf. 2: 17) because the action of the wise 
does not lead to the expected effect of being different from the 
consequence of the fool and being 'remembered'. 
After grieving (2: 17) over the absurdity of death nullifying the 
distinction between the wise and the fool, Qoheleth moves on in 
2: 18-23 to examine 't3y, 'activity', 'labour', 'toil' or 'the fruits 
of toil' and argues that the same absurdity awaits him in life. 
Human beings have no control over the effects of their actions; act 
and consequence are often matched in the most unexpected manner. 
Qoheleth sees absurdity in two areas: (1) the wise labourer might 
have to leave the fruits of his/her labour to an unknown successor 
- wise or fool (2: 18,19); and (2) the labourer has to leave the 
fruits of his/her labour to be enjoyed by someone who has not 
laboured for it (2: 20-21). That the fruits gathered by the hard 
work of a wise labourer may have to pass on to a fool and be 
enjoyed by a fool, is pronounced to be absurd in 2: 19b and 21b, 
where it is also called a 'great evil' (T]7 f91,2: 21b). 
However, there is a third aspect of the absurdity alluded to in 
2: 22-23: the act of labouring in wisdom on the part of a wise 
labourer does not lead to the expected effect of being secure or 
confident in oneself. Instead, it leads to a consequence of sleep- 
less and painful nights and days because he/she does not know who 
the successor and enjoyer of his/her fruits of labour shall be. 
Qoheleth declares "even this, it is also absurd (? tail 'J T fTT -D)" 
(2: 23b): action does not lead to the expected consequence. 
Following the description of the absurdity in the test of i-TTt]1, 
'mirth' (2: 1-11), the observations on i1? JI , 'wisdom' 
(1: 12-18; 
2: 12-17) and 't]y, 'activity', 'toil' or 'the fruits of toil' (2: 18- 
23). Qoheleth comes to an intriguing and somewhat unexpected 
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conclusion (2: 24-26) for the entire section (1: 12-2: 23). He advises 
one to enjoy life and be happy; in particular this means, to find 
enjoyment in one's activity (2: 24). 
9 This is only the beginning of 
Qoheleth's increasingly intensified seven-fold . advice. Qoheleth 
argues that the most rewarding and probably the only promising 
element in human activity is to find enjoyment in one's activity; 
especially in light of the fact that human activity is like the 
endless cycles of the natural phenomena (1: 4-7) with no enduring 
'remembrance' (11'171) and 'profit' (i1) (1: 11; 2: 16; 1: 3; 2: 1, 
11,13) to the previous cycle of activity. 
A theistic belief also compels him to argue that the enjoyment 
of life comes from God (n' 'j `1'n, 2: 24b-25). If the phrase In 
2: 26c 'This also is absurd and striving after wind' ('? j M-131 
M1 I11971) is understood to be the concluding phrase for the entire 
unit 1: 12-2: 26, the ']'R-statement Is used as a general statement 
referring to the reality of the absurd as mentioned In 1: 12-2: 23. 
But if 2: 26c is referring to the immediate context of 2: 24-26, 
Qoheleth is declaring the criss-crossing of acts and consequences 
between the "sinner' and the 'one who pleases God' as absurd. The 
acts of gathering and collecting of the 'sinner' do not yield the 
reasonably expected effect of being able to enjoy the fruits of 
his/her activities is deemed as absurd. If the act of labouring and 
the consequence of enjoying the fruits of labouring comes to 
humankind as God's gift, the activity of the divine giver (itl), 
2: 25-26a) is deemed by Qoheleth to be arbitrary to a point of 
absurdity. The absurdity of God's gift lies first In the fact that 
9See the earlier discussion of p711 in 2: 10,11. There is no 
evidence here to show that this advice to enjoy life is a statement 
of resignation as some have held (e. g. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, 
P. 11). 
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the sinner is given the undeserved opportunity of "gathering and 
heaping" instead of perishing, as the expected effect of being a 
sinner. Second, to give the result of the sinner's gathering and 
heaping to be enjoyed by the one who has not laboured, but one who 
pleases God (2: 26b) makes a double absurdity in God's action of 
giving and taking. Equally absurd are the acts of the sinner which 
do not yield the reasonably expected effect of enjoying what he/she 
had gathered and heaped. 
The section 1: 12-2: 26 may be summed up as follows. In his 
attempt to investigate if there is any )11n' in human activity, 
through his test of flltlýl, observations on 11D1f and 7t]y, Qoheleth 
argues that it is "n? ýT 
(absurd) to find no 1i1t1' (enduring profit) 
as the expected effect of human activity. However, he argues that 
although there is no 117n*1 to be found in any human activity 
(except in the weak sense when temporal 'profit' is mentioned, 
2: 13; 7: 12; 10: 10), and certainly not beyond death, there is a p`71T 
(portion), in all human activity. This I" is the joy in and 
arising from activity. It follows from this argument that human 
beings should do their best to secure their p'fT and find enjoyment 
in their activity while there is opportunity, because P71T vanishes 
when all activities cease in Sheol (cf. 9: 10). Thus his advice to 
humankind is to enjoy life and be happy. This provides Qoheleth 
with a new impetus to live in a world of absurd reality, the 
impetus appears again in 3: 12,13,22; 5: 17; 8: 15; 9: 7-9; 11: 8-9. 
Although his theistic belief compels him to advise one to revere 
God - the silent and unfathomable divine giver of "wisdom, 
knowledge and joy" (2: 26a) - Qoheleth nevertheless thinks the 
interrelationship between the acts and consequences both of the 
'sinner' and the one 'who pleases God' is also absurd (2: 26c). 
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4. The Seasons of Time lead to no 11111' (3: 1-22) 
(1) Qoh. 3: 1-15 
As Qoheleth continues to argue for the non-f17I1' of daily human 
activities in ch. 3, another phenomenon in human existence is being 
presented as an example of non-11711'. He argues that despite the 
fact that there are various occasions and fragmented moments in 
life (3: 1-8), beautiful (t1 ) and 'endurance' (b7j*7) as they are 
part of life, nevertheless, they do not add up to any 'enduring 
profit', 111 (3: 9). Not only that Qoheleth finds no 11111' in the 
various occasions in life, he also argues that human beings know 
nothing (3: 11c) of the principles by which these occasions (3: 1-8) 
come into being. Perhaps, their unknowability also constituted to 
the non-11111' effect. Finding no 11711' in the cluster of events in 
life, Qoheleth argues further that 'there is nothing better' than 
to enjoy life (3: 12) and sees it as the divine intention that human 
beings should find enjoyment in their activities (3: 13). 
The advice is followed by a theological confession which 
declares Qoheleth's theistic belief in the sovereign lordship of 
God (3: 14). God's action is enduring or 'eternal' UNO) and 
needing no addition (9101f7 N 1'71) nor can anything be subtrated 
from them (111]131 411' 1'X). 10 The last phrase of 3: 14 is interesting 
because the word IX7l could either be the Qal imperfect of tlK7 (to 
see) or tt1 (to fear). Most interpreters understand the word to 
mean 'fear' rather than from the root 1fl (to see). 11 So Crenshaw 
writes, "Qoheleth concludes that God has planned this way in order 
10Cf. Deut. 4: 2; 13: 1; Prov. 30: 6 on the prohibition of addition 
and subtraction of words. 
11Except Graham Ogden who argues that the word comes from the 
root TW7 (to see), thus interpreted the phrase as "God has done 
(this) so that they might see (what preceeds) from him, " in 
Qoheleth, p. 57. 
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to instill fear in human beings. " 12 If 'to fear' in the sense of 
afraid is the meaning here, this is the first time Qoheleth has 
given the reason for God's actions to be unfathomable, which Is so 
that humankind should 'fear God' (cf. 5: 6; 7: 18; 8: 12,13; 12: 13). 
This argument is based on the fact that human beings have no say 
whatsoever concerning the effects of their actions, because life is 
in the hands of the unfathomable God whose ways of governing the 
effects of daily human activities seem arbitrary. 
(2) Qoh. 3: 16-22 
This theological confession leads Qoheleth to investigate futher 
the element of absurdity in an unjust society (3: 16-17). As he 
observes injustice in society and expects some reaction to injus- 
tice from the sovereign judge, he argues that such an expectation 
leads inevitably to a new evidence of absurdity (3: 19). The absur- 
dity lies first in the fact that the acts and consequences of the 
righteous and the wicked have little relationship (3: 16). Second, 
the absurdity lies in the fact that despite the fact that human and 
beast are distinctively different and so may be expected, and 
undoubtedly they are to remain so, death nullifies any distinction 
between them, and there is no 11111' for human over beast. Further- 
more, not only that death nullifies the distinction between human 
and beast, the reality of the absurd in human affairs also puts 
humans on the level of animals, thus nullifies any distinction 
between them and that is absurd according to Qoheleth. 
Having declared the absurdity that death provides no JIM for 
the righteous over the wicked and humans over beasts (3: 18-21), 
Qoheleth once again advises that one should enjoy one's activity 
12J. L. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 99, translated the phrase as 
"God has acted so that they will be afraid in his presence" (92). 
Gordis, Koheleth, p. 156, translated as "for God has so arranged 
matters that men should fear Him. " 
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(3: 22; cf. 3: 12). This enjoyment is the p711 in human activity, the 
joy of work, the definite, positive reward in human activities. 
Though activity itself does not yield any 1111'. one should 
nevertheless find enjoyment in one's activity (3: 22b). 
As in 2: 18-26 (where a positive piece of advice came after the 
expression of a negative attitude toward life's absurdity, i. e. 7D1 
(2: 18-23] leading to 'M10? [2: 24-261), 3: 1-22 is also filled with 
the two ideas of ': j and Ill alternating with each other; no 111ri 
(3: 1-9) nevertheless i1nn1 (3: 12-14,17); 7: (3: 18-21) but T11 
(3: 22). Thus, the expressions of a negative attitude toward life in 
3: 1-9 and 3: 18-21 are followed by a positive affirmation of faith 
in the deity that life is to be enjoyed in 3: 12-14,17 and 3: 22. It 
is as if Qoheleth is weighing his philosophical and theological 
opinions on life and trying to decide in which position he should 
stand. This alternation certainly affirms the centrality of the 
dual ideas, 7ýY and ýnO, in Qoheleth's thought. 
5. Absurdity in Personal, Community and National Life (4: 1-16) 
Having argued that there is no 11iI1' in human activity which are 
thus full of absurdity, Qoheleth turns to explore the absurdity in 
personal, community and national life (4: 4,8,13-16); pointing out 
various absurdities in reality (4: 4.7,8,16). He first looks at 
social oppression (4: 1-3) and through a `better-proverb' (4: 3; cf. 
4: 6,9,13) praises those who do not have to witness social injus- 
tice. Here he makes one of his most sceptical statements about 
life: "I thought the dead who are already dead more fortunate than 
the living who are still alive; but better than both is he who has 
not yet been, and has not seen the evil deeds that are done under 
the sun" (4: 2,3). 
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However, Qoheleth's position is nc 
because in 9: 4-6 he states, "he who is 
has hope, for a living dog is better 
living know that they will die, but the 
have no more reward; but their memory 
A an advocacy of suicide 
joined with all the living 
than a dead lion. For the 
dead know nothing, and they 
(b`ý171 ) is forgotten ("DO I) 
... there is no more share (P7rl) for them forever (VD)) in all .. Ir 
that is done under the sun. "13 Thus, his praise of the dead and the 
unborn in 4: 2-3 is relative to the degree of their exposure to 
social injustice. In other words, Qoheleth Is grieved over various 
social oppressions and over the fact that human beings have no 
choice but to remain impotent, and to see (; TM), or even to experi- 
ence oppression personally. Thus, his praise of those who have 
never existed is a praise of those who do not have to experience 
oppression. 
Though the word 73-i is not mentioned in 4: 1-3, it is obvious sr 
that the idea of absurdity is present. The absurdity lies in the 
fact that the wickedness of the oppressor is not being met with the 
consequence of its action and neither does the one being oppressed 
is being greeted with comfort. The effect of being oppressed does 
not generated from one's act of injustice, but rather, from the 
wickedness of the oppressor. Qoheleth sarcastically argues that 
death is the only way of avoiding the reality of injustice, which 
is the same as saying there is no way of escaping in this present 
life because absurdity is a fact in life. It is absurd in that 
despite one's sense of justice, one will still be surrounded by 
injustice: our instinct does not match with our experience. 
Turning to social life, Qoheleth takes up another example of 
absurdity. He argues that it is absurd that those hard workers do 
13In this passage (9: 4-6), Qoheleth argues that death also termi- 
nates the portion that comes with activity. 
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not find time for enjoyment in life as the expected effect of their 
activities, nor do their activities that are motivated by envy of 
others' possessions lead to any enduring profit, 11'1I1' (4: 4-6). 
14 
The absurdity lies in the fact that enviness of others' possessions 
leads only to discontentment and thus, devotes more time to accumu- 
late wealth and leaves little or no time for joy (cf. 4: 7-8). How- 
ever, Qoheleth does not swing to the other extreme, advocating 
idleness - that is folly (4: 5). Instead, he praises those who are 
able to 'rest' because they are the ones who can be contented with 
their own modest work, thus they are the ones that can enjoy life; 
"A handful of rest is better than two hands full of toil and a 
striving after wind" (4: 6). 
Turning to consider another case of absurdity, 7: I (4: 7,8d), 
Qoheleth argues that the 'workaholic' who has no time to enjoy 
life, thus deprives oneself of joy in activity is absurd (4: 8b). 
Absurdity also lies in the fact that even though this 'workaholic' 
has no one to leave his/her wealth to, he/she never seems to be 
satisfied with the quantity of the wealth he/she has accumulated 
because discontentment drives him/her to spend more time in 
accumulating more wealth and thus, never find 'rest' (4: 4-6) nor 
enjoyment in either the fruits of his/her activity or even in the 
activities themselves. Thus there is no 1111 nor joy in his/her 
activity or life. In sum, it is absurd that this person has de- 
prived himself/herself of any joy or T11n' from his/her activity. 
The activity of the 'workaholic' does not lead to any effect; no 
enduring profit (because he/she has no one to leave his/her wealth 
to) and no joy (no time to find rest nor enjoyment). In fact, if 
14As discussed in Chapter II, the absence of enjoyment in one's 
activity leads Qoheleth to declare that is absurd: activity does 
not lead to the expected effect of enjoyment. Similarly, activity 
that does not lead to any enduring profit is also absurd. 
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he/she is too busy and has no time to be concerned with the effects 
of his/her action, he/she should at least enjoy working, and have 
the joy of possibly getting rich (4: 8b). But if he/she cannot even 
have their 1 1, enjoyment in activity, then this is declared to be 
absurd because their actions do not yield any effect (4: 8c). 
With the '7 
J 
declaration on the lonely and joyless life (4: 8), 
Qoheleth turns to encourage companionship in life because there is 
a 'reward' (1 ? functions exactly like p71T, 4: 9b) in communal 
activity that one does not get in solitary activity. Thus, Qoheleth 
praises those who live a communal life (4: 9-12). 
As Qoheleth broadens his argument to include examples of absur- 
dity from the national or international arena (4: 13-16), particu- 
larly on the transfer of monarchical power, he observed another 
absurdity (4: 16). The absurdity lies in the fact that as one 
monarch or regime comes the other goes, it does not lead to any 
enduring remembrance although the events of the monarch's life are 
amazingly memorable (4: 16b; cf. 1: 11; 2: 16). There is no enduring 
profit, but merely repeats events like the endless cycles in the 
natural system (cf. 1: 4-7). 
These examples of absurdity from the personal, communal and 
national life have once again demonstrated and supported Qohe- 
leth's argument on the absurdity of reality - human activity that 
leads to no expected effect is declared absurd. 
6. Fear the Unfathomable God (4: 17(5: 1)-5: 8(9)) 
After analysing the absurdity in the social and political 
realms, Qoheleth applies his wisdom to religious affairs (4: 17- 
5: 8). Obviously Qoheleth is familiar with the common religious 
practices, such as sacrifices, paying vows and praying before God. 
Qoheleth does not discourage or condemn these activities per se, 
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rather he is more concerned with the appropriate attitude for an 
inferior worshipper before a superior God (5: 1). This concern 
arises from his realization that life is full of absurdity, actions 
and effects often correlating in the most unexpected ways. This 
grasp compels him to warn anyone who goes to the temple to worship 
God to go with a cautious and reverent attitude, because the conse- 
quences of human actions are in the hands of Godly who is often 
silent and unfathomable and whose actions often seem absurd (cf. 
2: 26). This understanding of God leads Qoheleth to accompany his 
warning (4: 17-5: 5) with the advice to fear God, which occurs for 
the second time (5: 6; cf. 3: 14) - an irresistible demand of the 
divine superior for submission from the helplessly impotent human 
being. 
7. Absurdity in the Material World (5: 9(10)-19(20]) 
Having applied his wisdom to sacred matters, Qoheleth then deals 
with its opposite, the secular or material arena. He argues that 
there is absurdity in the gathering of wealth in 5: 9-11, after 
which he proceeds to describe the general human attitude towards 
wealth, possession and labour, which inevitably leads to the 
programmatic question of what the 1171 is. He argues that it is 
absurd that the act of accumulating wealth does not lead to the 
effect of being satisfied (5: 9), with no enduring profit to the 
accumulator (5: 10). Instead, a proverbial saying is used to encour- 
age those who are able to be contented with their lot (5: 11). 
isIt is interesting to note that Qoheleth may have purposely 
omitted the use of the personal name of God even in his close 
quotation from Deuteronomy 23: 22 (Qoh. 5: 3a). This omission may 
imply that Qoheleth does not intend to limit his counsel to 
temple-goers solely to Yahweh-alone worshippers. The admonition is 
for all religious or deity worshippers. 
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As he proceeds to describe his observations concerning wealth 
and the gathering of wealth (5: 12-16), he argues that there is no 
11711' (5: 15,16) in any human activity that involves labouring or 
the gathering of wealth and possessions. Twice he calls it Tv7 
, 717, a sickening evil (5: 12,15). If earlier he has argued that the 
accumulation of wealth should lead to the consequence of being able 
and having the opportunity to enjoy it, or being able to pass it on 
to someone worthy of its possession (cf. 2: 18ff.; 4: 7ff. ), it is 
here that he denies categorically any enduring profit to the 
wealthy. He argues that acts and consequences often do not have a 
rational correlation. There is no enduring profit, no and it 
is absurd to strive for wealth and possession (5: 15): 
18 As he came 
from his mother's womb he shall go again, naked as he came, and 
shall take nothing for his toil, which he may carry away in his 
hand ... just as he came so shall he go 
[like the natural phenomena 
described in 1: 4-7]; and what 111Ii [is there] for him who has 
toiled for the wind [in endless cycles with nothing enduring, cf. 
1: 6]" (5: 14-15). 
Having convinced his readers that the material world is full of 
absurdity with no enduring profit, Qoheleth once again advises one 
to find enjoyment in human activity within the short span of life 
that God has given to all (5: 17-18). This is the fourth of his 
seven advices to find enjoyment in one's activity, yet here, four 
new elements have been added. 
(1) He changes the 'nothing is better' (: 110 j) form in the 
previous advice (2: 24; 3: 12,22) to "it is good and it is beautiful 
(ýý]'-7V1X i1D) (RSV "to be fitting") ... and to see good 
(Cll? t'1ý1 
fTý1Lý)" (5: 17a). Qoheleth no longer puts his advice in a 'better- 
16See discussion in Chapter II on the concept of 7]#7 on wealth. 
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proverb' form in the comparative or relative sense, but he firmly 
states his advice that one ought to enjoy life. 
(2) A sense of an imperative to enjoy life is indirectly implied 
in the phrase "the few (7! MD) days of his life"- (5: 17b); life is 
short and opportunities are few, therefore one should enjoy all one 
can and when time allows. This idea that life is short and must be 
enjoyed is fully elucidated in his last advice in 11: 9 (cf. 
11: 7-12: 7). 
(3) The concept that joy is a gift of God, mentioned briefly in 
3: 13, is explicitly expanded in 5: 18, "Also, to every human being 
God has given Q UI) wealth and treasures, and power to eat of it, 
and to accept his portion (1771T)ß and find enjoyment in his labour 
- this is the gift (MO) of God. " This expanded advice agrees with 
his earlier declaration (5: 9-16) that accumulation of wealth and 
possessions leads to absurdity ('7j), if there is no enjoyment for 
the labourer in his activities. This can also be seen in his 
discussion immediately following this advice in 6: 2. 
(4) Most striking is his attempt here to suggest the expected 
consequence of humankind being given the PJ or joy in their activ- 
ities by God as a gift. The expected consequence of a joyful life 
is that one would not remember the negative aspects of life (5: 19), 
such as the realities he designates as 7noj. Ironically, it is 
interesting to note, even though Qoheleth himself may have been 
unaware of it or its a silent assent (because no ')not statement is 
issued here as in 2: 24-26), that this Is exactly where a further 
absurdity lies: that the acts of God giving human beings the 
enjoyment do not yield the effects one would expect, i. e. that 
human beings would not remember the absurd elements In life. At 
least Qoheleth is aware of the reality of 7]ÄT. 
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With the advice to enjoy life as the conclusion to this section 
(5: 9-19), Qoheleth has taken an active role, not only to encourage 
his readers to find enjoyment in life, but constructively and 
increasingly aggressively17 trying to persuade his readers that this 
is the right course to take in a world of absurdity. 
8. Life Without Joy is Absurd (6: 1-9) 
In this section, Qoheleth argues that living without enjoying is 
absurd and gives various examples of absurdity. The first example 
of absurdity is a situation (6: 1-2) where God gives wealth, posses- 
sions and power to a person but does not gives him/her the ability 
to enjoy all these gifts. In 6: 2 he declares that it is absurd 
('7j) for God to give wealth without also giving the ability to 
enjoy such wealth. This is the very opposite kind of absurdity to 
that in 5: 19, if there is an absurdity, where God gives one the 
gift of enjoyment so that one will not be aware of the absurdity in 
life (5: 19). 
Then he continues to argue that one who has many heirs and lives 
many years is worse than the still born if one's life is not 
greeted with joy (6: 3-6; cf. 4: 2-3,8), and it is absurd for such a 
blessed life not to experience any joy. Two other examples of 
absurdity is given in 6: 7,9 and 6: 8. In 6: 7,9, it is absurd if 
activity does not lead to enjoyment due to discontentment (cf. 
4: 7ff. ). In 6: 8, the absurdity lies in the fact that there is no 
f17nP to the wise (cf. 2: 15-16). These examples strengthen Qohe- 
17As can be seen in the change of mood in his latter advice in 
9: 7 and 11: 9 which are all in the imperative mood. Whybray has 
observed correctly that in 2: 24, the advice is a "plain statement"; 
in 3: 12,22a, the advice is placed after an "asseverative phrase"; 
in 5: 17, there is a "more solemn introduction"; in 8: 15a, it is in 
"even more decided terms"; and in 9: 7a-9a and later it is in the 
imperative mood. See, "Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy, " JSOT 23 (1982): 
87-98 (87-88). 
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leth's thought on the absurdity of human life, and drives home his 
negative answer to the programmatic question about T111p he asked 
at the very beginning in 1: 3 (cf. 6: 8) - there is no it is 
absurd, 71JT (6: 9). 
Not only that, embraced within these descriptions of the absurd 
is Qoheleth's clear and constructive argument that the absurdity 
lies in the absence of enjoyment in human activities, in addition 
to the already undeniably profitless activities themselves. It also 
leads to his crucial thought that the ability to enjoy one's activ- 
ity as one's VJ is absolutely essential and provides the ultimate 
motive for living in the world that has no 1110' and is full of '11. 1. VV 
9. Wisdom Unattainable (6: 10-7: 29) 
In the first six chapters of the book, Qoheleth has argued that 
the absence of 11111' leads to absurdity. (Seven out of the ten 
occurrences of 11'101' are found in the first six chapters. ) Having 
progressively intensified his advice to enjoy life, to find the p'fI 
in human activity, Qoheleth moves on in this section to focus on a 
very different topic - the inferiority of human beings to God and 
their helplessness in various situations. The Unattainability of 
wisdom and the impotent of human wisdom is the theme of Qheleth's 
thought in this section. 
(1) Qoh. 6: 10-7: 14 
He begins the section by introducing three questions concerning 
human powerlessness and inferiority in face of daily events and 
God: "what advantage? " (6: 11), "who knows? " (6: 12a; 8: 9; 9: 1,10,12; 
10: 14,15; 11: 2,5,6). and "who can declare or tell? " (6: 12b; 
10: 14b). Later on, he also includes the question "Who can find 
out? " (7: 14,24,27-29; 8: 17). 
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The introduction is followed by a series of proverbial sayings 
(7: 1-12) edited by Qoheleth leading to the conclusion in 7: 13,14 
which has a theological overtone. This series demonstrates that 
although there exist various wisdom teachings which are intended to 
serve as guiding principles for a successful and quality life (7: 1- 
12), most events do not follow these guiding principles (7: 13). 
Life is full of events that are contrary to this wisdom advice. If 
the series of sayings appear to be perversions of proverbs, they 
only prove that Qoheleth is not an idealist (or traditionalist), 
but an realist, fully aware of the irregularities In life. Human 
beings are helpless to do anything (7: 13) but to accept the 
irregularities as well as the regularities in life, knowing that 
God is the unfathomable divine superior (7: 13,14) whose hand Is on 
the effects of daily human activities. Knowing that 'prosperity' 
and 'adversity' will both characterize one's life without a 
detectable pattern of how God send them for future prediction 
(7: 14c), Qoheleth encourages one to enjoy the prosperity that comes 
along (7: 14a), butAbe prepared to accept the occasion when adver- 
sity prevails (7: 14b). In other words, the fact that human wisdom 
cannot gain access to the principles by which the divine superior 
acts, forces human beings to accept helplessly whatever comes 
into one's life including the reality of absurdity. If human wisdom 
is impotent to ascertain the principles by which God acts in human 
life, the question remains how should human beings conduct them- 
selves when they do not know what consequences may reasonably be 
expected to arise from an action? 
(2) Qoh. 7: 15-18 
Qoheleth addresses this question in 7: 15-18. After citing an 
example of irregularity in human life which does not conform to 
wisdom's guidelines (7: 15), Qoheleth continues by prescribing a 
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course of action aimed not at promoting a quality of life, but at 
giving instructions for a defensive way of life - staying alive 
(7: 16-17). He encourages his readers to follow this defensive way 
of life because it is based on the principle that God is superior 
and unfathomable. Human beings have no access to the principle by 
which God acts and therefore fearing God is the best defensive act 
inferior human beings can perform - in order to stay alive (7: 18). 
Whoever does it will 'come forth' from the 'left' or 'right' 
situation well, with a life that will prevent premature death - 
"why should you die before your time? " (7: 17); and self-destruction 
- "why should you destroy yourself? " (7: 16). However, this life 
will not necessarily be a life of quality and success as the wisdom 
convention promised. 
(3) Qoh. 7: 19-24 
At this point, Qoheleth pauses to reconsider the act of striving 
for wisdom (7: 19-29; cf. 1: 12-18; 6: 10-7: 14), and affirms the value 
and goodness of wisdom (7: 19). As he is aware that there is no 
sinless righteous person on earth (7: 20), he encourages a cautious 
attitude towards speech, casual talk and relationship with others 
(7: 21,22). He concludes the quest for wisdom in an autobiographical 
form (7: 23-25; cf. 1: 12ff. ) confessing that although he wants very 
much to strive to be wise (7: 23), wisdom is unattainable, "it 
[wisdom] was far from me, deep, very deep" (7: 23c, 24). The more he 
wants to be wise the more he is not wise! 
(4) Qoh. 7: 25-29 
Since the inaccessibility and unattainability of the wisdom that 
governs daily human activities convinced Qoheleth to abandon the 
subject, he turns ('111: 10) Instead to investigate folly ODD) and 
madness (ni77i1), pointing out three enigmatic findings concerning 
male and female. Qoheleth's first finding is that woman is bitterly 
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corrupted (7: 26). The second finding is that man is no better than 
woman, man is equally corrupted, if not slightly better than woman 
(7: 27,28). These findings on the corruption of men and women 
ultimately lead to the third finding about humankind (7: 29). It is 
in the third category that the creation of male and female is 
called into question. Qoheleth argues that although humankind is 
to be responsible for their own corruption, the creation of human- 
kind involves certain aspects of absurdity (although the word '21T 
is not used here): the action of God in creating human beings 
upright does not lead to the expected effect. Instead, the act of 
creation results in human beings seeking out "many devices" (7: 29). 
In other words, the act of creation itself could also be considered 
as absurd. 
10. To Fear Is To Live (8: 1-17) 
Following up an earlier subject on the inaccessibility and 
unknowability of wisdom (8: 1; cf. 7: 23f. ), Qoheleth, in a series of 
prohibitions and commands, gives instructions to his readers on 
how to conduct themselves before the superior (8: 2-9). He advises 
his readers to please their superior (8: 2) and to avoid unpleasant 
moment with their superior (8: 3). The reason for these advices is 
based on the view that although the action of the superior is 
unpredictable and unknown to the inferior (8: 7), the superior (i. e. 
monarch or God), neverthelesss, has the power to carry out his/her 
will to punish or to reward (8: 3-5a). Although Qoheleth encourages 
the inferior to adopt an attitude of obedience before the superior, 
it is not that he approves of human domination over other humans, 
"man lords it over man to his hurt" (8: 9b). The reason for this 
discouragement may lie in his conviction as expressed earlier that 
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no one is perfect (cf. 7: 20), humans are corrupted (cf. 7: 27-29), 
especially those who are in power (cf. 8: 3,4). 
In 8: 10, Qoheleth turns to give an example of absurdity and 
attempts to provide a reason in 8: 11 for the existence of the 
absurdity. He observes that by frequenting the temple, the wicked 
person receives that which should rightly belong to the righteous - 
the praise of the community (8: 10c) 18 and a decent burial (8: 10a). is 
He declares this event as a 7ý-i event and repeats this in 8: 14, 
pointing out that the actions of the righteous and wicked do not 
always result in what one would normally expect. The reason that 
the wicked receive the praise and decent burial rightly belonging 
to the righteous is not because the wicked are not judged (cf. 
3: 17), but rather they are not judged soon enough to discourage 
wickedness (8: 11). But this delay of judgment does not justify 
wickedness because earlier (7: 16,17) Qoheleth advises one not to be 
wicked as such action only brings self-destruction. Here, he 
advises that "it will be well with those who fear before God" 
(8: 12a) and "it will not be well with the wicked, neither will he 
prolong his days like a shadow, because he does not fear God" 
(8: 13). 
These theistic verses that are bracketed between 8: 10 and 8: 14, 
where the phrase 'fear God' occurs twice, support his earlier 
advice (8: 2-5; of. 3: 14; 5: 6; 7: 18) that one should fear one's 
superior despite the arbitrariness of the actions of the superior 
18 Here, I follow the LXX (Kai entgvsBnaav) and several other manu- 
scribes IlInIlO'l, "and were praised". Hithpael of the root 11: 0 "laud, 
praise. " 
The LXX has et 'q cLQaxeEvtes = I7'K]ltý b'7ý7 "the wicked 
being carried to their tombs. " The Vulgate, Peshitta, Rashi, Jerome 
read "the wicked buried". Gordis, op. cit., has "the wicked brought 
to their grave with pomp" (295). 
132 
because the superior has the power to reward and punish. This 
advice is also in accord with the advice in 7: 16-18, since both 
passages refer to actions (righteous and wicked) that do not lead 
to effects which could be reasonably expected (blessing and curse, 
respectively). Qoheleth is clearly reaffirming in 8: 12,13 his 
teaching of 7: 15-18, concerning the right course of action one 
should take in face of absurd reality. 
But unlike 7: 18, Qoheleth develops his advice further in 8: 12,13 
to include the advice to find enjoyment in human activity (8: 15). 
Thus Qoheleth no longer prescribes only a defensive course of 
action (7: 16-18) but also a positive and imperative advice to enjoy 
life in a world that is full of absurdity. 
At this point, Qoheleth has augmented his earlier advice on 
enjoyment - to enjoy life as one's 77R even though there is no 
JtitP in all the 7n activities - with the advice to fear God and 
enjoy life in face of the absurdity that righteous actions receive 
a response appropriate to wicked actions. With the advice to enjoy 
life (8: 12,13,15) despite the absurd elements in life, he is also 
implying the ineffectual, if not error, of wisdom teaching concern- 
ing reward and retribution because the acts of the righteous/wicked 
do not yield the expected effects of being rewarded/punished. His 
advice to enjoy life has also grown more affirmative and decisive 
than before; "So I commend ('CUT V 1) mirth" (8: 15a). If his earlier 
advice (2: 24ff.; 3: 12,13; 3: 22; 5: 17,18) to enjoy life is seen 
arising out of the discovery of a 77JT, enjoyment in activity 
despite the fact that there is no 1i1ä in human activity and the 
world is full of elements of absurdity, then this latter advice 
(8: 12,13,15) to fear God and enjoy life may be said to arise out of 
the realization that the teaching of reward and retribution - the 
blessing of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked - is 
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often not true. The reason for his advice to fear God may also lie 
in his confession at the conclusion of this section (8: 1-17), that 
the action of God, the way God exercises his power regarding the 
effects of human actions, is inaccessible even to one who claims to 
be wise (8: 17). 
11 Enjoy Life, No Matter What! (9: 1-11: 6) 
Qoheleth continues, in this section, to intensify his advice to 
enjoy life (9: 7-10) which stands out sharply in the midst of his 
reflections on various subjects: God's superiority (9: 1); death 
awaits all humankind (9: 2-6); the unknowability and unpredictabi- 
lity of various undesirable and unexpected moments in life (9: 11- 
12); the strength and weakness of wisdom (9: 13-10: 1); and the 
unexpected and irregular in life (10: 2-11: 6). 
(1) Qoh. 9: 1-10: 1 
He begins his reflection on the superiority of God under whom 
human beings are unable to secure the expected effects of their 
actions (9: 1). The deeds of the righteous and the wise are in the 
hands of God and no one knows what their consequences are. The 
absurdity in life suggest that the consequences of their actions 
are often not what they would expected. The criss-crossing of the 
acts and consequences of the righteous and the wicked reminds 
Qoheleth of the reality of death which nullifies any distinction 
between the wise and the fool. the righteous and the wicked (9: 2). 
Although humankind knows nothing about the actions of God regarding 
the consequence of human action, there is one thing Qoheleth knows 
for sure, i. e. one fate awaits all - wicked or righteous - indis- 
criminately (9: 2-3). Unlike his earlier reflections on the same 
theme on death in 3: 19-21 and 4: 2-3, here, Qoheleth praises those 
who are alive because there is no J' 1 
(memory), no p711 (portion), 
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no 7ý() (reward) and no ýý X (love) or M10 (hatred) (9: 6a) for 
those who are in Sheol forever ([1712)7) after this present life 
(9: 10). But even though we all know that death greets all human 
beings, no one knows when this undesired fate will arrive, just as 
no one knows when the many unexpected moments will occur in life 
(9: 11-12a). If these unexpected moments suddenly occur In one's 
life (tough luck! 9: 12b), there is nothing one can do about it 
because one "does not know his time (lily), " like fish or birds 
caught by surprise (9: 12a). 
In between these reflections on the unknowability and unpredict- 
ability of God's action and those unexpected moments in life is 
Qoheleth's intensified advice to enjoy one's life (9: 7-10). The 
unit 9: 7-9a marks an advance in Qoheleth's advice on enjoying life. 
As he makes various recapitulations of his earlier reflections in 
9: 1-6 and 9: 11-16,20 he also takes the readers a step beyond his 
advice of 5: 17,8 and 8: 15, with an advice cast in the form of an 
imperative, command to enjoy life. 
First, there is a change in the tone of his advice; a command to 
enjoy life is issued in 9: 7, rather than just a decision on his 
standpoint as in 3: 12,13,22 or an introduction or commendation as 
in 5: 17,18 and 8: 15. 
Secondly, instead of regarding enjoyment in life as a gift MMQ) 
of God, he asserts that the act of enjoyment itself is 'doing the 
209: 1-6 contains recapitulations of the unattainability and 
unknowability of wisdom (9: 1; cf. 6: 10ff. ); death nullifies the 
expected distinction between the righteous and the wicked, etc. (9: 
2-3a; cf. 2: 14b, 15; 3: 19-21); humankind is wicked (9: 3b; cf. 7: 29; 
8: 9b); and no remembrance of the dead (9: 4-6; cf. 1: 11; 2: 16; 4: 2, 
3,16). 9: 11-16 contains the recapitulations on the unknowability of 
what the reasonably expected consequence of an action might be (9: 
11; cf. 7: 13,14; 8: 4-8) and the seasons of time (9: 12; cf. 3: 1-11); 
the test of wisdom (9: 13-16; cf. 4: 13-16). 
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will of God', "God has already approved what you do" (9: 7b). God is 
in favour of one who enjoys life. 
Thirdly, it is implied in 9: 8 that righteousness or good conduct 
should accompany one's act of enjoyment. This may be related to the 
idea of judgment in 2: 26, namely that God gives enjoyment to those 
who please him and the task of hard labour without enjoyment to 
those who sin and displease him (cf. 11: 9b; 12: 13,14). 
Fourthly, enjoying one's marital life as one's j7'n (9: 9) is a 
new addition to his earlier idea of joy (cf. 2: 10; 3: 22; 5: 1$). 
where joy is closely related to 'portion, ' P7n and 'activity, ' Inv. 
These elaborations and intensification of the advice to enjoy 
life are not intended by Qoheleth to be taken as mere passing com- 
ments. Rather they represent his conviction that the advice con- 
tains the best course to be taken in a world full of absurd reality 
as argued through his observations, experiments and explorations, 
from which his conviction is derived. 
Lest one think that the four additional elements mentioned above 
are all that Qoheleth has advanced in his advice to enjoy life in 
9: 7-9, a strange idea is introduced following the 'enjoyment' 
advice in 9: 10. An element of excellence is added to his advice on 
enjoyment and human activity, i. e. to do the best in one's work, to 
combat any idleness and pessimistic attitudes in a world of absurd 
reality where no 111I1' is found and with no attainable wisdom. The 
addition of this idea - striving for excellence - is attributed to 
the realization that there is no activity beyond death. One might 
have noticed that Qoheleth's concept of death in 9: 10 has its 
preamble in the earlier verses: death is seen as one of the 
elements which nullify the distinction between the righteous and 
the wicked, the beast and the human (2: 14-16; 3: 19-20), it is also 
seen as a better alternative than having to encounter social 
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oppression (4: 2,3) and is much better than a wealthy and long life 
without enjoyment (6: 2,3). It is here that death is seen as a point 
of cessation for all human activities. This confession is crucial 
to Qoheleth's idea of the absence of any remembrance which leads to 
no j17C1' and thus the 7n declaration. Death marks the end of a 
cycle, a life span, like the individual cycle of the natural pheno- 
mena (1: 4-7) where a new cycle begins and the previous cycle 
vanishes without any remembrance (cf. 1: 11). Death as the point of 
cessation of the life cycle is also crucial to his later argument, 
i. e. the necessity of enjoying life while there is opportunity, 
because life is short and death is imminent (11: 7f. ). 
Knowing that death nullifies the distinction between the wise 
and the fool (9: 2), and that he still prefers to be alive than 
being dead (9: 4-6), especially a life full of wisdom than a life of 
folly (cf. 7: 11), Qoheleth turns to consider the strength and 
weakness of wisdom in 9: 13-10: 1. Though he never doubted the value 
and strength of wisdom, as illustrated in the story in 9: 13-16, and 
supported by a proverbial saying in 9: 17,18a, Qoheleth nevertheless 
thinks wisdom is very vulnerable (9: 18b-10: 1). 
(2) Qoh. 10: 2-11: 6 
Having ironically pointed out the vulnerability of wisdom (9: 
18b; 10: 1) , Qoheleth returns in 10: 2-11: 6 to examine the issue of 
the unexpected and irregular in life, with a view to demonstrating 
his earlier reflection (9: 1,11-12) on the unknowability of various 
occasions in life (cf. 3: 2-8). This demonstration will ultimately 
lead him to admit once again that humankind "cannot know the work 
of God who made all things" 0: M-11N fl fl7" 11 131J R ntuvt]-fl rin 9`7, Y V. I. Y-1 VI Y -1 -Y 
11: 5b). He concludes with the command that one should enjoy life 
while one has the opportunity (cf. 11: 7-9). 
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With such a view in mind, Qoheleth has compiled a series of 
proverbial sayings to demonstrate the various unexpected and irre- 
gular aspects of life alongside the many regularities. He sets side 
by side the regularities (10: 2-4,10,12-15,17-20a; 11: 3) and the 
irregularities (10: 5-9,16,20b; 11: 1-2,4) to demonstrate the unpre- 
dictability of various situations, perhaps also attempting to dem- 
onstrate the fact that the world is full of elements of absurdity, 
though the word 73ý'1is never used in this unit. V 
For example, in between his assertion on the expected and the 
regular, as well as the distinction between the acts and conse- 
quences of the fool and the wise in 10: 2-4 and 10: 12-15, he 
observes the irregularities and the unexpected situations of a fool 
sitting at the high place, or slaves riding on horseback while the 
prince walks on foot in 10: 5-7. These examples of irregularities 
also rendered the conventional teachings on the distinctions 
between the fool and the wise invalid. Further examples are seen in 
10: 8-11, where the elements of unexpectedness and irregularity are 
most striking, though they also demonstrate the fact that actions 
and their effects match in the most unexpected manner. For 
instance, the act of digging a pit is followed by the unreasonable 
and unexpected effect of falling in one's own trap (10: 8a); or "one 
who quarries stones is hurt by them" (10: 9a). 
In 11: 1-6, Qoheleth again elaborates on the irregular and 
unexpected nature of life: the bread on the water remains there for 
several days without decaying or flowing away with the water 
(11: 1); the decentralizing or dispersing of one's wealth rather 
than keeping the capital together for times of need (11: 2); the 
farmer who listens to the 'weather forecast' shall not succeed in 
anything (11: 4). Examples of the regularities are also illustrated: 
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dark clouds will empty themselves as rain on earth (11: 3a) and 
trees will fall where they are expected to fall (11: 3b). 
With these illustrations, he asserts that because various 
irregularities surround daily human life and that God's way of 
doing things is impenetrable by human wisdom (11: 5), it is best for 
human beings to carry out their actions to the best of their 
understanding (11: 6a), and work to the best of their ability (cf. 
9: 10b). However, this still does not guarantee a perfect timing for 
all actions nor a reasonable relationship between acts and their 
consequences (11: 6b). Those who act according to their wisdom 
expecting absolute regularity may not succeed (11: 4) because the 
activities of God are unfathomable and unknowable to human wisdom 
(11: 2b, 5). The advice that follows in 11: 6 is best understood in 
the light of 9: 10a as an advice to strive for excellence in all 
human activity (cf. 7: 18; 9: 10), and hope for the best because 
there is no easy alternative (11: 6) in a world full of irregulari- 
ties and unexpected moments, as well as absurdity. 
12. Enjoy, Life is Short! Death is at hand 1 (11: 7-12: 8) 
The unfathomability of God, the irregularities, absurdity in 
life and the impossibility of knowing what to expect from an action 
drive Qoheleth to his final advice. Like his previous advice 
(9: 7-9), this final advice is given in the form of a command - 
enjoy life! 
After expressing the pleasantness and desirability of life over 
death (11: 7). Qoheleth urges one to enjoy life in all the days of 
one's life knowing that what comes after is absurd (11: 8). The urge 
is followed with a command to enjoy life especially while still in 
one's youth, affirming that life is meant to be enjoyed (11: 8). 
Then, by means of four imperatives 11U) (rejoice), `j`7i1 (walk), y1 
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(know), 70's1 (remove), and `1: 3V1 (put away), he encourages his read- 
ers to treasure every enjoyable moment in life while the opportuni- 
ty exists (11: 9-10). The advice has also made its condition clear 
in 11: 9b, "But know that for all these things God will bring you 
into judgment, " though it is not certain what the judgment could 
be. In light of 2: 26 and 6: 2, there is the possibility that the 
judgment could be the taking away of joy from one's life. Although 
according to Qoheleth, act and consequence have little relationship 
and judgment is often delayed with many wicked people around 
unpunished, he is certain that the superior divine has the power to 
punish the wicked (8: 2-5) and will punish the wicked (3: 17). Thus, 
he would still opt for a righteous life. In any respect, this is In 
accord with the concept of joy in 2: 24-26 where the act of God's 
judgment is illustrated, and finds support in 9: 8 where he encour- 
ages one to please God even in one's enjoyment (cf. 12: 13,14). This 
command (11: 9) is followed by a description of the imminence of 
death, the moment of death, striking home the message that life Is 
short and the opportunity to enjoy life is scarce, therefore, one 
must treasure every moment in life to find enjoyment in it. 
The encouragement to enjoy life at the beginning (11: 8) of the 
unit is set in sharp contrast to the ': 37T statement at the end 
(12: 8), when death prevails over life (12: 7). In order to inject a 
sense of urgency in finding enjoyment in life, Qoheleth first em- 
phasizes that absurdity exists even in one's youthful days (11: 10); 
thus one must not let the elements of absurdity in life distract 
one from the purpose of enjoying life. Second, through the vivid 
description of the certainty and imminence of death in 12: 1-7. 
Qoheleth injects a sense of urgency into his command to enjoy life 
while still alive. Death as the end of a life cycle is described by 
means of the language of imagery. 
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The imagery employed in Qoheleth's description in 12: 1-7 does 
not emphasize aging or old age (never the interest of the book). 
Rather, the language of imagery emphasizes the certainty, the Ines- 
capability and the imminence of death, aiming to strike home the 
effect and awareness that death is at hand, therefore one should 
enjoy life now before it is too late! The phrase -9 '1VJX 'Ty (12: 1, 
2,6) clearly emphasize the moment before a life cycle approaches 
its terminating point (cf. 1: 4-11). There will be no remembrance of 
the previous cycle as it vanishes and replaced by a new cycle, a 
concept well founded in the poem on nature in the prologue. Since 
there is no remembrance, no enduring profit and effects on each 
individual cycles as they vanish, their ephemeral existence are the 
only sphere within which joy can be found. Thus, the description is 
meant to encourage the finding of enjoyment in life and at the same 
time pointing out the moment of death after which no activity 
exists, the end of a cycle. With the separation of the body and 
spirit in view in 12: 7, Qoheleth concludes the description and also 
the main text (1: 2-12: 8) with the 0'7n 7nß statement which togeth- 
er with 1: 2 framed the main body of the book. 
In sum, Qoheleth argued that although human activity yielded no 
fl11., activity itself produced the p? fl which is enjoyment. Human 
beings are to strive for excellence in all their activities for 
enjoyment lies within activity itself. Though life is full of 
absurdity, life is to be enjoyed. Although the acts of the 
righteous and the wicked do not often result in what one might 
reasonably expect, one is advised to fear the unfathomable supreme 
creator who has a peculiar way of directing the effects of human 
actions. 
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13. The Epilogue (12: 9-14) 
The epilogue commends the theological thought of Qoheleth to a 
wider readership. It provides a personal profile of Qoheleth, 
focusing on his professional activity (12: 9-10). Qoheleth is 
commended as ý7! j (wise) who taught knowledge and who jiff (listen), 
171T (search), and j7t1 (compile) many proverbs (12: 9). Qoheleth 
research and edit "words of pleasure" (ptilT-'7]). The nature of his 
teaching is expressed in 12: 11 and concludes with words of 
exhortation in 12: 12-14 concerning the activity of the sages and 
humankind. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POSITION OF OOHELETH'S THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT 
WITHIN ISRAEL'S THEOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the structure of Qoheleth's theological thought 
in Chapter Two was followed by a theological reading of the book in 
Chapter Three. This chapter will take the results of these two 
previous chapters a step further in order to investigate the posi- 
tion of Qoheleth's theological thought in Israel's theology and 
society. Similar interest has also been expressed by Frank Cruse- 
mann who remarks that "the question of what Koheleth's place in 
society has to do with his thinking has hardly been raised. And yet 
for me that is what is really interesting about him. "1 Crüsemann's 
basic methodological principle is "to relate all statements in the 
text [Qoheleth] to the concrete 'social whole' [i. e. society as a 
whole] of the time from which the text comes and to which it 
speaks. " He follows to suggest three steps to investigate the issue 
at hand: "(1) investigate the fundamental breakdown of the act- 
consequence connection; (2) make a concrete application of my find- 
ings to some major themes of Koheleth; and (3) turn to the politi- 
cal and social statements of the book. "2 Differing from Crüsemann's 
IFrank Crüsemann, "The Unchangeable World: The 'Crisis of 
Wisdom' In Koheleth, " in God of the Lowly, ed. W. Schottroff and W. 
Stegemam (New York: Orbis Book, 1984), pp. 57-77; trans. Matthew J. 
O'Connell from the German, "Die unveränderbare Welt. Überlegungen 
zur 'Krisis der Weisheit' beim Prediger, " In Der Gott der kleinen 
Leute (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1979). 
2Ibid. 
, p. 59. 
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suggestion. this chapter, based on the previous theological 
analysis of Qoheleth, will investigate the relationship between 
Qoheleth's thought and its position in Israel's theology. Later in 
the chapter, its place in the society will also be examined, or 
more precisely, to answer the question: where would Qoheleth's 
thought place him within Israelite society? 
Since Israel's theology has traditionally been regarded as being 
Yahwistic and Qoheleth, along with Job and Proverbs, formed the 
wisdom corpus of the Hebrew Bible, the task of investigating the 
position of Qoheleth's theological thought in Israel's theology 
would be benefited by a general analysis of the relation between 
wisdom and Yahwism. Such an analysis will help to discover common 
denominators between wisdom and Yahwism, which in turn will be 
compared with the theological thought of Qoheleth. The comparison 
will ascertain the compatibility and/or Incompatibility of Qohe- 
leth's theological thought with Israel's Yahwism. This will be 
followed by a proposal regarding the position of Qoheleth in 
Israelite society. 
1. The Debate on Wisdom's `Place' in the Old Testament 
One of the main difficulties facing Old Testament theologians is 
how to treat the wisdom literature; what is its relationship to the 
rest of the Old Testament and what is its place in Old Testament 
theologies. The relationship between Old Testament wisdom books and 
the rest of the Old Testament has generally been seen in two mutu- 
ally exclusive ways. On one extreme, wisdom influence was claimed 
to be present everywhere in the non wisdom books. This was based on 
common vocabulary, subject matter and world view. 
3 On the other 
3Donn F. Morgan, Wisdom in the Old Testament Traditions (Atlan- 
ta: John Knox Press, 1981); von Rad, "The Joseph Story and Ancient 
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extreme, Old Testament 'Yahwism', i. e. salvation history, was 
superimposed onto wisdom thought, thus misconstruing wisdom thought 
to be merely Israel's "response". 
4 
The first extreme has prompted Crenshaw to investigate the issue 
of wisdom influence outside the wisdom corpus in his article, 
"Method in Determining Wisdom Influence upon 'Historical' Litera- 
ture, "5 in which he reaches negative conclusion concerning alleged 
wisdom influence in many texts outside the wisdom corpus. In 
response to the other extreme, he remarks that "the character of 
the wisdom corpus resists all attempts to impose Yahwism as the 
norm by which to assess its validity, "6 even though it is not clear 
what the content of Yahwism is. 
Murphy, approaches the issue differently, building on von Rad's 
insight that "the experiences of the world were for her [Israel] 
always divine experiences as well, and the experiences of God were 
for her experience of the world. "7 He suggests that 
The problem of the relationship between wisdom literature and 
other portions of the Old Testament needs to be reformulated in 
terms of a shared approach to reality.... It is not a question 
of the direct influence of the sages or of the wisdom 
literature, but rather of an approach tob reality which was 
shared by all Israelites in varying degrees. 
In response to Murphy, Whybray rightly warns against the danger of 
Wisdom, " in The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays (London: 
Oliver and Boyd Ltd., 1966), pp. 292-300; in SAIW, pp. 439-47. 
4G. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972), "We 
can begin with the assertion that the wisdom practised in Israel 
was a response made by a Yahwism confronted with specific 
experiences of the world" (307). 
5J. L. Crenshaw, JBL 88 (1969): 129-142; Also in SAIW, pp. 481-94; 
"Prolegomenon, " pp. 9ff. 
6J. L. Crenshaw, "In Search of Divine Presence: Some Remarks Pre- 
liminary to a Theology of Wisdom, " RevExp 74 (1977): 353-69 (362). 
7G. von Rad, op. cit., p. 62. 
aR. E. Murphy, "Wisdom - Theses and Hypotheses, " in IW, pp. 35-42 
(39). 
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... reducing the concept of Israelite wisdom, outside the 
'wisdom books' proper, to no more than native common sense such 
as is to be found generally in human nature. All literature 
would then be 'wisdom literature', in so far as it had any kind 
of intellectual content, and to say of any author's work that it 
showed traces of wisdom thought, would be to say no more than 
that he was not a fool. 
9 
Although Murphy may not want to describe all Old Testament litera- 
ture as wisdom literature, nevertheless, Whybray's warning remains 
valid. 
Despite the fact that the relationship between the wisdom corpus 
and the rest of the Old Testament has yet to be adequately address- 
ed, it is, nevertheless unwarranted to deny a place for biblical 
wisdom literature in Old Testament theology. 
10 In the light of the 
two extremes mentioned above, the search for a relation between the 
wisdom corpus and the non wisdom books may be understood as a quest 
for a relationship between wisdom theology and Yahwistic theology - 
`wisdom and Yahwism. ' 
2. Wisdom and Yahwism 
In his 1975 article "Wisdom and Yahwism, " Murphy discussed this 
issue and expressed dissatisfaction with the understanding of 
Yahwism that was based solely on the decalogue, the patriarchal 
promises, the Exodus and Sinai events, etc., and made the following 
bold challenge: 
... Instead of inserting wisdom into Yahwism, with Yahwism as 
a kind of implicit determinant of orthodoxy, one might rather 
9R. N. Whybray, "Prophecy and Wisdom, " in Israel's Prophetic 
Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Ackroyd, eds. Richard Coggins, 
et al. (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), pp. 181-99 (186). 
10G. E. Wright, God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital 
(Studies in Biblical Theology 8; London: SCM Press, 1952), seems to 
have ignored wisdom literature and indirectly denied it a place in 
his biblical theology. 
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turn the question around: How Is Yahwism to be inserted into 
wisdom literature, into what was the daily experience of the 
Israelite? 11 
This question prompts one to investigate the nature of Yahwism? 
According to Murphy, the 'Yahwism' that is to be 'inserted' into 
wisdom should not only be "defined exclusively by the action of God 
in history: the patriarchal promises, the Exodus and Sinai events, 
etc., "12 but also the daily experiences of the Israelite as a 
responsible worshipper of Yahweh. To define Yahwism exclusively in 
terms of God's acts in history Is too narrow because there were 
other areas of life not really touched by any of these, for exam- 
ple, personal diligence, self-control, attitudes towards the poor, 
pride, trust in one's judgment, etc. For Murphy, Yahwism exempli- 
fies the total religious experience of the Israelite. This concept 
of Yahwism, however, runs the danger of being so broad as to 
include everything that is branded Israelite, thus making it too 
ambiguous and imprecise to be useful for a comparison with wisdom. 
In his 1984 S. B. L. presidential address, Murphy attempts a more 
precise connection between Yahwism and wisdom, via the concept of 
creation theology within the framework of Old Testament theology, 
based on the understanding of Yahwism as the religion that embraces 
the total religious experience of the Israelite. 13 This idea of 
connecting creation theology to wisdom theology is, of course, 
nothing new (cf. W. Zimmerli 
14). This has been stated more recently 
by H. -J. Hermisson, "before we can ask about wisdom in Old Testa- 
11R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Yahwism, " In No Famine in the Land: 
Studies in honor of John L. McKenzie, eds. J. W. Flanagan and A. W. 
Robinson (Montana: Scholars Press, 1975), pp. 117-26 (118). 
12Ibid., p. 119-20. 
13R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Creation, " JBL 104 (1985): 3-11 (3). 
14"The Place and the Limit of Wisdom in the Framework of the Old 
Testament Theology, " SJT 17 (1964): 145-58. In SAIW, pp. 314-38. 
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ment theology, we first have to ask about the place of creation 
theology in wisdom. " is To evaluate the arguments of Zimmerli, 
Hermisson or Murphy, one will need to know, first of all, what 
creation theology is and how this facet of Yahwism, as distinct 
from redemptive history as another facet of Yahwism, has been 
integrated into wisdom thought. Secondly, one needs to delineate, 
if possible, the content of wisdom theology, which shares the 
concept of creation theology as a common denominator with Yahwism. 
3. Wisdom and Creation 
The creation faith of ancient Israel has generally been 
considered by scholars to be chronologically late - attested in 
Second Isaiah, the Priestly writing and the late Psalms - and 
theologically secondary compared with the primary Old Testament 
concept of the history of salvation. Although von Rad has argued 
that creation faith was presupposed in the older tradition even if 
it appears more prominently in the later texts, he maintains that 
"the doctrine of creation was never able to attain to independent 
existence in its own right apart from soteriology. "1B This subser- 
vient role of creation was strongly challenged by H. H. Schmid17 who 
15H. 
-J. Hermisson, "Observations on the Creation Theology in 
Wisdom, " in IV, pp. 43-57 (44). 
18G. 
von Rad, "The Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of 
Creation, " in The Problem of the Hexateuch and other Essays, pp. 
131-43. In COT, pp. 53-64 and noted by B. W. Anderson in "Intro- 
duction: Mythopoeic and Theological Dimensions of Biblical Creation 
Faith, " in COT, pp. 1-24 (7), "The independence of creation from 
soteriology, in his [von Rad's] view, came into Israelite faith 
through the influence of wisdom. " G. von Rad's view is also found 
in Davie Napier's article, "On Creation-Faith in the Old Testa- 
ment, " Interp 10 (1956): 21-42. 
17H. H. Schmid, "Creation, Righteousness, and Salvation: 'Creation 
Theology' as the Broad Horizon of Biblical Theology, " trans. B. W. 
Anderson and D. G. Johnson, in COT, pp. 102-17 (102); idem, "Schöp- 
fung, Gerechtigkeit und Heil: Schöpfungsteologie als Gesamthorizont 
biblischer Theologie" ZTK 70 (1973): 1-19 (15); Also Theodore M. 
Ludwig, "The Traditions of the Establishing of the Earth in 
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argued that creation theology has a much more central theological 
significance than has been generally realized - indeed, he sees it 
as the broad horizon of biblical theology as a whole, which is, of 
course, another issue. 
Disagreeing with von Rad and Schmid, Zimmerli based on his study 
of the creation narrative in Genesis, particularly Gen. 1: 28 which 
legitimized humankind's going out to master the world, was the 
first to argue that "wisdom thinks resolutely within the framework 
of a theology of creation. "18 Despite Murphy's criticism that his 
approach is "too apologetic", Zimmerli, nevertheless, coined the 
phrase, "wisdom theology is creation theology. "1s Subsequently, 
scholarly interest in creation theology and its relationship to 
wisdom theology acted as a catalyst for the general acceptance of 
creation theology as a basis for the understanding of wisdom theo- 
logy within the framework of Old Testament theology. 
20 Creation 
theology is thus deemed by many to be an important and potentially 
Deutero-Isaiah, " JBL 92 (1973): 345-57 (357), argues that "creation 
faith in Deutero-Isalah is not merely subsumed under election or 
redemption faith. The cultic tradition of creation appears to stand 
as an independent element in Deutero-Isaiah,... " 
18W. Zimmerli, "The Place and the Limit of Wisdom, " p. 148; In 
"Ort und Grenze der Weisheit Im Rahmen der alt testamentlichen 
Theologie, " in SPOA, pp. 121-37 (123), he states, "Soll diese 
Eigenart theologisch gekennzeichnet werden, so wird man sagen 
müssen: Die Weisheit des Alten Testamentes hält sich ganze entsch- 
lossen im Horizonte der Schöfung. Ihre Theologie Ist Schöpfungs- 
theologie. " 
19Ibid.; James L. Crenshaw, "In Search of Divine Presence, " 
p. 362; H. -J. Hermisson, "Observations on the Creation Theology in 
Wisdom, " p. 43; R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom - Theses and Hypotheses, " 
pp. 36-37. 
20Of course, the tremendous number of scholarly studies on 
`creation and wisdom' in Proverbs 8: 22 has an intense impact on 
this issue. Gerhard Hasel In a recent article, "A Decade of Old 
Testament Theology: Retrospect and Prospect, " ZAW 93 (1981): 165-83, 
includes creation theology as one of the criteria for determining 
the success of a biblical theology. Recent treatment of the issue 
can be seen in R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Creation"; H. -J. Hermisson, 
"Observations on the Creation Theology in Wisdom. " 
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fruitful concept by which to understand the role of wisdom thought 
in the Old Testament. 
However, although the majority of scholars would agree, Preuss 
rejects this understanding in a series of studies. 
21 Along with 
Mendenhall, Preuss asserts that wisdom is a foreign body within the 
Hebrew Bible and therefore cannot be considered Yahwistic. In 
response to Preuss, Murphy comments that "Preuss poses the question 
in the wrong fashion since the fact of the matter is that Israel 
worshipped Yahweh as the creator. " 
22 
If, as most scholars had understood, creation theology is inse- 
parable from 'wisdom theology', thus making wisdom and Yahwism 
related via the concept of creation theolgy, then the question I 
asked earlier needs to be addressed: what is 'creation theology'? 
and how does it relate to 'wisdom theology', granted that 'wisdom 
theology' is definable? Interestingly, as Crenshaw observed in 
1976, "Astonishingly, to this day no one has devoted a full scale 
essay to this problem despite the constant refrain in scholarly 
works that wisdom thought and creation theology are inseparably 
bound together. "23 Neither had any one attempted to delineate the 
21H. 
-D. Preuss, "Erwägungen zum theologischen Ort alttestament- 
licher Weisheitsliteratur, " EvT 30 (1970): 393-417; idem, "Das 
Gottes bild der älteren Weisheit Israels, " VTSup 23 (1972): 117-45; 
idem, "Alttestamentliche Weisheit in christlicher Theologie, " in 
Questions Disputees d'Ancien Testament, ed. C. Brekelmans (BETL 33; 
Louvain: 1974): 165-81; cf. G. Mendenhall, "The Shady Side of 
Wisdom: The Date and Purpose of Genesis 3, " in A Light Unto My 
Path: Old Testament Studies in Honor of Jacob M. Myers, eds. H. N. 
Bream, et al. (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1974): 319-34 (324), 
also argues along this line, "With Solomon's charisma of wisdom, 
received at the old Gibeonite high place, almost certainly in 
connection with a pagan incubation ritual, the old pagan tradition 
of some gods as the source of royal or other wisdom was reintro- 
duced into Palestinian politics. And this had nothing to do with 
the Yahwistic tradition, while the gods as the donors of technical 
wisdom goes back at least to old Sumerian myth. " 
22R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Yahwism, " pp. 117-18 (123) ; idem, 
"Hebrew Wisdom, " JAOS 101 (1981): 21-34 (27). 
23J. L. Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon, " in SAIW, pp. 1-45 (26). 
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content of wisdom theology. Since then there have been several 
studies investigating creation theology as it relates to wisdom 
thought. 
The following will investigate what creation theology is, 
particularly in relation to wisdom thought, since the coined phrase 
`wisdom theology is creation theology' has gained popular accep- 
tance. Its validity or legitimacy for understanding the wisdom 
corpus of the Hebrew Bible, particularly the book of Qoheleth will 
also be assessed. 
B. WHAT IS CREATION THEOLOGY? 
Although Zimmerli coined the phrase `wisdom theology is creation 
theology, ' he never seems to have justified it by demonstrating the 
role of creation in wisdom thought. 
24 Crenshaw comments correctly, 
"Any attempt to provide such an analysis of creation theology with- 
in the framework of wisdom needs to clarify the role of creation in 
the total thought of Israel before going on to demonstrate the 
distinctiveness of the function of creation theology in wisdom 
literature. " The following will examine the contributions of 
various scholars to the issue of creation theology at large, before 
its implication in wisdom literature, and particularly in Qoheleth, 
can be construed. 
After surveying various scholarly opinions on the subject of 
creation theology, Crenshaw makes two observations: 1) "Creation 
cannot be divorced from the concept of chaos (H. Gunkel). " and 2) 
24H. 
-J. Hermisson thinks Zimmerli only understands his own 
statement from a negative point of view, and Hermisson attempts a 
positive appreciation of the statement in "Observations on the 
Creation Theology in Wisdom, " p. 44. 
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"Creation is not a primary datum of Israel's faith, but plays a 
subservient role to redemption (von Rad). " 2S 
Schmid, however, rejects von Rad's view that creation is second- 
ary in Old Testament theology, and argues that "the doctrine of 
creation, namely, the belief that God has created and is sustaining 
the order of the world in all its complexities, is not a peripheral 
theme of biblical theology but is plainly the fundamental theme. " 25 
He based his analysis on the concept of myth in creation in 
Israel's ancient Near Eastern neighbours and sees connections 
between 'creation, ' 'order' and 'justice'. 27 
Taking his first observation, the concept of chaos, seriously, 
Crenshaw proposes three distinct points concerning creation and 
wisdom: 
1) the threat of chaos in the cosmic, political, and social 
realms evokes a response in terms of creation theology; 2) in 
wisdom thought, creation functions primarily as defense of 
divine justice; and 3) the centrality of the question of God's 
integrity in Israelite literature place28 creation theology at 
the center of the theological enterprise. 
It is worth noting that in Crenshaw's exemplification of the second 
point, only Job, Proverbs and Ben Sirach are found appropriate, 
whereas Qoheleth is the major example for the first point. 29 
Although scholars generally understand biblical wisdom as a 
search for `order', Murphy argues against it by suggesting, 
... As I see it, wisdom's alleged search for order is our 
modern reconstruction. It asks a question never raised by 
25J. L. Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon, " pp. 26-27. 
26H. H. Schmid, op. cit., p. 111. 
27H. H. Schirad, op. cit., pp. 104-105, states that "In short, 
ancient Near Eastern cosmic, political, and social order find their 
unity under the concept of 'creation' ... law (in the legal realm), 
nature (famine, drought) and politics (threat of the enemy) are 
only aspects of one comprehensive order of creation. " 
28J. L. Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon, " p. 27. 
29Ibid. 
, pp. 26-35. 
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Israel: On what conviction is your wisdom based? Answer: on the 
order of the universe. Such an answer seems logical and probably 
correct; but Israel never asked it, nor consciously assumed the 
answer that we give to it. Secondly, the emphasis on order seems 
to me to be induced by an overreliance upon the parallelism 
between Egyptian Maat and Hebrew o1M)IT. 
30 
But Murphy is not consistent in his view because 'order' becomes a 
major theme in his formulation of "Wisdom - Theses and Hypothe- 
ses. "31 Equally ineffective is his view of wisdom as a "shared 
approach to reality" among the Israelite and the ancient Near 
Eastern people. In his 1984 presidential address, after criticizing 
the concept of creation and wisdom as articulated by von Rad, 
Westermann and Zimmerli as "mirror images" and accusing them of 
housing creation in an "insecure home", 
32 Murphy proposes a two-fold 
concept of creation: "1) Creation as 'beginnings, ' and 2) Creation 
as the arena of human experience where people lived out their 
lives. "33 
Approaching the issue of creation theology differently, Anderson34 
argues for five theological dimensions of biblical creation faith, 
based on the function and role of mythopoeic language: 1) Creation 
of a People, 2) Creation and Order, 3) Creation and Creaturely 
Dependence, 4) Creation as Origination, and 5) Creation and New 
Creation. According to Anderson, not all of the five dimensions 
need be present at one time or in one text. It is one's task to 
understand how each is received in a particular circle or stream of 
tradition and to perceive how they are related in the Old 
30R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom - Theses and Hypotheses, " p. 41, n. 4. 
31Ibid., pp. 35-36, "Biblical wisdom issues from the effort to 
discover order in human life. " 
32R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Creation, " p. 4. 
33Ibid, pp. 5ff. 
34B W. Anderson, "Introduction: Mythopoeic and Theological Dimen- 
sions of Biblical Creation Faith, " in COT, pp. 1-24. 
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Testament. It appears that Anderson's five theological dimensions 
of biblical creation faith follow closely the path of salvation 
history. 
Another line of thought on creation theology is found in 
Hermisson's recent article, where he makes several observations 
based on Proverbs 10-29, the Wisdom Psalm 104, Psalm 89 and Job 
38-41. He observes that, 
... 1) Creation is the basis not only of regularity, but of a 
meaningful and satisfactory order of events in the world, a 
purposefulness of created beings and things, 2) the image of 
Yahweh's creative activity as the foundation of the orders of 
the world: meaningful and rational orders, and also at the 
borderline of cognition, a knowing which itself was created by 
Yahweh and thus properly associates with the orders and 
function, and 3) Creation did not only happen at the beginning 
of the world, but takes place continuously; therefore, the 35 
orders have not become rigid, but necessarily remain flexible. 
For some reason, he does not include any passage from Qoheleth in 
his attempt to formulate a creation theology. 
Attempting to distinguish 'sacred' and 'profane' wisdom, McKane 
and Scott argue that the old proverbs in the Old Testament were 
originally secular and were later transformed by the Yahwist into 
more religiously flavoured wisdom sayings. 
36 This concept falls into 
the extreme of superimposing Yahwism onto wisdom thought, thus 
inviting the criticism from Murphy that "A distinction between 
religious and secular is not applicable to Old Testament wisdom 
teaching, " 37 though "one cannot deny that the Israelite distinguish- 
35Hermisson, "Observations on the Creation Theology in Wisdom, " 
pp. 46-47. 
38William McKane, Proverbs: A New Approach (OTL; Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1970); R. B. Y. Scott, "Wise and Foolish, Right- 
eous and Wicked, " in Studies in the Religion of Ancient Israel 
(VTSup 23; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), pp. 146-65 (164), "McKane's 
distinction between sayings with or without religious content and 
terminology is justified, but can be carried further. " 
37R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom - Theses and Hypotheses, " p. 40; cf. F. M. 
Wilson, "Sacred and Profane? The Yahwistic Redaction of Proverbs 
Reconsidered, " in The Listening Heart, eds. K. G. Hoglund, et al. 
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ed between the two but they are not separated as independent areas. 
The world, as the creation of God, is the arena of his activity and 
of human life. " 
38 
Jenks 39 proposes three basic theological presuppositions or 
principles that undergird even the oldest section of Proverbs, 
chapters 10-29: 
1) That this is an orderly world, ruled by Yahweh, its wise 
creator; 2) That knowledge of this order is possible to the 
person who opens himself to wisdom; and 3) That the wise man who 
thus aligns himself with God's order will experience good 
things, while the fool will suffer for his folly. 
Without going into detail, it is obvious to any reader that Qohe- 
leth would disagree with all three of Jenks' theological presup- 
positions. 
Another attempt to associate Qoheleth's theological thought with 
creation is that of Müller40 who attempts to depict the thought 
structure (Denkstruktur) of Qoheleth by means of a phenomenological 
model and concludes that 
The thought of Qoheleth is shaped by the structure of a 
"creator" religion; the weakness of his religious outlook is 
that the world order established by the heavenly creator falls 
victim to a value vacuum. The scepticism of Qoheleth matches 
this pessimistic ambience of his religion; it is so radical in 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987), pp. 313-34. 
38R. E. Murphy, op. cit., pp. 40-41, n. 3. He cites Ps. 19; Job 
28: 24-27; Wis. 13: 1-19, as examples that manifested various aspects 
of the divine - even In the most 'worldly' things. 
39Alan W. Jenks, "Theological Presuppositions of Israel's Wisdom 
Literature, " HBT 7 (1985): 43-76 (44). 
40H. 
-P. Müller, "Neige der althebräischen `Weisheit'. Zum Denken 
Qohäläts, " ZAW 90 (1978): 238-64. Müller attempts to "(1) die Denk- 
struktur des <Predigers Salomo> mit Hilfe eines phänomenolo- 
gischen Modells nachzeichnen, das auf ihn m. W. noch nicht angewen- 
det worden Ist, sie suchen (2) die geistesgeschichtlichen und zu- 
gleich politisch-sozialen Bedingungen zu prüfen, die die Ausprägung 
dieser Denkstruktur bei Qohälät erklärbar machen; schließlich 
nennen sie (3) einige Motive, die die theologische Bedeutung der 
althebräischen Weisheit, wo sie blüht und wo sie zur Neige geht, 
für heutiges Verstehen erhellen könnten" (238). Quotation from 
Miiller's own English summary in p. 264. 
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its grounding in the ways of God that it ultimately prevents man 
from passing any judgment upon the creator and his world, and 
so opens the way to a theologically motivated joy in living. The 
background to Qoheleth in the history of thought is Palestinian 
Hellenism of the third century B. C. This allowed Egyptian and 
Mesopotamian motifs which were consistent with the spirit of the 
age to grow together into a unity. Its social-location is to be 
found in a displaced Upper Class which was deprived of its power 
by the Diadochi and their collaborators. 
It is doubtful that Qoheleth would be aroused by a theological 
motivation to enjoy life if he is a sceptic and his religion pessi- 
mistic. It is also difficult to perceive how Qoheleth could have 
believed in a world order established by the heavenly creator on 
the one hand, and believed such an establishment has fallen victim 
to a value vacuum on the other hand. Furthermore, it is most 
unlikely that Qoheleth would "prevent man from passing any judgment 
upon the creator and his world " for he does it himself in his 
concept of '7tJ (absurdity). Müller does not see much of Yahwism in 
Qoheleth's thought, although he labels Qoheleth's theology as a 
'creator' or 'originator' religion. 
In view of the diversity, complexity and uncertainty of various 
scholarly understandings of creation theology, it Is difficult, 
though may be appropriate, at this juncture to sum up what they 
have said about creation theology. The following is a collection of 
what various scholars have understood to be creation theology and 
their legitimacy and relevancy as well as appropriateness to 
Qoheleth's theological thought will be assessed accordingly. 
1) Creation as "beginnings" (Murphy), 2) Creation and chaos; 
"the threat of chaos in the cosmic, political, and social realms 
evokes a response in terms of creation theology" (Crenshaw). 3) 
Creation, order. justice; "In short, ancient Near Eastern cosmic, 
political and social order find their unity under the concept of 
'creation' (Schmid); "this Is an orderly world, ruled by Yahweh. 
157 
its wise creator" (Jenks); "creation functions primarily as defense 
of divine justice" (Crenshaw); is "the basis not only of 
regularity, but of a meaningful and satisfactory order of events in 
the world, a purposefulness of created beings and things" 
(Hermisson), and 4) "creation activity of God deals with the 
creation of man with human situations, or matters within man's 
sphere of activity" (Hermisson), thus creation may be understood 
"as the arena of human experience where people live out their 
lives" (Murphy). 
C. 'CREATION THEOLOGY' AND OOHELETH'S THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT 
Since his 1964 article, Zimmerli has continued to recognize 
wisdom as a "legitimate" element in Israel's theology. Perhaps he 
has realized the difficulty of applying his concept of creation 
theology and wisdom theology to Qoheleth and Job and urges the need 
for weighing the importance of Job and Ecclesiastes in the total 
view of wisdom. 
41 Taking Zimmerli's point seriously, it remains 
difficult, if not impossible, for one to construe a consistent and 
total view of wisdom theology under the concept of creation theo- 
logy, largely due to the apparent scepticism in Qoheleth, and per- 
haps Job. Hermisson, however, thinks that the difficulty is only an 
apparent smokescreen when he remarks that "anyone who sets out 
systematically to look for the theology of creation in the 'proper' 
wisdom writings will arrive at a result which is disappointing at 
first. " 42 He asserts that "creation is the basis of a meaningful and 
41W Zimmerli, "Erwägungen zur Gestalt einer alttestamentlichen 
Theologie, " in Studien zur alttestamentlichen Theologie und Pro- 
phetie: Gesammelte Aufsätze II (Theologische Bücherei 51; Munich: 
Kaiser, 1974), pp. 27-54 (45-7) ; cf. R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Yah- 
wism, " p. 125, n. 4. 
42H. 
-J. Hermisson, "Observations on the Creation Theology in 
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satisfactory order of events in the world, a purposefulness of 
created beings and things. " But when he comes to Qoheleth, Hermis- 
son confesses the incompatibility of such a concept of creation 
with Qoheleth, "for Ecclesiastes, ... not all wisdom managed to 
resolve the perplexity over the good order and the incomprehen- 
sibility of the world and the aloofness of the creator God. " 
43 He 
also plainly admits that "[creation] 'theology' Is hardly present- 
able in the form of individual proverbs; therefore if only on the 
ground of their conformity to the literary type, one must not 
expect too much of the older collections of Proverbs, but must look 
for other texts. "44 It is not impossible that this comment of 
Hermisson also implies that Qoheleth does not conform to the 
convention of creation theology. Taking this hint as a departure, 
we will examine the elements of creation theology and assess its 
validity in Qoheleth's theological thought. 
1. Creation as 'Beginning' 
Although creation as the 'story' or 'doctrine' of 'beginnings' 
is one of Murphy's two proposed elements for creation theology, he 
states that "the contribution of wisdom on this score has been 
ambiguous because of the uncertainty of the translation of 11t3K 
(craftsman or nursling? ) in Prov. 8: 30. "4S Despite Murphy's assign- 
ing a central role to this text in his articulation of creation as 
'beginning', it is difficult to see why he does so, especially 
Wisdom, " p. 43. 
43 Ibid., p. 54. 
44Ibid. 
, p. 44. 
45R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Creation, " p. 5. 
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when, following von Rad, 
46 he perceives in Prov. 8: 22-31 a divine 
origin for 'Lady Wisdom', identifying her as the 'Lord'. 
Anderson is more explicit in his discussion of creation under 
the theological dimension of 'Creation and Originality'. Basing 
himself on the priestly creation story and Job 38, he argues that 
"the story speaks of a new beginning in God's purpose, that 1) a 
cosmic order that is without blemish and is harmonious in all its 
parts, and 2) it portrays the radical dependence of the cosmic 
order upon the transcendent Creator. " 
47 
What Is Qoheleth's response to the above concept of creation as 
the beginning? To be sure, Qoheleth has never doubted it, in fact 
he even affirms the concept of "creation as the 'beginning"' which 
stresses that God is the creator who brings the world into exis- 
tence (Qoh. 1: 4-7; 3: 11; cf. 12: 1). But he is even more concerned 
with the purpose and meaning of human activity within such a 
created world, of which he either concludes with the rhetorical 
question "who knows? " expecting a negative answer (Qoh. 2: 19; 3: 21; 
6: 12; 8: 1) or cannot find out (Qoh. 3: 11; 7: 14,24,27-29; 8: 17). 
Qoheleth's understanding of creation in terms of 'order', as 
described by Anderson, is limited only to the order of the cosmic 
events; he is never sure of the human events. This is contrary to 
the ancient Near Eastern view of creation and order which saw a 
direct relation between cosmic order and social-ethical order, 
which will be discussed below at point three. 
46Ibid., p. 9, but Murphy thinks von Rad has not gone far enough 
just by identifying wisdom with 'order'. He draws on von Rad's 
interpretation of Prov. 3: 19 that "God established the earth into 
wisdom, not by wisdom, " and goes on "to identify the Lady Wisdom 
with the Lord, as indicated by her very origins and her authority. " 
47B. W. Anderson, op. cit., p. 15. 
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2. Creation and Chaos 
The understanding of creation theology in terms of order and 
chaos came about largely as the result of mythological interpreta- 
tion of the creation story. The struggle between the creator and 
chaos, good and evil, light and darkness, the oppressor and the 
saviour are well known In ancient Near Eastern mythologies. Without 
going Into the whole arena of the battle motif, the sea monster and 
the struggle with chaos motif in ancient Near Eastern myths, one 
wonders whether Qoheleth needs any of these mythologies in his 
reflection of daily human experience? In his Poem of Time (3: 1-8), 
there are opposite pairs, but his presupposition is far from the 
battle motif between the creator and chaos. Neither does he, in his 
description of the cycle of activity (1: 4-11), especially when he 
describes the sea (1: 7), have in mind the battle between Ba'lu and 
the sea god, Yammu, of the Ugaritic myth. Neither do the struggles 
between the rich and the poor, the wise and the fool, the strong 
and the weak, the righteous and the wicked, etc., exemplify the 
struggles between chaos and order. They merely describe Qoheleth's 
observations of the various facets of daily human experience. They 
never reflect any battle motif between order and chaos. 
However, Crenshaw sees the intrusion of chaos in Qoh. 7: 29, 
where he suggests that "The meaning of the verse is clear in spite 
of these difficulties (111h2,111,7: 29; 11121TT, 7: 25,27). It asserts 
that humankind alone is responsible for the corruption of the order 
of the created world. " 
48 One wonders whether Crenshaw reads too much 
of the order and chaos motif into Qoheleth. Nowhere in Qoh. 7: 29 Is 
humanity identified with the force of chaos in creation. Qoheleth 
merely asserts that humankind have chosen to pursue their own 
48J. L. Crenshaw, "Prolegomenon, " p. 28. 
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(corrupted) way despite the intention of the creator to create them 
'upright'. Qoheleth, in his concept of 71i1, promotes the idea that 
absurdity abounds in human activity. He never implies that human- 
kind's non-'uprightness' is the cause of the absurdity in human 
activity. Despite the fact, as recognized by Qoheleth, that God has 
made everything `beautiful' (fin', 3: 11), human activity is haunted 
by absurdity. Certainly the 1 in 3: 11 does not grow out of a 
victory battle of any kind. If there is any sense of chaos in Qohe- 
leth, it is to be sought in his concept of ): VT (I. 3: 16; 6: 2; J 
7: 15; 8: 10,14) and his exposition on the idea of irregularity 
(9: 11; 10: 6-9; 11: 1,4). But even in them, chaos is only perceived 
from the human's point of view because the occasions where chaos - 
absurdity and irregularity - occurs are in the hands of God (3: 11; 
9: 11,12) and God is never perceived by Qoheleth as chaos. Qohe- 
leth's view of the absolute sovereign creator who gives and takes 
is never envisaged in the battle motif between chaos and order in 
ancient Near Eastern mythologies. 
3. Creation, Order, Justice 
The concept of order in creation is forcefully argued by 
Schmid, 49 on the basis of his studies of ancient Near Eastern mytho- 
logical texts and Egyptian wisdom literature. Drawing implications 
from the myth of creation and its relation to the New Year's Festi- 
val, Schmid argues a close relationship between creation and order. 
First, he argues that in all ancient Near Eastern nations, "cre- 
ation faith did not deal only, indeed not even primarily, with the 
origin of the world. Rather, it was concerned above all with the 
present world and the natural environment of humanity now. " 
49H. H. Schmid, "Creation, Righteousness, and Salvation, " in COT, 
pp. 103-5. 
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Secondly, he argues that "the order established through creation 
and newly constituted every year is not only the renewal of nature; 
it is just as much the order of the state. " This he claims to be 
found in the motif of the battle against chaos-which belongs to 
creation typology. He argues that 
... 
In Mesopotamia, Ugarit, and Israel the Chaoskampf appears 
not only in cosmological contexts but just as frequently - and 
this was fundamentally true right from the first - in political 
contexts. The repulsion and destruction of the enemy, and 
thereby the maintenance of political order, always constitute 
one of the major dimensions of the battle against chaos. The 
enemy are none other than a manifestation of chaos which must be 
driven back. 50 
Thirdly, he argues from the Code of Hammurabi, especially the 
prologue, and the Babylonian Enuma elish, that "legal order belongs 
to the order of creation. " 
Thus he concludes that "ancient Near Eastern cosmic, political, 
and social order find their unity under the concept of 'creation. "' 
This, he claims, explains 
... why in the whole ancient Near East, Including Israel, an 
offense in the legal realm obviously has effects in the realm of 
nature (drought, famine) or in the political sphere (threat of 
the enemy). Law, nature, and politics are only aspects of one 51 comprehensive order of creation. 
With reference to wisdom and creation, Schmid sees "a close connec- 
tion between cosmic and social-ethical order, " especially in the 
realm of ancient Near Eastern wisdom. To him, "the realization of 
the ethical-social dimension in wisdom is nothing other than the 
realization of the original order of creation. " This concept, 
Schmid and others believe, "was given conceptual expression in 
ancient Egypt, where Maat, the concept for the order of creation, 
5oIbid. 
, p. 104. 
51Ibid. 
, p. 105. 
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is at once the central concept in both legal literature and wisdom 
literature. " 52 
This concept of Schmid is challenged, not only by Murphy's 
statement, as pointed out earlier, "wisdom's alleged search for 
order is our modern reconstruction, " 
53 but also finds Incompatibili- 
ty in Qoheleth's theological thought. Although in the formal sense 
of the book, Qoheleth appears to be searching for an order, in 
substance, Qoheleth actually seeks to argue through his observation 
and experience concerning the activity of humankind who live in a 
world of absurdity ('? j), where act and consequence has little 
relationship. Qoheleth's aim is never in search of a cosmic order, 
although he observed the fact that the natural world exists accord- 
ing to Its own course (1: 4-7). It is doubtful whether Qoheleth 
entertains Schmid's idea that "an offense in the legal realm has 
effects in the realms of nature (draught, famine) or In the politi- 
cal sphere (threat of the enemy). " Neither does Qoheleth perceive 
the world in Jenks' terms: "this is an orderly world, ruled by 
Yahweh, its wise creator, " or as Hermisson understands it, "cre- 
ation is the basis not only of regularity, but of a meaningful and 
satisfactory order of events in the world, a purposefulness of 
created beings and things. " It would be an affront to Qoheleth's 
wisdom, if creation is thought to have been perceived by him as 
"primarily a defense of divine justice, " to use Crenshaw's words. 
52On this score, Schmid, ibid., p. 115, n. 8, draws support from 
Otto Eissfeldt, Prolegomena zur Frage der Gesetzgebung und Rechts- 
sprechung in Ägypten, p. 150, "The central concept, around which 
all the powers of government are oriented and which in the 
juridical sense may be regarded as the most general element of law, 
is Maat"; H. Brunner, Die Weisheitsliteratur, p. 93, "The central 
concept of wisdom teaching is that of Maat, 'law', 'justice', 'the 
primal power'; and S. Morenz, Ägyptische Religion, p. 120, "... the 
Egyptian ethic and its innermost aspect is Maat. " 
53Murphy, "Wisdom - Theses and Hypotheses, " p. 41, n. 4; "Wisdom 
and Yahwism, " pp. 120ff. 
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Concerning the legal and socio-ethical dimensions of order in 
creation, no doubt social justice has been a major theme in ancient 
Near Eastern wisdom literature as well as in the Old Testament. 54 
Although social injustice, i. e. political oppression (4: 1), the 
reward of the wicked, the suffering of the righteous (3: 16; 5: 7), 
is observed as a fact of life by Qoheleth, neither he nor God ever 
try to make right what is crooked or to establish the correlations 
between `right' and 'crooked' (1: 15; 7: 13). Instead, he simply 
acknowledges their existence and unchangeability since the author- 
ity is with God whose activity is unknown to humankind (8: 17). So- 
cial injustice is a phenomenon that is inscrutable, unpredictable 
and beyond human ability to mutate. The concerns of Qoheleth are 
not with the origins of evil, the cause and effect of the existence 
of social injustice (though he mentions it in passing in 8: 11) or 
the doctrine of retribution. Rather he is concerned with the art of 
survival (7: 16-18; 8: 12-13) In a world where injustice abounds and 
act has little relation to consequence. He is even more concerned 
with the formulation of one's course In life - to enjoy life while 
opportunity exists - knowing and accepting that the existence of 
injustice and death comes upon both righteous and wicked indiscrim- 
inately. Thus, Schimd's understanding of social justice and cre- 
ation is incompatible with Qoheleth's theological thought. 
54Leon Epsztein, Social Justice in the Ancient Near East and the 
People of the Bible, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1986), 
p. 140, is a recent attempt to survey the subject and concludes 
"the quest for social justice, which elsewhere came sharply to a 
halt (Mesopotamia, cf. T. Jacobsen, The Treasures of Darkness, 
1976) or suffered a long eclipse (Egypt). was to be pursued by the 
people of the Bible almost without interruption down to our own 
days. " 
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4. Creation as the arena of human activity 
The concept of creation as the arena of human activity where 
people live out their lives is proposed by Murphy as part of his 
two-fold concept of creation. He understands "creation to be the 
whole range of existing things, from humans to ants, not excluding 
the abyss and Leviathan. This is the world open to human exper- 
ience. " Hermisson thinks the older proverbs promote a similar idea, 
that the "creation activity of God deals with the creation of man, 
with human situations, or matters within man's sphere of acti- 
vity. " While defining creation in terms of the 'arena' or 'sphere' 
of human activity is broad enough to include practically 'every- 
thing under the sun', it runs the danger of being too vague and 
ineffective as a meaningful and useful concept. No doubt, Qoheleth 
is aware of the sphere of human existence and activity, as reflect- 
ed in the prologue (1: 4-7) where he describes the continuous active 
world of natural phenomena within which humans exist and act. But 
if that is creation theology, it would be saying nothing more than 
the obvious (perhaps, creation theology is the statement of the 
obvious). Surely Qoheleth's theological thought is more profound 
than merely identifying the sphere of human experience, which he 
does only in the prologue. He is more fascinated by what is happen- 
ing within the arena of human activity. Understanding creation as 
"continuous and ongoing, providing the fundamental parameters with- 
in which humans live and die, " as Murphy5S and Hermisson66 did, is 
only peripheral to Qoheleth's thought. To discover whether anything 
endures within the sphere where "one generation goes and one 
55R. E. Murphy, "Wisdom and Creation, " p. 6. 
58Hermisson, "Observations on the Creation Theology in Wisdom, " 
p. 47. 
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generation comes" is one of his tasks and his firm conclusion is 
that nothing endures forever; no enduring remembrance, no enduring 
profit (Qoh. 1: 3-11,14). 
5. Conclusion 
Creation theology, as conceived by various scholars to be the 
theology of Wisdom, both with its complexity, variety and sophisti- 
cation, has fallen short of being the centre of the theological 
thought of Qoheleth. It is surprising to realize how little atten- 
tion has been paid to the wisdom of Qoheleth in the course of for- 
mulating wisdom theology. What constitutes the heart of wisdom 
theology will remain an open question until a comprehensive theolo- 
gical framwork of the wisdom corpus (Job, Proverbs, Qoheleth) is 
provided. Wilson rightly comments that "Whatever the abstract pos- 
sibilities of relating wisdom to creation, whatever the religious 
function of wisdom in other ancient Near Eastern cultures, the 
theology of wisdom in Israel must be understood in terms of the 
elaborations of this theology in Israel's own wisdom literature. " 
57 
Although being an ancient sage, and perhaps being aware of the 
wisdom of his neighbour, Qoheleth's wisdom hardly conforms to the 
Egyptian Maat or the order and chaos motif. He observed, experi- 
enced and acknowledged the existence of the cosmic and social 
events in his world. He acknowledged O'i72t as the wise Creator (cf. 
Qoh. 12: 1) who has made everything beautiful in its own time, yet 
who is hidden from human wisdom (3: 11; 7: 14; 8: 17; 11: 5). Creation 
is something Qoheleth accepts as fact, but it is marginal to his 
theological thought structure. As observed by Vriezen, "He reasons 
from personal experience and on that basis all that he can retain 
57F. M. Wilson, "Sacred and Profane? The Yahwistic Redaction of 
Proverbs Reconsidered, " in The Listening Heart, pp. 314-34 (329). 
167 
is belief in the Creator ... Even so we should not simply call him 
a sceptic. "58 Qoheleth's theological thought has prompted Vriezen to 
remark further that "No wonder, then, that the history of the canon 
shows that Ecclesiastes was always considered a border-line case as 
regards canonicity. " 
so 
Qoheleth's concern is to understand the world of reality and to 
determine what is the best course for him and humankind within the 
realities of life. In the process of understanding the reality of 
the world of human activity by means of observation, experiment, 
reflection and meditation, he formulated a theological framework. 
If Vriezen's remark is correct, and Qoheleth is not a sceptic, why 
then is Qoheleth "considered a border-line case as regards canoni- 
city? " Perhaps, this has nothing to do with his scepticism. But in 
either case, the nature of Qoheleth's theology would be a crucial 
factor. What is Qoheleth's theological perspective, anyway? Would 
his theology label him a Yahwist? anti-Yahwist? or "middle-of-the- 
road"? Where does he stand theologically in Israel's theology? 
D. QOHELETH'S THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
In order to determine the position of Qoheleth's theological 
thought within Israel's theology, one needs to delineate his theo- 
logical perspectives. The following will first assess the theologi- 
cal perspectives of Qoheleth with a view to understanding whether 
he is a Yahwist or an anti-Yahwist or somewhere in between. Having 
established that the theology of Qoheleth is neither an authentic 
Yahwistic nor anti-Yahwistic theology, I will attempt to propose an 
58Th. C. Vriezen, The Religion of Ancient Israel (London: Lutter- 
worth, 1967), p. 270. 
59Th. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, 2nd edn. 
(Massachusetts: Charles T. Branford Co., 1970), p. 84. 
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alternative statement of his theological position which would truly 
represent his theology as one that does not contain a polemic 
against Yahwism In its broadest sense, but one that Is faithful to 
the daily experience of most Israelites. 
1. His Awareness of Yahwism 
Despite the alleged scepticism and pessimism in Qoheleth's theo- 
logical thought, there is evidence that possibly reflects his 
awareness of the Yahwism of his day, as can be seen in his aware- 
ness of the book of Genesis and the Mosaic Law code. 
a. His Awareness of Genesis. 
In his observations of cosmic and social-ethical events, Qohe- 
leth seems aware of Genesis 1-11. In fact, Hertzberg has suggested 
that Qoheleth might have had the book of Genesis in front of him 
when he composed the book. 
60 Whether Qoheleth follows Genesis indis- 
criminately or with other intentions in mind needs to be studied. 
However, it is clear that he accepts the fact that God (b' 7K) has 
created the world and humankind should fear him (3: 11; 12: 1). 
(1) Qoheleth and Genesis 1-3 
The 7 theme in Qoheleth has been regarded as one of the 
crucial themes in the theological thought structure of Qoheleth. If 
one reads the book with Genesis 1-3 in mind, the `771 theme can be 
seen as Qoheleth's doubt concerning God's purpose In creation: 
especially in Gen. 1: 2f where God creates a 'good' (31D) world out 
of the 'formless' (1T1fl) and 'void' (1ji ) cosmos. This is not the same 
as saying that Qoheleth does not believe God has a purpose. Far 
60H. W. Hertzberg, Der Prediger (KAT 17 ; Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1963), p. 230, "das Buch Qoh ist geschrieben 
mit Gn 1-4 vor den Augen seins Verfassers; die Lebensanschauung 
Qoh's ist an der Schöpfungsgeschichte gebildete 
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from it, Qoheleth never questions God's purpose in creation (cf. 3: 
11; 7: 14,29a); rather, he is doubtful if anyone can know and find 
out the purpose and meaning of it, let alone knowing how God works. 
Hiddenness is the theme of God's activity in Qoheleth's thought. 
Despite his doubtfulness, it is difficult to establish that Qohe- 
leth is equating the 'void' OMI) and 'formless' (a f) with the 
'absurd' (' j); he will not go as far as to say that God should not 
have created the cosmos out of the originally 'void' and 'formless' 
situation (Gen. 1: 2). Neither is he, in his concept of absurdity, 
suggesting any relationship with mythology concerning the struggle 
between God the Creator and the opposing forces which continues to 
this day. Although Qoheleth never doubts God's omniscience and 
omnipotence, he still falls short of being a pious Yahwist61 who 
accepts the knowability of God's purpose in creation, perhaps 
through the law and salvation events. By denying the knowability of 
God, Qoheleth stands at a distance from the camp of Yahwism. 
(2) Qoh. 1: 3-11; 3: 1-11; 7: 13 and Gen. 8: 20-22 
In observing the circularity of the natural order and marvelling 
at the beauty of nature (1: 4-7; 3: 11) within which humans conduct 
their activities, Qoheleth could have Genesis 1 and 8: 21f. in mind, 
"And when the Lord smelled the pleasing odour, the Lord said in his 
heart, "I will never again curse the ground because of man.... 
22While the earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, 
summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease. " As in Genesis 1 
and 8, Qoheleth undoubtedly perceives order in nature as created by 
61R. N. Whybray, "Conservatisme et radical isme dans Qohelet, " In 
Sagesse et Religion, Colloque de Strasbourg (Octobre 1976) (Presses 
Universitaires de France. 1979), pp. 65-81 (81), has a similar 
conclusion, "c'est le point de vue d'un juif de 1' 6poque pour qui 
ni l'introversion des super-pieux ni les fantaisies eschatologiques 
de 1'esprit apocalyptique ne peuvent resoudre les problemes de la 
vie quotidienne. Mais ce point de vue nest ni une heresie ni un 
rejet des croyances juives en faveur d'une philosophie 6trangere. " 
170 
God. However, instead of affirming the end of the cursing, as 
promised by God after the flood, and the beginning of a new era of 
blessings, as the Yahwist might have seen it, Qoheleth states that 
"what has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will 
be done" (1: 9); history is capable of repeating itself with little 
mutation. However, that is not to say that Qoheleth understands 
nature as a "Soulless mechanism which is regardless of human woes 
and human wishes and is without any discernable purpose, "62 as 
Eichrodt did. Besides affirming the hiddenness of God's activity in 
creation (3: 11; 8: 17a), Qoheleth makes no attempt to develop a 
theology of creation. 
After the 'Poem on Natural Phenomena' (Qoh. 1: 4-7) and 'Poem on 
Time' (Qoh. 3: 1-8), although Qoheleth asserts that "God has made 
everything beautiful in its time" (3: 11a), a sense of the burden- 
some in creation is being Injected through his idea of the hidden- 
ness of God's activity and the reality of the absurd in human acti- 
vity. It is not certain if the curse on Adam and Eve, if not on 
humanity (Gen. 3: 14-19), has any influence on Qoheleth's thought. 
Those pairs of opposites in Qoh. 3: 1-8 reflect Qoheleth's hones- 
ty in his observation of the realities of life, rather than 
explaining away those undesirable occasions in life based on the 
principle of rewards and punishments, or suppressing them under the 
central theme of the redemptive acts of God in Yahwism. This seems 
to demonstrate the difficulty of subsuming Qoheleth's thought under 
that of Yahwism. 
(3) The Curse Gen. 3: 17-19; Qoh. 5: 14-16; 7: 29; 8: 11; 9: 3; cf. 2: 26b 
A. B. Caneday recently purports to have understood Qoheleth's 
theological presupposition from the point of view of the curse 
62W. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, II, p. 161; cf. C. C. 
Forman, "Koheleth's Use of Genesis, " JSS 5 (1960): 256-63 (257). 
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under which creation lies: 
The difficulty of interpreting this book is proportionally 
related to one's own readiness to adopt Qoheleth's presupposi- 
tion - that everything about this world is marred by the 
tyranny of the curse which the Lord God. placed upon all 
creation. If one fails to recognize that this is a foundational 
presupposition from which Ecclesiastes operates, then one will 
fail to comprehend the message of the book, and bewilderment 63 will continue. 
It may be true that Qoheleth affirms the existence of evil in daily 
human activity (Qoh. 7: 20,29; 8: 11; 9: 3), but he seldom goes into 
a serious search for the origins of evil. His affirmation of the 
existence of evil comes largely as a result of his observation on 
human activity, and not through philosophical reasoning or mytholo- 
gizing; his epistemology is unique in this sense. 
His belief that upon death humankind who are made of dust shall 
return to dust (Qoh. 12: 7; 3: 20), as in Gen. 2: 7 and 3: 19, has 
prompted scholars to compare Gen. 3: 17-19 with Qoh. 5: 14-16; 7: 29; 
8: 11; 9: 3, and argue for a theology of 'original sin' in operation 
within Qoheleth's theological presupposition. One wonders if that 
is a Christian reading of the book? Although Qoheleth may have 
been aware of the Yahwist's concept of curse and punishment in 
Gen. 3: 14-19, there is no reason to read in 7: 29, "God has made 
humankind upright, but they have sought out many devices, " the 
doctrine of 'original sin'. Neither is that the reason for Qoheleth 
to emphasize the subject of human 'toil' ('7 V) (Qoh. 1: 2; cf. Gen. 
3: 17 'in toil' In fact, 7t]y in Qoheleth often means 'act- 
ivity', except in a few instance where 'hard labouring' as 'toil' 
is perceived (Qoh. 4: 8). There need not be any correlation between 
Qoheleth's emphasis on the subject of human toil and humans' return 
to dust, and the cause and cost of sin as perceived by the Yahwist 
63Ardel B. Caneday, "Qoheleth: Enigmatic Pessimist or Godly 
Sage? " CTJ 7 (1986): 21-56 (21). 
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in Gen. 3: 14-19. If in fact Qoheleth does mention the curse of sin, 
it is to be found in 2: 26b where the sinners are 'cursed' to toil 
without enjoying the fruits of their toiling. But this is different 
from the 'curse' of Genesis where the sinners are cursed to toil in 
order to survive on the fruits of their toil. In this case, it 
seems beyond Qoheleth's ken to know the origins of human toil. 
Qoheleth has not shown keen interest in adapting the Yahwist's 
theology of humankind as beings created in God's wisdom, neither 
has he set out deliberately to oppose the Yahwist. Maybe Qoheleth 
does not even concern himself with the Yahwistic or any theology of 
sin? 
b. His Awareness of the Mosaic Law Code. 
The Mosaic dogma of reward and retribution as another facet of 
Yahwism has been thought by some to be Qoheleth's theological pre- 
supposition. His recognition of the sovereignty and freedom of God 
to give and take has been seen as an defence of authentic Yahwism. 
But if one examines more closely Qoheleth's sayings concerning 
reward and retribution, act and consequence, one will find that 
though the dogma may be what Qoheleth wishes to see Implemented, he 
finds no enforcement of the dogma by God (Qoh. 3: 16; 7: 15; 8: 14). 
The freedom of God's sovereign act to reward and punish was not 
seen in a positive light but as an arbitrary act. Although he may 
be challenging the conventional dogma of retribution, Qoheleth is 
not in any way trying to introduce another set of rules to govern 
social ethics or to harmonize the dogma of retribution with his 
observation. The alleged 'golden mean' teaching of Qoheleth in 
Qoh. 7: 16-17 is actually a 'survival tactic' of Qoheleth; the rule 
for 'staying alive'. In fact Qoheleth prefers being wise and 
righteous rather than being a fool (Qoh. 2: 13-14; 7: 19). 
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The closest that Qoheleth comes to the Yahwism of the Mosaic 
covenant is his emphasis on `fearing God' (67.7X X; 1ý) (Qoh. 3: 14; 
5: 6; 7: 18c; '8: 12,13; 12: 13), but even here, he also demonstrates an 
independent understanding by employing a formula different from 
that of Proverbs, 11111= IIX'(fear Yahweh) or of traditional 
Yahwism. Also expressed is his unique combinations of fearing God 
and staying alive (5: 6; 7: 18; 8: 12,13) and fearing God and keeping 
his commandment (12: 13). 
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2. His Use of Yahwistic Language 
Qoheleth's use of creation `language' or vocabulary is peculiar. 
Although Hertzberg has suggested that Qoheleth might have the book 
of Genesis in front of him when he composed the book, 
SS Qoheleth's 
choice of creation language may cast doubt on such idea. 
The use of creation language other than the Priestly and Yahwis- 
tic creation terminologies might reveal something about Qoheleth's 
intention to dissociate his language from that of conventional 
Yahwism. 66 For example, the normal Priestly and Yahwistic use of 
'create' (Xi ) and 'good' (31tß) are replaced by 'made' (ý1 ) and 
'beauty' (fl ') (Qoh. 3: 11; cf. Gen. 1). The preference for bi 7tX 
rather than 1JT throughout the book is most noticeable, especially 
in the 'fear God' (tt71 Oli t) formula which is different from 
Proverbs' 'fear of Yahweh' (71 fi M11). 
64In The Courage to Doubt (London: SCM Press, 1983), p. 193, R. 
Davidson understands Qoheleth's concept of fearing God as a 
surrender before the unknown God and such a "thought brings a chill 
into his [Qoheleth's] sensitive soul. " 
65H. W. Hertzberg, Der Prediger, p. 230, "das Buch Qoh Ist 
geschrieben mit Gn 1-4 vor den Augen seines Verfassers; die Lebens- 
anschauung Qoh's ist an der Schöpfungsgeschichte gebildet. " 
66 R. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 189ff., reaches a rather similar 
conclusion by comparing Qoheleth's attitude to the natural world 
(Qoh. 1: 5-7) with that of the Psalmists (Pss. 8,136,104) who 
praise and marvel at creation. 
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In his advice for religious life In Qoh. 4: 17-5: 6, Qoheleth's 
religious (cultic) language demonstrates his familiarity with the 
characteristics of worship, i. e. sacrifices and vows in ancient 
Israel (as well as the ancient Near East). They also reveal that he 
might have been deliberately leaving out the name of Yahweh in his 
close quotation from Deuteronomy 23: 22-24 (Evv. 21-23) In Qoh. 5: 3- 
5 (Evv. 4-6); especially when quoting Deut. 23: 22a (Ev. 21a), "-'7 
ýj'i172t illjl'7 Ti) 7-h (When you vow a vow to the Lord your Cod), " in v vý Y. 
Qoh. 5: 3a (Ev. 4a), "d'iftO 'I'll 111-1 'V ZO (When you vow a vow to ir V. I. 
God). " His use of other religious language includes, 'the house of 
God' (4: 17) and 'the holy place' (8: 10) where he discusses his 
observations on the relation between act and consequence. 
It is also a characteristic of Qoheleth to assign different 
meanings to the same word at different context. The rare word 113017 
(devices) in Qoh. 7: 29 and the ambiguous term 4711 in 3: 11, together 
with a handful of other words with multiple meanings, 1. e. 7TiT 
(absurd, emphemeral), fl77 (toil, activity), strongly suggest a play 
on the different meanings of the words by Qoheleth to achieve 
ambiguity for its own aims. 
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3. Social Justice and Reality 
Social justice has been recognized to be a common theme in 
ancient Near Eastern wisdom literature and is deeply rooted in its 
mythology. 
88 Though the Hebrew notion of justice has reference to a 
specific mode of life lived by Yahweh worshippers as seen in the 
67Ruth Page has formulated an interesting theological framework 
under the title Ambiguity and the Presence of God (London: SCM 
Press, 1985). With support from Ecclesiastes, she argues that "in 
an ambiguous world some action is unavoidable and even desirable, 
and that although it is finite it can be worthwhile" (p. 23f. ). 
68 Leon Epsztein, "Social Justice, " pp. 3-42. 
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Mosaic and Prophetic traditions, Qoheleth's concept of justice is 
neither related to mythology nor framed in the Yahwistic context. 
His understanding of social justice is formulated through his 
observations on human activity. He acknowledges what he has observ- 
ed regarding justice and injustice as mere fact In life's reality. 
This acknowledgement becomes the necessary data In the formulation 
of his theological thought, as his approach to reality in daily 
human experience. 
In Qoh. 4: 1-3. after expressing emotionally his concern for 
those who are being oppressed, Qoheleth merely goes on to accept 
the fate of the oppressed and praises those who do not have to 
learn of social evil. He does not condemn the injustice as the 
prophets do, neither does he try to make straight what is crooked 
(Qoh. 1: 15; 7: 13). But his philosophy of life is far from being one 
of resignation or pessimism. Instead, he urges those who are young 
to treasure their opportunity to enjoy life all they can; that is a 
gift of God who has approved it (Qoh. 2: 24a; 3: 12; 3: 22a; 5: 17-18; 
8: 15a; 9: 7-9; 11: 7-12: 1). 
Although Qoheleth realizes that God is the one who determines 
who gets what and when, he observes that there is no observable 
pattern or guideline in God's activity, it is hidden away from 
humankind (11: 5). Seeing no relationship between act and conse- 
quence, Qoheleth's notion of justice does not conform to Yahwism in 
either the Mosaic or prophetic traditions, especially in their 
concept of reward and retribution. Although he seems to suggest a 
different ethical approach to life that is based on the principles 
of fearing God, staying alive (7: 16-18; 8: 12-13), and enjoying life 
(11: 9), that is not in contradiction with Yahwism nor does it 
merely follow the 'golden mean' principle of Hellenistic thought. 
By advising one to fear God, stay alive and enjoy life, he is 
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encouraging positive action in human activity despite life's 
reality in the unjust social world. 
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4. The Arbitrariness of God's Activities 
The activity of God, according to Qoheleth, seems arbitrary 
because it shows no observable pattern or guideline that explains 
act and consequence. His actions are inscrutable even to faithful 
Yahwists who claim according to their Yahwism to know God. But in 
opposing traditional Yahwism Qoheleth is not saying that there is 
no God or 'God is Dead'. Instead, he affirms that God is at work 
(Qoh. 3: 11; 7: 14) and is actively involved, for example, in the 
giving and taking of wealth (5: 19; 6: 2) according to his own will 
in the arena of human activity (cf. Qoh. 2: 24-26; 5: 18-20; 6: 2a). 
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But humankind cannot know or find out how or when God gives and 
takes (8: 17; 11: 5). The hiddenness of God expressed in Qoheleth is 
a far more concrete fact than the temporary emotional expression of 
the prophets, for example, Isaiah, in Isa. 8: 17, "Yahweh concealed 
his face, " or Deutero-Isaiah In Isa. 45: 15, "Truly, thou art a God 
who hidest thyself. " It satisfies Qoheleth to bow before the 
'mighty one' (Qoh. 3: 14; 6: 10; 7: 13-14) and to advise others to 
fear God with a hope that one will be blessed (7: 26b; 8: 12-13), 
though no one knows how or when. 
69Ruth Page has an interesting thesis in Ambiguity and the 
Presence of God, p. 24, where she argues that "action is unavoid- 
able and even desirable as response to the exigencies of life in a 
mutable, malleable and ambiguous world. " 
70According to J. J. Dreese's analysis, of the 30 occurrences of 
God as the subject of a verb in Qoheleth (1: 13; 2: 26(2x); 3: 10, 
11(3x), 14(2x), 15,17(2x, read sam for sham), 18; 5: 5(2x), 17,18(2x), 
19; 6: 2(2x); 7: 13,14,29; 8: 15; 9: 7; 11: 5,9; 12: 7,14] the verbal 
root Ri) (to give) occurs ten times and the root jTtll) (do) seven 
times. 
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5. His Concept of Joy 
Qoheleth's concept of joy is mostly ignored by the Torah where 
`law' has been the centre of Yahwism. The noun 1? 111 (mirth, joy) 
occurs 94 times in the Hebrew Bible but only 3 times in the Torah 
(Gen. 31: 27; Deut. 28: 47; Num. 10: 10) . The verb TTt]t1 occurs 11 t Imes 
in the Torah out of 154 occurrences and 11 ? 3t? only once in Deut. 
16: 15 out of 21 occurrences in the Old Testament. 
Although it is not certain if Qoheleth had Num. 10: 10 In mind, 
Qoh. 5: 18-19, "For he will not much remember the days of his life 
because God keeps him occupied with joy in his heart" (5: 19), 
certainly modifies the idea of remembrance as it relates to boy in 
Num. 10: 10, "On the days of your gladness (1=1110t? ) ... you shall 
blow the trumpets over your burnt offerings and over the sacrifices 
of your peace offerings; they shall serve you for remembrance 
before your God: I am the Lord your God. " 
Similarly, Qoheleth's concept of sinner, as Gordis puts it, "a 
sinner is he who fails to work for the advancement of his own 
happiness, "71 is a twisted version of Deut. 28: 47, that one would 
deserve punishment if one "did not serve the Lord your God with 
joyfulness and gladness of heart. " Although pleasing God by obser- 
ving the Mosaic law code has always been the ultimate goal of the 
Yahwist, Qoheleth challenges such understanding by commanding one 
to seek enjoyment in life as one's life goal because enjoying life 
is doing the will of God (Qoh. 9: 7). That is a challenge rather 
than a antithesis to Yahwism. 
However, it would be an affront to Qoheleth's wisdom if one 
thought of him as a hedonist. Qoheleth's encouragement to enjoy 
life is conditioned by responsibility in one's action to seek 
71R. Gordis, Koheleth, p. 91. 
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enjoyment because God will judge (Qoh. 2: 26b; 11: 9; 12: 14). Here 
Qoheleth again twists the idea of judgment in Deut. 28: 47 to suit 
his concept of joy. 
6. His Concept of Wisdom and Wealth 
Qoheleth's concept of wisdom is most interesting due to his 
honesty and bluntness in admitting the vulnerability of wisdom 
(9: 18b) which other wisdom conventions dare not admit (cf. Prov. 
15: 33). He exhibits a similar attitude towards wealth, 'the protec- 
tion of wisdom is like the protection of money' (7: 12; cf. Prov. 
16: 16) and 'money answers everything' (10: 19) a position which 
makes him different from other biblical wisdom thought (cf. Prov. 
23: 4,5). 
7. His Concepts of Profit and Portion 
These two concepts are rarely touched by Yahwism perhaps due to 
the concept of Yahweh's ownership as creator. As the two concepts 
are rooted in the commercial world, it is not difficult to perceive 
why the commercial interest among post-exilic Jews had been a 
challenge to the post-exilic prophets and the great conservative 
Yahwist Ezra. The accumulation of wealth as the main activity among 
the post-exilic Jews was interpreted by the prophets as a challenge 
to Yahweh's ownership and providence (cf. Haggai and Malachi). But 
Qoheleth's search for enduring profit is something new not only to 
Yahwism, but also to the post-exilic Jews who indulged in material 
wealth. The conclusion that human activity has no enduring profit 
and therefore is absurd would certainly provoke strong protest from 
the commercially minded Yahwist and non-Yahwist alike. However, the 
acknowledgement of a portion in human activity as God's gift to 
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humankind in their activity may be seen as a compromise with the 
Yahwist's work ethic (cf. Exod. 19: 9). 
S. Conclusion 
The theological perspectives of Qoheleth as analysed above 
demonstrated that Qoheleth is not a hardline conservative Yahwist, 
nor yet a radical anti-Yahwist. Qoheleth's theological perspective, 
though reflecting a knowledge of Yahwism, is faithful to the reali- 
ty of the daily experience of most Israelites. He never attempts to 
be dogmatic with his theology, like a hardline conservative Yahwist 
such as Ezra. His theology is unique and personal. It touches tan- 
gentially on the Yahwistic faith, yet does not totally rebel 
against or conform to it. His theology has distanced Itself from 
both the Yahwistic circle and the non-Yahwistic circle. His faith- 
fulness to his observations and experiences of life, and his 
studying of various wisdom and religious ideas (cf. 12: 9), prompted 
him to formulate or reformulate his theological thought as well as 
positions on religious and social issues. In this moment of formu- 
lation or transition, his theology is a kind of 'liminal' theology. 
With this kind of unconventional theological thought, where does 
Qoheleth stand in Israel's society? 
Davidson calls Qoheleth a radical conservative. 72 Whybray73 argues 
that Qoheleth, though living in the Hellenistic world and well 
aware of Hellenistic philosophical thought, is nevertheless a radi- 
cal Jewish wisdom thinker, rather than an importer of foreign con- 
cepts. Identifying Qoheleth's thought within the background of 
72R. Davidson, Courage to Doubt, pp. 184-202; cf. R. Gordis, 
"Its Religious Vocabulary, " in Koheleth, pp. 87-94. 
73R. N. Whybray, "Conservatisme et radicalisme dans Qohelet, " p. 
81. 
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Palestinian Hellenism of the third century when the process of 
amalgamation between various social cultures and religions was 
taking place, Moller argues that Qoheleth's "social location is to 
be found in a displaced Upper Class which was deprived of its power 
by the Diadocht and their collaborators. "74 I would propose that 
Qoheleth is a 'liminal intellectual', one who is temporarily 
detached from his previous attachment and has not yet found a 
settlement. He is in between, perhaps going through a transition. 
E. OOHELETH'S POSITION WITHIN ISRAEL'S SOCIETY? 
Where does Qoheleth stand in the social and religious world of 
Israel? Von Rad labels Qoheleth as one who pitched his camp on "the 
farthest frontiers of Yahwism. " 75 But how was Yahwism represented in 
Israelite society? The concept that Israel is a monolithically 
Yahwistic society has been challenged by Morton Smith who argues 
that there were two parties in post-exilic Palestine: the 'Yahweh- 
alone' party and the syncretistic cult of Yahweh. He outlines the 
post-exilic history briefly as follow: 
The Assyrian and Babylonian conquests put an end to the royal 
patronage of the cult of Yahweh but the popular, sycretistic 
piety on the one hand, and the exclusive devotion of the Yahweh- 
alone party on the other, continued and extended the cult. 
Accordingly, there were two phases of the extension. On the one 
hand, the syncretistic form of the cult was spread widely by 
Israelite deportation and/or emigration from the eighth century 
on, and evidently secured considerable adherence from gentiles 
.... On the other hand, the leaders of Yahweh-alone party seem 
to have been mostly carried off to Babylonia. There the party 
secured a strong and wealthy following among the exiles. At the 
time of the Persian conquest, it supported the Persians and 
thereafter succeeded in placing some of its members in high 
positions in the Persian court. With Persian support it eventu- 
ally gained control of the rebuilt Jerusalem temple and then won 
over the populace, first of Jerusalem, later of Judea. This made 
it the largest and politically the most important group within 
74H. 
-P. Müller, "Neige der althebräischen 'Weisheit', " p. 263. 
7 G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, p. 458. 
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the cult of Yahweh. ... Consequently, the adherents of the old, 
popular form of the cult gradually assimilated their claims and 
practice to those of Jerusalem, and in effect were converted to 
the Yahweh-alone position. This process is traceable in Pales- 
tine before the Maccabean period. It was enormously accelerated, 
both in Palestine and abroad, by the success of the Maccabees 
If Morton Smith is correct in depicting post-exilic Israelite 
society as religiously pluralistic society which mainly consist of 
two groups, with the Yahweh-alone party being the dominant one, 
then the conversion of members of the minority cult into the 
politically powerful 'Yahweh-alone' party was almost unavoidable. 
Thus, the crossing of individuals between 'religious camps' for 
various political, religious or social reasons is not impossible, 
and most probably it characterizes the social-religious situation 
of Qoheleth's time. 
By pitching his camp at the farthest frontiers of Yahwism, is 
Qoheleth in the process of transferring himself to another camp- 
ground (i. e. from being a non-Yahwist to a Yahwist? ) or was he 
awaiting to be received and regrouped with the Yahwistic group? Or 
would he remain to be what he was, a 'liminal' Intellectual? 
Indeed, it is probable that Qoheleth's theology reflects a thought 
process which has either gradually distanced him from Yahwism if he 
was originally a Yahwist, or gradually coming to term with Yahwism 
if he was originally a non-Yahwist. 
As 'wisdom' is known to be a movement, rather than a static 
phenomena, and if the canonical and the non-canonical wisdom books 
form some kind of development, Qoheleth stands right in between 
them. It may not be difficult to conceive that if Qoheleth were a 
little more to the left, he might be out of the canon, and if he 
76Morton Smith, Palestinian Parties and Politics That Shaped the 
Old Testament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 83. 
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were a little more right, he may have already enjoyed a position 
better than his present one in the canon. 
Thus, it is probable that Qoheleth was going through a period of 
transition. This transitional period is identified by the modern 
social anthropological term 'liminality'. If 'liminality' char- 
acterizes Qoheleth's situation, could Qoheleth then be a 'liminar' 
or 'liminal intellectual' who practices a 'liminal' theology? 
1. `Liminality' as a Social Setting 
The term '11minal' from Latin limen, meaning 'threshold' or 
'borderline' was first used by the sociologist Arnold Van Gennep in 
The Rites of Passage, where he defines 'liminality' as "a place and 
moment in life-crisis rituals of preindustrial societies. " 
77 Later 
it was adopted by Victor Turner who used it to "designate the gene- 
rative quality which lends motion to a society, forcing it out of a 
rigid system and into flowing process. " 
78 According to Van Gennep's 
study of ritual process, it consists of three stages: "1) separa- 
tion (pre-liminal), 2) transition (liminal), and 3) incorporation 
(post-liminal). "79 The first stage is a time of detachment of an 
individual or group from a fixed social structure and all prior 
cultural conditions. In the second phase, liminality is the social 
77Arnold 
van Genpep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), p. 11; Ronald L. Grimes, "Ritual Studies: A 
Comparative Review of Theodor Gaster and Victor Turner, " in RSR 2 
(1976): 13-25 (19). 
78Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Struc- 
ture (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 95; Ronald L. 
Grimes, op. cit., p. 20; L. G. Perdue, "Liminality as a Social 
Setting for Wisdom Instructions, " ZAW 93 (1981): 114-26. 
79In his studies of "Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and 
Ritual: An Essay in Comparative Symbology, " Rice University Studies 
60 (1974), p. 65, Victor Turner takes this concept of liminality 
further to include post-industrial, non-ritual phenomena and he 
coins the term `liminold' applying it to functional equivalents, 
e. g. hippies, artists, pilgrims; cf. Grimes, op. cit., p. 20. 
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setting for the detached group or individual, in which there may be 
few or none of the previous cultural elements and at this stage, 
anti-structure emerges. Finally, when the transition is over, the 
group or individual is reincorporated into the social structure 
with a new position that calls for new behaviour based on the new 
norms. 
Without going too much into the sociologist's arena, but with 
serious consideration given to Smith's historical outline of the 
post-exilic Palestinian social-religious situation, I assume the 
possibility of such social processes in post-exilic Isarel, If not 
in the Hellenistic world generally. The question thus remains, will 
Qoheleth fit into such liminality as a social setting? 
2. Qoheleth as a 'Liminal Intellectual' 
The social background of the wise has been a controversial 
matter. There are a host of opinions among wisdom scholars concern- 
ing who the wise are and the social settings in which they practice 
their wisdom. There are basically six possibilities concerning 
their social status. The most frequent suggestions are 'upper- 
class' or 'landed nobility'80, 'statesmen'81, 'governmental offi- 
80Robert Gordis, "The Social Background of Wisdom Literature, " in 
Poets, Prophets, and Sages (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1971), pp. 160-197 (187f. ), "Their [Proverbs, Agur ben Yakeh, Ben 
Sira, Job and Koheleth] political and social view-points, like 
their religious and moral conceptions, reflect an upper-class 
orientation. "; H. -P. Müller, "Neige der althebräischen 'Weisheit', " 
p. 263. 
81William McKane, Prophets and Wise Men (London: SCM Press, 
1965). 
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cials'82, 'teachers' in either court or temple schools 
83, 'scribes'84 
and 'intellectuals'8S. Concerning their social setting, there are 
four major proposals: 1) the family/clan/tribe (Sippenweisheit)88, 
2) the court/royal court; 87,3) the school (court-and/or temple)88, 
and 4) the 'intellectual tradition'89. According to Cottwald, 9° the 
social setting of Isarelite wisdom went through a historical devel- 
opment, though his historical reconstruction is inconclusive. 
While Qoheleth may reflect some aspects from several of the 
above categories of social status, he cannot be placed squarely 
within any of the suggested social settings. There has been specu- 
lation that Qoheleth is a royal court sage, on the ground of his 
'royal' language and his attempt to be identified with King Solo- 
mon. But his discontent over the issue of the social Injustice 
perpetrated by the powerful would tie d, Rocult fv, h. m +o remain as 
a royal court sage. In view of his use of language, his epistemology, 
his sy mpAy for the poor and oppressed, his recurring phrases and 
82B. Kovacs, "Is there a Class-Ethic in Proverbs?, " in Essays in 
Old Testament Ethics, ed. by J. L. Crenshaw and J. Willis (New York: 
KTAV, 1974), pp. 171-190 (186), "Court and king sayings, instruc- 
tion and discipline, an ethic of restraint, observance of proprie- 
ties, and a system of authority suggest a professional ethic of 
adminstrators or officials. " 
ß3H. 
-J. Hermisson, Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit 
(WMANT 28; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirche-ner Verlag, 1968), pp. 96ff. 
84M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972). 
85R. N. Whybray, Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament (BZAW 
135; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1974). 
esE. Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft des 'apodiktischen Rechts' 
(WMANT 20; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965), pp. 110f. 
87W. Richter, Recht und Ethos: Versuch einer Ortund des weisheit- 
lichen Mahnspruches (Studien zum Alten und Neuen Testament 15; 
Munich: Kösel, 1966). pp. 110f. 
e8H. 
-J. Hermisson, op. cit., pp. 96ff. 
89R. N. Whybray, op. cit. 
90 Norman K. Gottwald, The Hebrew Bible: A Socio-Literary Intro- 
duction (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 567-71. 
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themes, and the conclusion to his book, he represents a unique 
class of sage and 'tradition'. He and his followers might be clas- 
sified best as 'liminal' Intellectuals, though this may not be a 
formalized and static class of sages. They may have detached them- 
selves from the higher learned societies of sages of Yahwism who 
may not have known much about the realities of life or who may have 
only known how to defend 'authentic' Yahwism such as the three 
friends of Job. It Is also probable that they may be detaching 
themselves from the syncretistic cult and in the porcess of 
crossing over to the Yahweh-alone community. Thus, they may be 
going through a period of transition to reformulate their wisdom as 
a new breed of tradition, perhaps, incorporating a few of their 
previous cultural elements. Since Qoheleth has no parallel among 
the biblical sages, it is not inappropriate to classify him as a 
'liminal' Intellectual. 
F. YMWISM AND SYNCRETISM IN ISRAEL 
Having proposed that Qoheleth is a 'liminal' intellectual and 
that his theology is a form of 'liminal' theology, the following 
will attempt to provide an historical setting for such phenomena 
with a brief sketch of the formulation and transformation of 
Yahwism in Israelite society. 
1. From Conquest to Exile 
Since entering the land of Canaan at the time of Joshua's 
conquest, Israelites faced a severe threat of syncretism. As is 
evident from the book of Judges, Yahwism had become syncretistic. 
Throughout the monarchical period, although David was generally 
faithful to Yahwistic monotheism, Solomon was not able to maintain 
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this towards the end of his reign, possibly as a result of his 
commercial expansion. The beginning of the divided monarchy marks 
the beginning of a new political era as well as an official syncre- 
tistic cult, especially to the Northern kingdom of Israel. The 
syncretistic faith of the Northern kingdom prospers under various 
Israelite kings; such as Jeroboam I (1 Kgs. 11: 26-14: 19; 2 Chron. 
10,13), Ahab (1 Kgs. 16: 19-22: 40) and Jeroboam II (2 Kgs. 14: 23- 
29), until the coming of the war-machine of Assyria. The prophets, 
such as Hosea, who call on Israel to turn away from sycretistic 
faith and return to authentic Yahwism Call in vain. On the other 
hand, in the Southern kingdom, despite the emphasis of the prophe- 
tic oracles on the return to monotheistic Yahwism from syncretism, 
the effect of Josiah's reform did not last for more than half a 
century. The oracles of Jeremiah and Ezekiel are witnesses to the 
corruption of Judah's mo4heistic faith. Yahwism was at its lowest 
point with the destruction of Jerusalem and the deportation of the 
people of Judah under the lordship of Babylonians. 
The effects of the deportation and importation of people to and 
from Palestine by the Assyrians and Babylonians have proven to be 
so great that some historians believe that Palestine was full of 
ethnically heterogeneous groups. 
91 Obviously with the two-way flow 
of emigrants, there is bound to be an active interchange of 
religious and cultural matters and thus the society was constantly 
in a state of flux or processual state. 
91 Morton Smith, op. cit., pp. 82-98; Bustenay Oded, Mass Deporta- 
tions and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire (Wiesbaden: Dr. 
Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1979), pp. 75-115. 
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2. The Exilic Period 
The criticisms of the two prophets, Ezekiel and Zechariah, 
representing the periods-of exile and return, witnessed to the 
existence of syncretistic beliefs among the Israelites in Pales- 
tine. Upon returning to Palestine, Ezra and Nehemiah were lone 
Yahwists among a people of syncretistic faith, as reflected in the 
social issue of inter-marriage. However, due to their strong 
political position and wealth, they were able to influence and 
convert Palestinian Jews of syncretistic cult into their reformed 
monotheistic Yahwism. The returnees were mostly the upper-class 
wealthy people compared with the poor who remained in Palestine. 
Though the purity reforms of Ezra gained support in Palestine, 
syncretism remained, though in the minority. The denunciations of 
the post-exilic prophets and the social unrest in Palestine at the 
time of Nehemiah also suggest a mixture of ethnic groups with 
different sets of religious and social-ethical norms within the 
Israelite community. 
3. The Post-Exilic Period 
According to Morton Smith, after the completion of the Jerusalem 
wall, "the Yahweh-alone party no longer formed a distinct social 
class, since Nehemiah consistently writes of the people as a whole 
(contrast the reports from the preceding century in Ezra 1-6). "92 
Though there is a lack of historical material from this period, it 
is not difficult to draw evidence from the Apocrypha and Pseudepi- 
grapha to demonstrate that a diversion from the Yahwism of the 
Deuteronomist or the Chronicler took place. The political unrest 
and the growth of sectarianism during this period of 'prophetic 
92Ibid., 
p. 153. 
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silence' contributed to the fluidity and dynamism of a society's 
processual nature. With the rise of the Graeco-Roman culture on the 
one hand and the fading away of the early post-exilic culture on the 
other, it is no wonder that a sense of lostness is detected in the 
Hebrew sage. 
Although the above is merely a brief sketch of the religio- 
historical situation of the period from the fifth to the first 
century B. C., it is enough to suggest the probable existence of 
liminal intellectuals within the society, and thus to provide a 
plausible social setting for Qoheleth and his unconventional 
theology. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Although I will not go as far as Mendenhall or Preuss in seeing 
an antithesis between wisdom and creation, neither will I postulate 
that in Qoheleth wisdom theology is creation theology. Instead, I 
have argued that regardless of how well the statement 'wisdom 
theology is creation theology' holds for Old Testament wisdom 
literature in general, it is certainly not the theology of Qohe- 
leth in which creation is at the most marginal. The theology of 
Qoheleth is neither a theology of creation nor a hardline conserva- 
tive Yahwist nor an anti-Yahwistic theology. It is a '11minal' 
theology created by a 'liminal intellectual'. 'Liminal' In the 
sense of 'threshold' or 'borderline' perhaps best describes Qohe- 
leth, as one who is going through a transition from a former social 
status or religious conviction to another. 
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SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
As each section and chapter of this thesis has its own conclu- 
sion and summary, this conclusion will not be extensive. 
Although there is no conclusive evidence to support a claim for 
a logical development within the literary structure of the book, 
the book of Qoheleth is essentially a unity. The unity exists not 
only within individual pericopes, but also between them. Pericopes 
are related to each other by various themes, such as, hebel, joy, 
profit, portion, wisdom, wealth, remembrance, life, death, etc. An 
analysis of the literary structure of the book in Chapter One has 
successfully identified various pericopes and their respective 
themes. 
The contents of these pericopes were further analysed in Chapter 
Two in order to delineate the structure of Qoheleth's thought. My 
analysis of the thought of Qoheleth has shown that it has a 
structure. This structure consists of two primary concepts and 
numerous secondary ideas. The two primary concepts are: hebel OTT) 
and joy (i t]LJ); secondary ideas include, wisdom, wealth, profit, 
portion, life, death, etc. Together they form the total structure 
of Qoheleth's thought. The two primary concepts not only make sense 
of Qoheleth's thought, but also bind various pericopes together to 
form a unity. 
Also, I have argued in Chapter Two that the two primary concepts 
do not contradict each other, nor do they repel each other. Instead 
of one being set above the other, they are equals co-existing and 
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complementing each other as parallel elements of Qoheleth's 
thought. Through the concept of hebel, Qoheleth argued that life is 
full of the reality of the absurd when human activity does not lead 
to the expected effect, and also when an act has little or no 
relationship to its consequence. Qoheleth argued that activity 
(i. e. the test of mirth, cf. 2: 1-11) without any 'enduring profit' 
(117f1') is absurd, and similarly activity (i. e. accumulating 
wealth, cf. 4: 7-8; 6: 2-3) without enjoyment or activity (i. e. being 
righteous or wise, cf. 2: 13ff.; 3: 16ff.; 4: 1-3) which receives the 
undeserved or the unexpected. Although Qoheleth argued that human 
life is full of absurdity, life is meant to be enjoyed as a gift 
from God (cf. the passages on joy). Thus, Qoheleth consistently 
argued that one should find enjoyment in one's life because God has 
approved it. He even commanded one to enjoy life while in one's 
youth because of the certainty and inescapability of death which 
might come at the most unexpected moment (cf. 11: 7-12: 7). 
After the analysis of the structure of Qoheleth's thought, I 
provided a reading of the book, analysing its argument as it 
develops. This is by no means arguing for a logical development 
within the structure of the book. Rather, this was a reading of 
Qoheleth's thought in its sequential unfolding accordng to the flow 
of the book. The reading draws on the previous analyses of the 
literary structure of the book (Chapter One) and the structure of 
Qoheleth's thought (Chapter Two). 
Having understood Qoheleth's theological thought, I proceeded to 
analyse in Chapter Four the position of Qoheleth's thought within 
Israel's theology. As Israel's theology is commonly represented as 
Yahwism or Yahwistic belief, I have analysed the relationship of 
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wisdom to Yahwism generally, and to creation theology in 
particular. As was argued in Chapter Four, Qoheleth's theological 
thought is not compatible with the usual scholarly understanding 
that wisdom theology is creation theology. Qoheleth's theology, 
although reflecting elements of Yahwism, cannot be taken as 
Yahwistic theology. However, there is also no evidence that 
Qoheleth's theological thought is anti-Yahwistic. 
Being unconventional, Qoheleth's theological thought is best 
identified as a 'liminal' theology, with 'liminality' as its social 
setting. Thus, Qoheleth may be seen as a 'liminal Intellectual', 
one who has temporarily detached himself from his previous social, 
economic, political and/or religious attachment and is in a process 
of being reincorporated into a new environment. As the syncretistic 
cult of Yahweh and the Yahweh-alone party had been neighbours for a 
long time in Israel, the possibility of Israelites crossing between 
the two 'camps' was likely. This would provide a possible social, 
economic, political and religious setting for our 'liminal 
intellectual'. 
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